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Abstract: Written under the double heading The Paradox of Sense, or on the Event of Thought, 
this dissertation is a study of the doubled pathway of articulation in Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy. 
With the repetition of the heading, we want to suggest that, in fact, these two pathways unfold 
with respect to the same Event. The question which way do we turn, away or towards the virtual, 
is equivalent to the question, what difference is there. The double pathway defines the central 
problematic of this dissertation: in the first place, the line of articulation leads to the expression 
of sense in the proposition, meanwhile with the repetition of difference, another pathway of 
articulation is retraced that revolves around speaking the event. With the event the question 
becomes: What does it mean to speak the event once beings are taken to be events?  
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Etherror by Viktor Timofeev 
Introduction 
  
The Question of Sense 
  
What if there were no sense […] other than the sense that is lost, the pre-sense that is 
found always already before us? [...] It is always too late for the question of sense, 
too late or too soon, it comes down to the same.
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
Written under the double heading The Paradox of Sense, or on the Event of Thought, this 
dissertation is a study of what we call the doubled pathway of articulation in Gilles Deleuze’s 
philosophy. With the repetition of the heading, we want to suggest that, in fact, these two 
pathways unfold with respect to the same Event. Being occasioned by one and the same Event, 
the two pathways are encompassed in the same problematic repeated in the heading. This 
problematic corresponds to a central question, which is: How does something new become 
expressed of beings? At its core, this question is essentially an ethical one: What does it mean to 
speak “for” another?2 Such a question is just as much about who speaks, as it is about what is 
spoken of. Deleuze’s attitude on the formulation of questions is clear in Dialogues (2007):    
Questions are invented, like anything else. If you aren’t allowed to invent your 
questions with elements from all over the place, from never mind where, if people 
‘pose’ them to you, you haven’t much to say. [From questions grows] the art of 
constructing a problem, a problem position, before finding a solution.
3
  
 
It is fitting then that we pose our question in a somewhat unfamiliar fashion than the way in 
which inquiries directed at Deleuze’s philosophy are usually formed. In this study, we do not 
promise to resolve this question. Instead, we intend to pursue the problem that lends its sense to 
it: the condition in light of which something new is said of beings.
4
 For Deleuze, questions are 
defined by a twofold reference that preserves their openness. They are “aimed at a future (or a 
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past),” or both times simultaneously.5 The question seeks after the condition, and the condition in 
the mode of the problematic lends its sense to it.  
When asking how the new is said of another, we are inquiring after the genesis of the 
ground of beings, on the basis of which something meaningful can be said of them. Broadly 
speaking, there are two ways in which this meaning has been approached. The dividing line is 
between those who interpret sense
6
 as abiding with models of recognition, and those who 
determine sense as co-present to paradox. Deleuze’s paradoxical constitution of sense renders the 
new something untimely, the always new in being, which not only makes it impossible that we 
treat it as an instance of signification, but also that in relation to paradox, it is the instance that 
displaces identification. The power of paradox has been long affirmed.
7
 According to Deleuze, 
paradoxes are 
recreational only when they are considered as initiatives of thought. They are not 
recreational when they are considered as ‘the Passion of thought,’ or as discovering 
what can only be thought, what can only be spoken, despite the fact that it is both 
ineffable and unthinkable—a mental Void.8  
 
Emerging with the groundlessness that raises the ground, paradox involves having to speak 
without having the tongue to do so, having to think without having an image to approximate.
9
 
Our doubled heading, hence, inquires after the same instance; thought appropriated to paradox, 
the unformed, is the Event of thought. In the constitution of sense, paradox is the affirmation of 
the movement of sense in two directions simultaneously. It generates the unlimited becoming of 
events in the reversible directions of the past and the future at the same time, all the while 
eluding the present. Deleuze’s argument is that, in affirming the becoming of events, paradox 
deposes recognition in two ways: “paradox is initially that which destroys good sense as the only 
direction, but it is also that which destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed 
identities.”10 The two aspects of doxa are themselves related to the doubled directionality of 
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events. The event expresses itself or is the expressed that subsists in actual expressions, meaning 
that it becomes possible to grasp it as moving in one direction only. Deleuze writes that “good 
sense is said of one direction only: it is the unique sense and expresses the demand of an order 
according to which it is necessary to choose one direction and hold on to it.”11 The idea that 
sense moves in one direction, pertains to the attribution of sense to the object; it is the 
determination of the object as coinciding with its supposed identity. In the other direction, we do 
not have the paradoxical instance that fractures the subject position, thereby giving way to the 
new, to the passion of thought, but the correlation of good sense with the model of recognition. 
Deleuze claims that “in common sense, sense is no longer said of a direction, but of an organ. It 
is called ‘common,’ because it is an organ, a function, a faculty of identification that brings 
diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same.”12 The crowning achievement of 
philosophies of representation is common sense, because it enables the abstraction of sense in the 
form of signification, which is thereafter deployed as a determining instance of an unspecified 
object.
13
 On both sides of the frontier, sense merely reinforces orthodoxy. Hereafter, “it matters 
little whether philosophy begins with the object or the subject, with Being or with beings, as long 
as thought remains subject to this Image which already prejudices everything.”14 Bound by this 
image, philosophy is incapable of overturning doxa, or contributing to the endeavour of bringing 
the new to beings. Deleuze asks, “what is the fate of philosophy which knows well that it would 
not be philosophy if did not, at least provisionally, break with the particular contents and 
modalities of doxa?”15 
 In contrast to philosophies built on modes of recognition, Deleuze conceives of sense as an 
unlimited becoming, so as to articulate something excessive that belongs to the ideal stratum of 
its constitution. In The Logic of Sense (1969), he argues that the event “implies something 
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excessive in relation to its actualization,” something that overthrows the worlds, individuals, and 
persons, in which the event is becoming actualized.
16
 In his other key text, Difference and 
Repetition (1968), in which sense is approached as Idea, he writes that “there is an excess and an 
exaggeration peculiar to Ideas which makes difference and repetition the combined object, the 
‘simultaneous’ of the Idea.”17 Why argue that there is something excessive about the ideal 
stratum of sense? While this question can be taken up in a variety of ways, for us, it is a question 
of the becoming of beings, of the differential relation of beings, which renders sense something 
excessive with respect to the actual terms of any relation. To begin with, Deleuze argues that this 
becoming does not mean that one term “becomes the other, but each encounters the other, a 
single becoming which is not common to the two, since they have nothing to do with one 
another, but which is between the two, which has its own direction, a block of becoming, an a-
parallel evolution.”18 What he calls a singular becoming is the ideal stratum consisting of a 
combinatory of events that determine a differential relation, or better yet, such events are the 
differentiations that make the relation a block of becoming. The premise that underlies this claim 
is that it is never on the basis of a repetition of the Same or the identical that a differential 
relation is composed. Every encounter with a sign
19
 disguises the return, the repetition, of 
difference that transforms the relation as such. We can, then, say that there is something 
excessive about events because the ideal stratum is irreducible to the actual terms, which 
themselves involve asymmetrical modes of becoming with respect to it. The singular becoming 
of beings is not the same as the beings enveloped in the relation.
20
 But this is only because this 
becoming is itself constituted as a function of the paradoxical instance or the Event, which is the 
return of difference. Deleuze’s central thesis in Difference and Repetition that repetition defines 
the theatre of the future, that it should be conceived of as novelty when adequate to difference, is 
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revisited in The Logic of Sense with the double directionality of sense. The paradox of the 
unlimited becoming of event is encapsulated in the idea that the Aion, being the empty form of 
time that makes the difference, renders the event something “always already passed and eternally 
yet to come.”21 In the direction of the past, it is that which selects the ground of events, bringing 
them to a point of actualization in the present, while in the other direction it continues the 
becoming along with the constitution of the differential relation. We refer to the events that 
constitute the becoming as the primary line of articulation in the course of which sense is 
essentially produced as effect. According to Deleuze, the event makes language possible because 
it is “endlessly born in the future direction of the Aion where it is established, and somehow, 
anticipated; and although it must also say the past, it says it as the past of the states of affairs, 
which go on appearing and disappearing in the other direction.”22 The principal saying, then, 
revolves around sense becoming expressed or explicated in the present. Thus far, we have 
referred to event and sense interchangeably because, for Deleuze, they are indeed the same thing, 
“except that [with the primary line of articulation] sense is related to the proposition.”23 This 
relation of sense to the proposition marks the passage of the actualization of sense; it becoming 
expressed in the proposition and attributed to an actual being. With respect to this pathway of 
articulation, the ideal stratum of sense is that line or complex of determining events that serves as 
the frontier of propositions and states of affairs. It severs the event on the whole from corporeal 
content, so as to render it expressible as such. This same frontier perpetually displaces the point 
of convergence of content with the propositional mode of expression. This is because sense, as 
the sayable of becoming, is the said of states of affairs.  
 A set of problems arise as consequences of the movement from the principal pathway of 
articulation to the other one in which what is excessive in the Event becomes sayable. Deleuze 
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argues that sense is one of the dimensions of the proposition insofar as it is expressed by it, but 
that it is nevertheless distinct from the propositional mode of expression. Reduced to the 
propositional mode of expression, sense mistakenly becomes interpreted as one and the same 
thing as signification.
24
 For Deleuze, sense cannot be the same as signification as it is located in 
the complex theme or the problem, in relation to which propositions are solutions. It might be 
more adequate to say, then, that sense is the extra-propositional dimension that subsists in the 
proposition as it becomes explicated. Now, there are several delicate issues that arise when we 
force sense to become equivalent to signification in the expression. The leveling of sense to 
signification amounts to the treatment of repetition in the encounter as an object of 
representation. By grasping sense as the identical in light of signification, we inevitably give way 
to what Deleuze calls the “long perversion which places [the problem] under the power of the 
negative.”25 He rightly argues that “it is at the same time and from the same point of view that 
we claim to understand repetition in terms of the Same and explain it in negative fashion.”26 
Where sense is conceived of as signification, it simultaneously gives way to the negative, or, 
conversely, to the analogies of judgment. From this perspective, the philosophy of difference is 
itself sacrificed. The return of difference is not interpreted as the continued becoming of sense, 
as paradox, but as a contradiction that must be overcome in the identity of the concept, or 
subordinated in a so-called higher instance of the act of judgment. With respect to the first we 
have the partitioning of the becoming into two aspects, conceptual difference and difference 
without a concept.
27
 Their dialectical relation is the becoming identical of the concept. In the 
second, we have the subordination of the event to qualities in a slightly different way. Here, the 
organ of recognition works to raise, or rather abstract, the sense to the level of universal 
predicate, whereby it becomes expressed as the identity of the undetermined concept. Thereafter, 
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this sense is the possible that essentially distributes beings, instead of being that which is 
produced with the singular becoming of beings. We agree with Deleuze that these erroneous 
interpretations of the event, nevertheless, arise with the eternal return of difference. In the instant 
of turning or reversal, the return 
gives rise to a certain illusion in which it delights and admires itself, and which it 
employs in order to double its affirmation of that which differs: it produces an image 
of identity as though this were the end of the different. It produces an image of 
resemblance as the external effect of ‘the disparate’. It produces an image of the 
negative as the consequence of what it affirms, the consequence of its own 
affirmation.
28
  
 
While sense is indeed an effect expressed in the propositional mode of expression, it is the 
simulated sense of, what Deleuze sometimes calls, the ontological sense or (quasi)cause.
29
 This 
means that it is produced in light of the paradoxical instance, the unformed, that selects the 
events of a repetition on the basis of the different; a difference that is felt but, nevertheless, 
disguised in the repetition of the past. The turning in the other direction whereby the becoming 
of the event is continued, presents the instance of the doubling of the affirmation of the event on 
the basis of the different. In Deleuze’s philosophy, this second affirmation is the affirmation of 
the eternal return of difference, the being of becoming itself, which is the affirmation of the 
continued becoming of beings. It is an affirmation that is affirmed of all beings. This second 
affirmation not only opens up another line of articulation of that which is excessive in the Event, 
but abolishes the moment of the appropriation of the simulated sense in signification. With this 
paradoxical Event, we have the birth of the actor that “neither allows [themselves] to be 
represented nor wishes to represent anything.”30 Instead, the articulation of that which is 
excessive in the event comes down to articulating others as events, whereby new modes of 
existence becomes possible. Repetition adequate to difference opens up the future of the act of 
thought.  
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  The problematic we are dealing with under the concept of the two pathways of articulation, 
is the fundamental idea propelling Deleuze’s philosophy. From his earliest writings to his latest 
essays, the relationship of the actual and the virtual remained his basic concern. With these lines 
of articulation it is always a question of which way to go, away or towards the virtual. One of the 
lines is the actualization of the virtual, as the actual and the virtual enter into what Bergson called 
the tightest circuit. The other line presents that which is excessive in the event, it need not be 
actualized or could not be actualized as such. It instead counter-actualizes the event. With the 
relationship of these two lines, we find the intersections of what Deleuze and Guattari understand 
in What is Philosophy? (1994) as the respective tasks of science, philosophy, and, the arts. If we 
follow the principal line of articulation in which the problem is explicated in the domain of 
solutions, we find the juncture where the task of philosophy and science intersect. If we turn to 
the other, it becomes a question of what it means to embody the event, as artistic creation does, 
or to speak the event in concepts, as philosophy aims to do. In recent years, there has been a 
growing interest in Deleuze’s philosophy of the event. We are aware of four major texts 
published on the theme, Deleuze and Language (2002) by Jean-Jacques Lecercle, The Priority of 
Events: Deleuze’s Logic of Sense (2011) by Sean Bowden, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event 
(2012) by Francois Zourabichvili, and, Deleuze’s Logic of Sense: A Critical Introduction and 
Guide (2008) by James Williams. Deleuze and Language is the first book to exhaustively engage 
with the themes of The Logic of Sense. This dissertation differs from it in many respects, the 
central distinction being that we are not placing the emphasis on Deleuze’s study of language. 
Neither are we interested in engaging with the themes of The Logic of Sense alone, particularly 
the strand of psychoanalysis that runs through that text. The Priority of Events: Deleuze’s Logic 
of Sense, is a study of the a priori genesis of sense, through a reading of the central figures and 
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philosophical approaches that influence Deleuze’s theory of sense. While this text is a helpful 
tool for anyone seeking to understand some of the key concepts in The Logic of Sense, the 
inquiry that underpins it is not similar to our own. We find greater affinity with Zourabichvili’s 
text, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event, in which he places the emphasis on the event as an 
encounter with a sign that forces thought. While we commend Zourabichvili in having delineated 
how the differential relation unfolding in time involves the univocal sense of being in the 
becoming of beings, our problem with the text is that it does not deal with what Deleuze calls the 
simulated sense with respect to the univocal being. As a result, the critique of the dogmatic 
image of thought is not oriented enough: How is it directed at our time for the sake of a time to 
come? The central inquiry, broadly structured as the doubled pathway of articulation, produces a 
problem that, at its core, is an ethical one. We know of no other work that expresses this problem 
in quite the same way, or no other that has engaged with the strands of Deleuze’s philosophy 
through the prism of the problem that we formulate in the course of this study.  
 We begin our study with an exploration of the ontology of sense as Deleuze does. The 
introductory chapter involves a review of Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence, which played an 
essential role in Deleuze’s efforts to construct a discourse of being distinct from Hegel’s. The 
question is what sort of logic or discourse of being can realize the doctrine of complete 
immanence. While Hyppolite is convinced that, unlike thinkers before him, Hegel’s dialectic was 
able to effectively realize the doctrine of complete immanence, Deleuze questions whether it “is 
the same thing to say that Being expresses itself and that it contradicts itself.”31 For him, Hegel’s 
contradiction essentially violates the doctrine of complete immanence, because it does not affirm 
the higher instance of difference in which being expresses itself for-itself. Difference is 
subordinated to the concept or sense. His review of that text demonstrates that Deleuze became 
10 
 
interested in a theory of expression that would affirm difference as such. He begins to lay out 
such a theory in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1677). For Deleuze, Spinoza’s Ethics is 
an onto-ethology or a pure ontology as ethics, in which the doctrine of immanence is affirmed. In 
that text, Deleuze develops a new logic of expression, in accordance with which sense becomes 
formulated as the expressed. Although Deleuze does not argue that Spinoza is a philosopher of 
the event, it is clear that Spinoza’s pure immanence in which beings are manners of being as the 
expressed of substance or Being, moves in that direction. Deleuze gathers something essential 
from Spinoza which is repeated in his joint work with Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?:  
Whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to something a confusion of plane and 
concept results so that the concept appears as a transcendent universal and the plane 
becomes an attribute in the concept. When understood in this way, the plane of 
immanence revives the transcendent again.
32
  
 
Spinoza’s pure immanence furthers the philosophy of the event in many ways. When we ask how 
something new is expressed of beings, why the expressed is not the essence of a being, but 
beings taken as events, or how it is that a singular sense is expressible of a becoming that 
implicates beings, Spinoza’s pure immanence comes to mind. While it is true that Spinoza had 
affirmed the univocal being by furthering the doctrine of complete immanence, for Deleuze, 
Nietzsche effectively realizes this doctrine with the eternal return. The tracing of the 
philosophical trajectory that had influenced Deleuze’s theory of sense allows us to formulate our 
central problematic in the latter part of the chapter. We have introduced this problematic here as 
the doubled articulation of the event, as corresponding with the doubled affirmation put forth by 
Nietzsche and taken up by Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962).  
 After having laid out our problem, we return to the doubled articulation in the introduction 
of the second chapter, entitled, “The Virtual and the Actual Object.” To a large degree, this 
chapter deals with the first line of articulation, the relation of sense to the proposition, or the 
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point of intersection of the problem and the domain of solutions. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze 
argues that there are two moments in the history of philosophy when the old metaphysical 
Essences were essentially overthrown. Sense was discovered with Stoic philosophy, and then 
with transcendental philosophy. We begin with Deleuze study of the lekton or legen, the 
incorporeal meaning, in Stoic philosophy. After we have dealt with the Stoic influence, the 
question becomes in what way is sense related to the proposition as its fourth dimension as 
Deleuze seems to think. Part of our analysis of the dimensions of the proposition, denotation, 
signification, manifestation, involves an engagement with theorists that conceive of sense as 
signification and the concept as function, including, Gottlob Frege, and, Bertrand Russell. If 
sense is not signification, if it is not the undetermined concept expressed in the form of the 
function, then, what is it? Deleuze’s central argument in the “Third Series of the Proposition” is 
that none of the other dimensions of the proposition can ground the grounded itself, hence, 
leading to the vicious circle of the dimensions of the proposition. Here, it is not a matter of 
showing how sense works from the outside, but how it is already installed a priori in the 
relations of the proposition as that which produces their vicious circle, all the while displacing it 
or unfolding it from within. This leads us to the second central undertaking of this chapter, which 
is the inquiry into the transcendental itself. What sort of transcendental field is capable of 
expressing Deleuze’s theory of sense, all the while effectively grounding the expression of sense 
in individuals, persons, and classes? The study of the transcendental field allows us to take up 
one of the pressing themes deserving of attention in The Logic of Sense, which is Deleuze’s 
engagement with Husserl. By outlining Husserl’s theory of sense, particularly his two-membered 
predicative process, which, as suggested by the doubling of the process, resonates with our 
central problem, we intend to show the ways in which Deleuze distinguishes himself from that 
12 
 
project. The principal problem, for Deleuze, is that “Husserl does not think about genesis on the 
basis of a paradoxical instance, which properly speaking would be non-identifiable.”33 
 Together with the fourth, the third chapter lays out the pathway of the second articulation 
of the event. This chapter, being written on the syntheses of time, deals with some of the 
essential themes in Difference and Repetition. Our inquiry, which is how the new is expressed of 
beings, requires a close study of Deleuze theory of time, since it is in time that the becoming of 
beings unfolds. There, we intend to follow the thread of time as it is outlined by Deleuze in the 
three syntheses of time, so as to show how they all culminate in one and the same Event. In 
effect, we are repeating the central thesis of The Logic of Sense that sense moves in two 
directions simultaneously, that of the past and the future. Our interest in the theory of time is 
much more specific than this, however, since what we are seeking after is how someone manages 
to think something new with the highest affirmation in the eternal return. By revisiting Deleuze’s 
plane of immanence, we want to emphasize that, for him, the making of a life that unfolds in 
time, is not the supreme object of knowledge, it does not concern the acquisition of knowledge as 
with Husserl. Rather, the becoming of beings unfolding in time defines what it means to learn. It 
is only in the process of learning that something new becomes sayable of beings. We turn to 
Deleuze’s theory of learning in the last chapter of this dissertation, “Deleuze’s New Meno.” In 
accordance with this new Meno learning would not be oriented towards the past, but the future. 
Deleuze’s study of the apprenticeship to signs in Proust and Signs (1972) demonstrates the two 
sides of aesthetics, the making of a life as a work of art, and the work of art as the creation of a 
life. We continue the inquiry into the theory of learning by, then, turning to what Deleuze, like 
Heidegger, understands as the grounding of the problematic field in learning. In doing so, our 
aim is to explore the differential relation that constitutes the Idea itself. If each encounter with a 
13 
 
sign presents us with the repetition of the past in which difference is introduced, then, learning 
essentially involves the transformation of this relation prior to the constitution of beings. Indeed, 
the paradoxical instance, the return of the different, requires not only a fracturing of the self, but 
the other as well, as a function of which the problematic field itself unfolds. For Deleuze, since 
learning is essentially oriented towards the future, it involves not “a mythical past or former 
present, but […] the pure form of empty time.”34 With respect to this theory of learning, thinking 
is no longer an abstract possibility, or a distant object of contemplation. Neither does it conform 
to some image, model, or presupposed aim. It arises by being coupled to that which is outside of 
thought, that which does not think, but must be thought as such. It is only once the field reverses 
itself, when it makes the difference in the direction of the future, that we manage to think and 
articulate something new of beings. To be on the way to thinking, one must learn. Saying the 
Event, both, the counter-actualization of the event so as to bring something to existence that had 
not existed, and the critique of dogmatic image of thought explored in the previous chapters, 
emerges with the Event of thought.  
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1 
The Problem of Sense Introduced 
 
Never shall this force itself on us, that that which is not may be; 
While you search, keep your thought far away from this path. 
 
- Parmenides 
 
 
 This chapter lays out the groundwork for the logic of sense. It is the groundwork for the 
logic of sense in two ways. In the first place, we trace a selective trajectory of Deleuze’s thought 
in which he experiments with the idea of sense prior to writing The Logic of Sense.
1
 Second, the 
groundwork for the logic of sense involves the laying of the ground of the emergence of sense. It 
is only once we have laid out this ground, once we have traced the twists and turns in Deleuze’s 
thinking on the matter, that we are able to formulate the problem of sense, that of the doubling of 
the pathway of articulation. If laying the ground serves as the logos or logic in light of which the 
legein emerges as the saying, then, we must inquire what sort of ground informs it. The principal 
way in which Deleuze approaches this question is by proposing alongside Jean Hyppolite that 
being is sense, not essence: “That the world is sufficient is not only to say that it is sufficient for 
us, but that it is sufficient unto itself, and that it refers to being not as the essence beyond the 
appearance, not as a second world which would be the intelligible world, but as the sense of this 
world.”2 With the renunciation of the second world which had violated the doctrine of complete 
immanence, the question becomes how this being expresses itself, or, alternatively, what sort of 
ontology is the ontology of sense. It is on this terrain, on the terrain of the ontological sense, or 
as Deleuze also refers to it, the univocal being which is said in the same sense of all the senses, 
that the nature of the simulated sense becomes a point of contention. Deleuze’s early engagement 
with Hyppolite’s text on Hegel, Logic and Existence, in which Hyppolite claims that Hegel’s 
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discourse of being realizes the doctrine of complete immanence, propels Deleuze to put forth an 
alternative logic explored in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. The key argument that 
encapsulates his response to Hyppolite’s text is that it is not the same thing to say that difference 
expresses itself and that it contradicts itself. By turning to Spinoza’s plane of immanence and 
Nietzsche’s eternal return, Deleuze seeks to explore an alternative logic of expression that would 
essentially replace the point of contradiction with that of the repetition of difference; the 
ontology of which is fully fleshed out in Difference and Repetition. Here, we can identify two 
points that are of importance in Deleuze’s thinking through of the notion of sense. Firstly, by 
putting into question the point of contradiction, Deleuze wants to move away from the tendency 
towards attributing the plane of immanence to a transcendent universal.
3
 Once he has moved 
away from this universal along with the sort of being that is implied by it, the problem becomes 
how the return of difference, the ontological sense itself, is linked to the simulated sense. The 
relationship of the univocal being with the singular sense of a becoming is captured in the 
problem of the doubled pathway of articulation in the last part of this chapter.   
 How should the reader approach this chapter? Deleuze’s studies of major thinkers in the 
philosophical tradition, including, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Leibniz, among others, can generate much 
confusion for the reader who is unfamiliar with his philosophy, or what philosophy is according 
to him. Oftentimes, it is unclear whether the ideas explored in such studies can be attributed to 
the thinker under consideration. As such, Deleuze is often thought to have misread or 
misappropriated aspects of another’s thought, all in an effort to compose a philosophical lineage 
that displaces the Hegelian interpretation of the history of philosophy. In addition to this, it is 
difficult to discern which ideas Deleuze adopts as being his own, and which ones he abandons as 
specific to another’s philosophical system. The question becomes, what role does x or y play in 
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Deleuze’s philosophy? In other words, is he a Spinozist, a Nietzschean, or anti-Hegelian? Which 
one is he? Deleuze and Guattari’s joint work What is Philosophy? serves as a response to such 
questions. The two define philosophy in the following way: “Philosophy is a constructivism, and 
constructivism has two qualitatively different aspects: the creation of concepts and the laying out 
of a plane” of immanence.4 According to Deleuze and Guattari, each philosophy lays out a plane 
of immanence. While these planes cannot be thought to compose a historical becoming, aspects 
of the respective planes of two or more philosophies may overlap, all the while maintaining their 
distinction. In reading Deleuze’s studies of major thinkers, we must be able to discern the plane 
of immanence that belongs to each, while also grasping at what point the two overlap or meet up. 
On the other hand, when reading Deleuze’s central philosophical texts, Difference and 
Repetition, and, The Logic of Sense, we must treat these figures as conceptual personae with 
which Deleuze creates specific concepts. Being able to discern between these two ways of 
reading Deleuze, between his reflections on the history of philosophy, and the doing of 
philosophy, which are both present in his studies of other thinkers, prepares us for a more robust 
engagement with him.     
 
The Hegelian Proximity or Distance
5
 
 
Deleuze never wrote a volume on Hegel. In Difference and Repetition he conceived of an 
alternative philosophy of difference without taking the immensity of the Hegelian system too 
seriously. Perhaps because of this, there is a general sentiment that Deleuze did not know his 
Hegel, and that he did not take good care in reading him. Even so, a look at the trajectory of 
Deleuze’s philosophical thought demonstrates Hegel to be just as influential in orienting it, as 
thinkers to whom he devoted his praises, and about which he wrote full length volumes. In his 
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approach to Hegel, Deleuze is Nietzschean, not merely in his interpretation, but in his 
mannerism; he created philosophy in an innocent way without ever appearing as though a 
laborious struggle needed to be waged against Hegel.
6
 One cannot go so far as to say that 
Hegel’s problems became Deleuze’s concerns, but that he offers an alternative solution to the 
problem of immanence by placing it on a terrain that is foreign to dialectical being. The two 
positions do not have a hidden resemblance, nor are they in need of reconciliation.
7
 The 
fundamentals of his position can be found in the “Review of Jean Hyppolite, Logique et 
Existence” (1954). While it is not immediately obvious what role Hegel plays in The Logic of 
Sense, the title, at the least, alludes to Hyppolite’s argument that Hegel’s logic is one of sense.  
In Logic and Existence, Hyppolite’s efforts are directed at demonstrating that Hegel’s logic 
realizes the doctrine of complete immanence, which, he asserts, a philosopher such as “Spinoza 
had not been able to realize.”8 The principal argument supporting the thesis of his text is that 
there is no second world beyond this one. The metaphysical duality of essence and appearance, 
which results in another world that limits what is knowable, is replaced with the logic of sense. 
Because ontology is not the ontology of essence, being, the Absolute, “is not thought anywhere 
else than in the phenomenal world.”9 Moreover, the genesis of being proceeds in accordance 
with Hegel’s dialectical logic, as the being which is thought and lived as sense. Deleuze 
expresses an affinity with Hyppolite’s principal argument when writing: “That there is no 
‘beyond’ means that there is no ‘beyond’ of the world, and that in the world there is no ‘beyond’ 
of thought.”10 However, if the Absolute, determines itself by appearing or alienating itself in the 
phenomenal world, how can it be said that being is sense and that sense is being? This question 
is of special importance because sense, for Hegel, never proceeds from the depths of the 
inexpressible. Hyppolite’s response is that sense is already there as the being of the sensible, but 
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that it is not thought for-itself. He writes that it is “being which posits itself as sense, and this 
means that sense is not alien to being, is not outside of or beyond it. This is why sense also 
comprehends non-sense, the anti-Logos; it is in itself just as much as it is for itself, but its in-
itself is for itself, and its for-itself is in itself.”11 Such a formulation is meant to simultaneously 
involve the essence of appearance as the negation of the sensible thing, and the differentiation of 
the Absolute being which comprehends itself as the becoming of sense. The positive 
determination of the Absolute, or the negation of the negation, enables one to grasp the “identity 
of being and difference as sense.”12 Hyppolite concludes that immanence is complete in Hegel’s 
philosophy, because logic is the absolute genesis of sense, as the being of sense, and the sense of 
being (the in-itself and for-itself). Alternatively, the contradiction produced by the self-division 
of the Absolute is overcome when we arrive at the absolute knowledge that the same sense is 
both, essence and appearance. From the perspective of absolute knowledge, the opposition of 
that which is, and that which is not, is superseded. The logic, as the genesis of sense, not only 
creates a particular sense in which thing and thought are identical, it is also thought for-itself as 
the absolute form that “knows itself as the sense of all of the senses.”13   
 
Depth and Height  
 
 
Allow me to highlight some of the essential moments of the text, so that Hyppolite’s 
central thesis is better understood. Hyppolite begins as Hegel does in The Phenomenology of 
Mind. Modelling his argument after Plato’s Sophist, he differentiates Hegel’s philosophy from 
two other types that remain on the level of immediacy. In the first place, it is the immediate 
sense-experience of pure singularity which is put into question. Thereafter, it is the 
understanding which errs, insofar as it posits the different qualities of a self-same thing as 
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indifferent, even while such qualities are contraries or opposites. The former is inexpressible in 
language, while the latter produces a language of abstract determinations, which essentially 
reinforce the nothingness of the former. The problematic of contraries, along with an altered 
topography of depth and height, will be given new life by Deleuze in a number of series in The 
Logic of Sense. The question that best captures the first section of Hyppolite’s study is the 
following: “What is the sensible outside of the sense with which language endows it?”14 Such a 
question is relevant, as sense has a double meaning, as if operating in two directions at once, 
externalizing itself by appearing, and internalizing itself as essence. Quoting Hegel’s Lectures on 
Aesthetics, Hyppolite writes that sense is both the “organ of immediate apprehension,” and, the 
significance or thought of the thing. After having demonstrated that sense goes in two directions 
at once, Hegel goes on to emphasize that, “a sensuous consideration does not cut the two sides 
apart at all; in one direction it contains the opposite one too, and in sensuous immediate 
perception it at the same time apprehends the essence and the concept.” 15 Here, we already have 
a response to the stated question, which is that the sensible does not exist outside of sense. At the 
same time, however, because a sensuous consideration merely foreshadows the concept, it 
maintains its problematic status. But, perhaps we are being too hasty. We have not taken up the 
other side of the question, which is an inquiry into “the sensible which is outside of the sense.” 
The other side of the question must be considered as it demonstrates that the sensible, as 
nothingness outside of sense, continues to “haunt” consciousness. 
In “The Ineffable,” Hyppolite notes that philosophical inquiry into the sensible, as it is 
given in sense-experience, produces the worst type of knowledge by beginning from a faulty 
premise. In the Phenomenology, Hegel argues that this type of approach seems like the most 
natural way of proceeding, since the thing is present to the ego in its essentiality, or in the simple 
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fact of being there. However, he quickly adds that, when we say ‘this’ thing, we must recognize 
that the thing present “exists in its certainty through the other”; it is mediated, just as ‘this I’ 
which says it, is mediated.
16
 Rather than experienced in its pure singularity this instant, the thing 
becomes expressible in language as a universal ‘this.’ Hegel claims that, as a memory archive, 
language remains the truth behind sense-certainty, even though the ‘meaning’ of what we say 
when we say ‘this’ thing is not thought for-itself. Philosophies that reject the becoming of sense 
cannot produce a concrete being in- and for-itself, the existence of which must be recognizable in 
language, because pure singularity cannot be formulated in the stated medium. The sensible 
outside of sense, therefore, has no existence. Such a claim quickly gets us to the heart of 
Hegelianism. Pure becoming without mediation enslaves us to the destiny of ephemeral being, 
whereas the concrete becoming of sense leads to the freedom of grasping our world through our 
own actions.
17
 Consciousness as sense “recognizes one moment in the other: its purpose and 
action in fate, and its fate in its purpose and action.”18 Such knowledge must be expressible in 
language, since language deals with universals which are held in common within a community. 
“In language,” Hyppolite writes, “self-consciousness, qua singularity being for itself, comes as 
such into existence, so that it exists for others.”19  
Though sidestepping the sensible singularity seems straightforward, and we accede 
because there appears to be little gained by turning to universals, it is a significant move. As 
Hyppolite shows, there is much more implied in the argument, which we gain in later sections of 
the Phenomenology. The argument is that even if we proceed without knowing what we ‘mean’ 
when we say ‘this’ thing, we never begin from the sensible outside of the sense that expresses it 
in language. To state this differently, we cannot begin outside of sense from the ineffable, 
because, for Hegel, a pure singularity which omits mediation marks nothing else than the 
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dissolution, or death of an instant. “This dissolution, this non-sense is then the truth of the 
rejection of mediation.”20 We never go from pure becoming, which is essentially inexpressible or 
the anti-Logos, to language. The expression of sense cannot originate with non-sense or the 
ineffable, since the ineffable overcomes the finitude of pure singularity in an absolute 
transcendent, which itself remains inexpressible.
21
 Hyppolite, thus, asserts that philosophy 
cannot hold the ineffable higher than speech, since that would signal its own destruction as a 
science of absolute knowledge. If the truth of the purely lived sensible singularity is its own 
dissolution, how is such dissolution explained if the doctrine of complete immanence is to be 
maintained? Hyppolite argues that in order for us to grasp how essence itself appears, immediacy 
must first be negated. The dissolution of the sensible is not, however, the same as its negation. 
The “becoming of the sensible is in itself its essentialization, but essentialization is not there as 
such.”22 This essentialization refers to the being which interiorizes itself; it is saved in memory 
or available for recollection by being reflected in thought. But also, in interiorizing itself, being 
becomes different from itself, it is appearance. Hyppolite, thus, writes “being which appears is 
identical to itself in its difference, which is essential difference, that is, the difference of itself 
from itself. It is different from itself in its identity; it contradicts itself.”23 The logic therefore 
embraces the movement of sense in two directions simultaneously. These two directions are 
actually one and the same thing from the perspective of the Absolute itself, even if at first they 
appear contradictory. Hyppolite shows that, being negates itself by becoming appearance, and 
affirms itself as the essence in appearance, in the same movement.  
By inquiring into the dissolution of sensible singularity, we have already made a transition 
to the Absolute, as the being which determines itself in accordance with dialectical logic. This 
shift underlies a key claim made by Hyppolite that discourse in Hegel’s philosophy is not a 
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discourse of man, but a discourse of being. By arguing that the absolute is already there in the 
Phenomenology, he makes the claim that language is, for Hegel, both, human speech held in 
common, and the discourse of being and universal self-consciousness. This duality is present in 
Hyppolite’s questions, which in some ways resonate with our own: “How can being say itself in 
man and man become universal consciousness of being through language?”24 Or, alternatively, 
“how can language […] human speech, be simultaneously that of which one speaks and the one 
who speaks?” These questions are as interesting as they are important. Their complexity is 
compounded by the notion that sense does not proceed from the ineffable. That is to say, for 
Hegel, there is already an “existing universe of sense,” a language of universals in which being is 
expressed, so that anything which is thought for-itself can only be thought as a universal.
25
 But 
how can Hyppolite affirm that such discourse is the discourse of being, rather than man? Before 
we can attempt to formulate Hyppolite’s response to these questions, we must turn to universals 
as they are immediately grasped by perceptual understanding. The pitfalls of the understanding 
are precisely in that it posits universals in their positivity, as indifferent differences. We have 
outlined Hegel’s critique of depth, now we shall turn to the errors of height.  
Our inquiry into positive diversity returns us to the problem of difference, the Platonist 
account of which in the Sophist, was of special relevance for Hegel.
26
 Of course, there is a drastic 
difference between the two. As Hyppolite notes, Plato’s dialectic, according to Hegel, is an 
immobile one, since he did not raise difference to contradiction. Nevertheless, Hegel’s 
universals, as they are presented in actual experience, can be interpreted through Plato’s lens of 
change and rest.
27
 Because change and rest are two sides of the same coin, they are the engine of 
negativity that subverts empirical thought. We already saw this change when discussing the 
disappearance of the sensible. Hegel also presents such a passage by referring to the structure of 
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the present, which he proposes is a universal Now, This Now, designating that which is and is no 
longer. In this passage from that which is, to that which is not in the present instant, he argues 
that an “other […] is set up: the This is superseded: and this otherness, the cancelling of the 
former, is itself again annulled.”28 For This Now to appear as such, the previous one must have 
disappeared, since This Now must itself appear. But Hegel claims that:  
To represent that a thing has disappeared, it is not enough to perceive a contrast 
between the past and the present; it is necessary […] to turn our back on the present, 
to dwell on the past, and to think the contrast of the past with the present in terms of 
the past only, without letting the present appear in it.
29
  
 
If we are to think how things in their distinction from the rest nevertheless sustain change so as 
to become determined, this passage must be approached from the perspective of the past. On this 
rare point, Hyppolite agrees with Henri Bergson, whose philosophy of continuous duration is 
otherwise placed under great scrutiny in Logic and Existence. The passage itself in Hegel’s 
philosophy is drastically different than that of Bergson’s. For Hegel, the past externalizes itself in 
the present, just as this thing in the present must negate itself, or become determined by no 
longer being as such. It is only in this passing, which itself forms an opposition, that things 
themselves can be thought. Thought itself does not produce opposition, things themselves 
manifest such opposition. Hyppolite, thus, argues that:  
Hegel’s originality lies in the rejection of this merely human explanation of 
negation—an explanation that we find for example in Bergson—as well as in the 
rejection of the particular privilege granted to the thought that would nevertheless 
maintain that ‘Being, the thing, is in a sense always positive.’30 
 
If it is indeed the case that temporal mediation produces both the appearing of the thing, while 
also determining it, why is this mediation not apparent to consciousness? Although naïve 
consciousness undergoes this passage of reflection into itself in relation to the other, the ‘I’, 
Hegel argues, “is always forgetting it again and beginning the process all over.”31 This is the 
24 
 
explanation of how consciousness cancels itself in immediate sense-certainty. Perception, 
however, differs from this. Perception begins with the positivity of being, particularity, the 
positivity of universals which are no yet determined concretely. It apprehends things as 
consisting of having a manifold of properties considered exclusively or separate from the others, 
even while the understanding grasps this thing as identical to itself throughout time. Hegel calls 
this sound common sense, or the “sophistry of perception,” because it “seeks to save these 
moments from their contradiction, tries to keep them fixed by distinguishing between ‘aspects,’ 
by using terms like ‘also’ and ‘so far as.’”32 Here is where language held in common becomes 
problematic, since empirical knowledge affirms contrary qualities of something, rendering one 
false and the other proposition true, as it becomes opportune to do so in accordance with 
experience. It is not as though empirical thought does not recognize difference and identity. 
Indeed, the being which it apprehends is taken to be identical to itself while being different from 
others. However, the difference that it grasps is an external one, since empirical thought does not 
realize how a thing can be for-itself, all the while passing into the other. This is because it rejects 
the sort of opposition found in the diversity of things. Even though it posits change and rest as 
two sides of the same coin, empirical thought cannot explain how something can preserve its 
identity all the while determining itself by negating itself in its other. “Empirical thought [thus] 
recognizes only exteriority or separated interiority.”33 In other words, it cannot explain on what 
basis something establishes such a distinct form of existence.  
Hyppolite claims that because it rejects mediation, empirical thought is not only an empty 
form of thought that proceeds by comparison and similitude, but the determinations through 
which it supposedly conceives of things, are mere abstractions external to the terms. “In diversity 
the different things are individually what they are, and indifferent to the relation in which they 
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stand to each other. This relation is therefore external to them.”34 But according to Hegel, if 
empiricism is overcome through the opposition of things themselves, this is because negation is 
already present in being. Negation is already present once things themselves are thought to have 
a distinct existence from others. Hyppolite writes: “already in order to discover a thing that 
differs from another, and from all the others, is thereby a thing that contains negation.”35 
Opposition is posited as soon as something distinct is posited. For Hegel, then, identity itself is 
affirmed in self-difference, or through negation. In other words, positivity can only be affirmed 
of the thing insofar as it negates itself. Echoing Plato’s formulation of change and rest in relation 
to difference, Hegel writes:  
Difference as thus unity of itself and identity, is in itself determinate difference. It is 
not transformed into another, not relation to an other outside it: it has its other, 
identity, within itself, just as identity, having entered into the determination of 
difference, has not lost itself in it as its other, but preserves itself in it, is its 
reflection-into-self and its moment.
36
  
 
While the identity of something is positively determined insofar as it excludes the negative, it is 
affirmed as such as having this or that property, insofar as it externalizes itself in a relation. 
Likewise, the negative differs from the positive insofar as it stands for the differentiation of the 
thing, by virtue of which it can be determined to be identical. In other words, the negative and 
positive subsist through each other.
37
 
Hegel will go on to resolve the problem of contrary qualities by arguing that the 
contradiction of sense moving in two direction simultaneously, must itself be reconciled in the 
absolute. We will elaborate on this shortly. In the first series in The Logic of Sense, “Of 
Paradoxes of Pure Becoming,” Deleuze will reformulate this problem of contraries by arguing 
that universals themselves do not capture pure becoming. Deleuze claims that becoming in two 
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directions at once, cannot be thought in fixed terms, or from the perspective of the present or 
agent. Referring to the stories of Lewis Carroll, he writes:  
 
Alice and Through the Looking Glass involve a category of very special things: 
events, pure events. When I say ‘Alice becomes larger,’ I mean that she becomes 
larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is 
now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she 
was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one 
was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose 
characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does 
not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. 
It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at 
once.
38
  
 
For Deleuze, Hegel betrays the double directionality of becoming by artificially proposing there 
to be a separation of terms where none exists. If we presuppose the terms to be separate, if we 
conceive of their becoming in fixed terms beginning from the present as such, their passing into 
the other cannot be thought in any other way than through the anthropomorphic concept of 
opposition. Deleuze, hence, not only proposes that the Hegelian movement is artificial, unable to 
tear itself away from the barriers it has set for itself, but also that this becoming, as it is perceived 
in the ontic realm, is merely transposed into the ontological. Conversely, for those sympathetic to 
Hegel’s philosophy such as Slavoj Zizek, Deleuze’s sophistical argument simply reinforces 
indifferent differences, hence, also leaving being indeterminate.
39
 Indeed, the reversals of 
becoming, of being large and small at the same time, do tend towards an indifferent difference. 
But, as Deleuze notes, this is an “optical illusion” through which Alice, the subject that fixes the 
limits, remains the same. While Hegel is concerned with demonstrating the identity of the 
subject, for Deleuze, such identity is fictional, just as the absolute self or subject that contradicts 
itself as it externalizes itself, is also fictional. By referring to becoming as event, Deleuze does 
not merely want to displace the primacy of the copula, but also the sort of being that is implicit in 
27 
 
such a formulation. For him, being is not the absolute being of dialectical logic; it is the return of 
becoming in which identity is subordinated to difference. This sort of becoming is not 
contradictory, but paradoxical.  
Does this mean that becoming is itself inexpressible for Deleuze? This dissertation 
revolves around this question. In that same series, Deleuze evokes Plato’s Philebus, in order to 
distinguish between two types of things:  
that of limited and measured things, of fixed qualities, permanent or temporary which 
always presuppose pauses and rests, the fixing of presents and the assignation of 
subjects […][and a second,] a pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-
mad, which never rests. It moves in both directions at once.
40
  
 
The question is: What sort of relationship do these types have with language? Deleuze puts forth 
a working response while again referring to Plato, this time to the Cratylus:  
Sometimes Plato wonders whether this pure becoming might not have a peculiar 
relation to language. […] Could this relation be, perhaps, essential to language, as in 
the case of a ‘flow’ of speech, or a wild discourse which would incessantly slide over 
its referent, without ever stopping?
41
  
 
These questions presuppose an insightful and innovative reading of the Cratylus. In that text, 
Plato reflects on two types of languages, one which pertains to the becoming of things, and 
another in which the thing referred to and the instance of naming seem to coincide. Of course, 
Plato concludes that the meaning of the being must be grasped in the naming, but the process 
itself of having arrived at this conclusion is of greater interest. Deleuze gathers from all of this 
that there seem to be two sorts of languages, one of pauses and rests, and the other discourse 
intimately intertwined with the becoming. These two types of languages will define what he calls 
the secondary organization of sense, and the tertiary order in which the secondary inheres: “Is it 
not possible that there are two distinct dimensions internal to language in general—one always 
concealed by the other, yet continuously coming to the aid of, or subsisting under, the other?”42 
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By putting into questions whether we proceed from a language of pauses and rests which assign 
identities to things affirmed through the copula, or if there is another language, one of verbs of 
pure becoming, in which “all identity disappears from the self, the world, and God,” Deleuze is 
challenging Hegelian indeterminate universals, which in the course of determination, lead to 
singularities “imprisoned in the Self or a superior I.”43 This other dimension of language will not 
merely be in the service of the dominant one, it will not “fill out” the empty term by determining 
it through movement, hence, becoming a sense of sense as in Hegel. Due to the accusation that 
Hegel merely reinforces the language of fixed identities, by way of which he himself perpetuates 
common sense, Hyppolite’s claim that language in Hegel’s philosophy is simultaneously the 
language of man and of being becomes suspect.   
 
Language, Thought, and Sense 
 
 
The problem of sense is revisited by Hyppolite on the level of language, the importance of 
which has become evident. Perhaps it is not even correct for us to say on the level of language, 
since for Hegel, we can never think the sense of something without already presupposing the 
existence of language. This is precisely the difficulty, as a result of which the error of conceiving 
of sense as signification emerges. If it is indeed the case that the thought of sense arises as such 
only insofar as there is language through which the existence of something becomes expressible, 
then, in turn, we must explain how this sense, which Hegel presents as a universal, becomes 
determinable a priori in the absolute, even if it is not thought for itself as this particular sense in 
the empirical. Or, alternatively, we could say that the universal already exists, but merely in the 
abstract form. In other words, if we are to state the property that defines this or that thing, we 
must recognize that this property, as a universal, pre-exists the conditions in which it is 
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determined. This is the problem, the complexity, to which Hegel formulates his response. The 
dialectical movement by way of which the universal is itself determined is absolute knowledge. 
In this form, it is the discourse of being. The dialectical logic, in which the absolute expresses 
itself, is there in the domain of language. One and the same logic expresses the sense of being. 
This is precisely why linguistic expression is not thought to be human expression alone, but is 
the house of being. It is, however, in the same movement that Hegel goes wrong, interpreting the 
becoming of sense as the becoming of the concept.
44
   
What about artistic expression? Could poetry be the other language, the language of the 
sensible itself? Hyppolite does put forth a response to these questions. “Couldn’t we prefer the 
image to speech as the carrier of sense?” he asks. He quickly dismisses the importance of this 
question, however, when noting that poetry “seems to be sense for itself,” but it does not reflect 
this sense, or does not know itself to have formulated a sense.
45
 In other words, poetry seems to 
prefigure sense without giving way to it. It is not the sense of sense. Art, including poetry, he 
argues, is a “sort of nature that disappears […] gradually as we go to signify it on purpose, as we 
go on to untie the knot of determinations, in light of sense.”46 The sensible which it fuses with 
sense, without expressly stating it, disappears as soon as we determine it. It is no longer poetry. It 
finds its truth in its other, philosophy. In this way, artistic expression shares in the alienation of 
sense in language in general. Indeed, for Hegel, sense is already there in language even if we are 
not aware of what we mean when we say ‘this’ thing. But this thought of being which is there in 
language must become the thought of thought, or as stated previously, the sense of sense. On 
what basis is such an argument made? Or how does Hegel explain the alienation of sense in 
language? While we explore these questions, it is better at the same to inquire as to how the 
dialectic in the phenomenology and the dialectic in the encyclopedia reconnect, without one 
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being prior to the other. Hyppolite frames this inquiry in a slightly different way when asking: 
“How [does] the thought of being which constitutes language become the thought of thought, 
without it being the case that this reflection on language itself emerges from language?” 
In the previous discussion, we noted that the passage of the sensible is itself present in 
reflection, and that the universal is already immanent in nature as logos. “In this dialectic, the 
sensible becomes the Logos, meaningful language, and the thought of the sensible does not 
remain interior and mute. It is there in language.”47 According to Hegel, the movement from the 
passage of the sensible, to its becoming expressed in language, is performed by thought. The 
passage of the sensible is interiorized in thought, and the thought itself is exteriorized in 
language. This is the first form of memory, the one in the phenomenology. That of which one 
speaks, and the one who speaks, are inseparable, according to Hyppolite. This is not only 
because the sensible is interiorized in thought, but because the subject too must externalize him 
or herself in the same process. Hereafter, linguistic expression can no longer be understood as 
the mere reflection on the self, or on a thing that is external to the self. It is an expression in 
which the self says itself and its other. But this language is still not aware of itself as the 
discourse of being, since in exteriorizing itself, thought is alienated thought in language. Or as 
Hyppolite writes: “the passage from sensible to sense and from thought to its own alienation in 
language—these two movements coincide.”48 In this sense, thought as alienated in language, 
acquires the same status that the sensible itself has in experience. “This exteriority, the open 
system of language and speech, is thought in itself, the thought that turns itself into a thing, a 
sensible being, a sound, while the thing itself is negated, interiorized into thought.”49 In other 
words, we no longer need refer to the sensible being itself outside of language, it is now 
language that is turned into a sensible sign; a content in which the signification itself is alienated. 
31 
 
Language is already, then, according to Hyppolite, the mastery of the sensible, in which 
signification is intuited there in the exteriority of language. This is the second form of memory; 
language as an archive or storehouse of the “existential aspect of thought” that must be thought 
for-itself in order to become the sense of sense, or thought of thought.
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 Just as the sensible 
singularity is negated in experience, the determination of sense in language is the second 
negation, a new negation, exercised on the sensible sign. The sensible sign is treated as content 
which is progressively raised to the level of form. Raised to the level of form, it is thought for-
itself, rather than thought in-itself, or intuitive thought.   
With the idea that there are two types of memory, we seem to have a response to the 
dilemma we outline in the above introductory statement. We inquired as to how it is possible that 
the universe of sense pre-exists the thought of the thing, not only because we wanted to inquire 
as to why Hegel argues that the sensible singularity is in itself inexpressible, but because we 
wanted to grasp how it is that the thing thought for-itself presupposes this sense. Hegel rightly 
recognizes the difficulty of this task, when writing that “to comprehend the position and sense of 
memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of the hardest points, 
and hitherto one quite un-regarded in the theory of spirit.”51 What is it that we are after here? In 
Hegel’s philosophy, we are delving into the intersecting point of the particular and the universal. 
How the becoming of the sensible can already be one and the same as the becoming of sense. 
How it is that something can be thought for itself in its particularity, while being expressible as 
this or that sense, which already exists in language, as if language were already implicitly there 
in thought. Here, we are not discussing the dialectical logic of language considered on its own 
terrain, but have attempted, instead, to dabble in the intersection of Hegel’s two memories we 
highlighted above. But it is not as though the analysis of language is not already implied in such 
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a consideration. We are merely grasping it from its other side, as it connects to the 
phenomenology, rather than how one arrives at the sense of sense on the level of discourse. The 
two, however, are inseparable for Hegel. This is precisely why Hyppolite argues that:  
to understand the intimate connection of these two memories and their inseparability 
[…] is to understand thereby even the concrete identity of the immediate and the 
universal, to catch the glimpse already of the reason why the Logic will be able to 
treat immediate being, the structure of the sensible, while remaining in the universe 
of significations.
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Having paused at this intersection, we will now turn to Hegel’s discourse of being, his 
determination of the concept.   
On the Absolute:  
The Being of Sense and Sense of Being 
 
 
 In arguing that there is such a thing as absolute being, Hegel wants to demonstrate that 
being itself, while having a different form of existence from finite beings, nonetheless, is the 
reason behind their coming into appearance. He, hence, wants to make the absolute be the 
ground or condition of the appearing, while making appearing itself become the reflection of the 
absolute by way of which it determines itself. Since this appearing is, simultaneously, the 
internal differentiation of the absolute, a moment of its self-genesis, it cannot be considered to be 
external to it, even if in empirical consciousness it is taken as such. Its total self-genesis, shall we 
say the coming into its own of the concept equal to its content, is the sum of the moments by way 
of which it determines itself. Here, the difficulty for Hegel will be to demonstrate how this 
absolute as infinite being is able to determine itself by reflecting itself in appearance, all the 
while not being determined by phenomena, since they themselves are finite. The resolution to 
this problematic, as Hegel frames it, is found in the concept of negativity, which itself bears the 
affirmative position, the Logic of the absolute. In order that we may understand what is meant by 
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the Logic of the absolute as the sense of being, we must untie the moments that compose the 
whole of the transcendental. Seeing that our task is to explain Deleuze’s position in the appendix 
to Hyppolite’s text, we will move through these moments quite quickly.   
 For the most part, Hyppolite posits the dialectical development of the absolute in the last 
chapter of his text, “The Organization of the Logic: Being, Essence, Concept.” Just as the first 
position in the absolute is nothingness, the first term of the method, its beginning, is the universal 
which is indeterminate. The two involve one another. As immediacy, which is not meant to be 
sensible immediacy, being in its own self-relation is pure thought. In order that it may emerge 
from this self-relation, it must be thought or realized in the concept. Hyppolite, hence, writes:  
Being, considered as irreducible to pure thought, is the absolute self-relation which is 
also pure thought. Thought does not lack being; it lacks determination. And being, 
this mere self-relation, also lacks determination. In the form of being and 
nothingness, of being and the question of being, their opposition is reciprocal. […] 
But this very simplicity of the beginning is its determination.
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To realize the concept is to determine it, just as the absolute in its self-division determines itself 
in the doubling of essence. It might seem strange to draw these two movements together, since in 
the latter the absolute does not emerge from itself or is not realized, while in the former, the 
immanent self-relation of the absolute says itself in the dialectic. Or, alternatively, here sense 
“hears itself” so that it may become expressed. The difference is that in the former we stop with 
essence, the self-negation of being, while in the other, we have negated this negation. The 
dialectical method is this expression, as the discourse of being. Now, in order to demonstrate this 
movement, Hyppolite opens up the discussion of the absolute when noting that the negation of 
nothingness, the immediacy of the absolute, is, both, the progressive presentation of being as 
essence, and the self-relation of the absolute in its becoming for-itself. We will set aside this 
contradiction, so as to firstly lay out the field of reflection.  
34 
 
 The field of reflection is the sphere of essence in which the whole of being is itself 
negated. By the whole sphere of being negated, Hyppolite means that being in its immediacy is 
negated, or, rather, it is not immediately present in the field of reflection for-itself. Because 
essence is the negation of being as immediate, we are not aware that the position itself, or 
essence, is engendered by the logic of sense.
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 What is this essence as negated being? Hyppolite 
writes that: “being opposes itself to itself; negates itself as being and posits itself as essence. But 
essence is appearance. Essence is posited in appearance, that is, negated being, and there 
alone.”55 We must be careful when articulating this idea, since the negation of the whole of being 
is its self-negation so that essence is posited, while when Hegel says essence is appearance, he is 
saying that the absolute negates itself in its other, so that it may reflect itself or determine itself. 
Thus far, we have stressed that appearing is the self-reflection of the absolute, its difference from 
itself, and that, in turn, this appearing is itself the determination of being as essence. The double 
movement is simultaneous, being indicative of the doubling of essence; what in Deleuze’s 
philosophy will be re-interpreted as the double directionality of sense. These two directions, the 
doubling of essence, is the self-division of the absolute, its negation in its other, which is the 
appearing of being in the determination as essence. In order to express this idea Hyppolite argues 
that: “The movement of the logic of essence is a double movement in one alone. It is the 
movement by which being negates itself, turns itself into appearance, and the movement by 
which, while negating itself, it posits itself, makes itself essence in appearance.”56 On the one 
hand, as appearing, being as essence is the condition of this appearing, but if we follow the other 
direction, essence is the internal reflection of being, its determination, like the echo of appearing. 
“In immediate being, it is non-being which is the ground into which all particular beings 
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disappear or from which they emerge. In essence, it is being itself which reflects itself, insofar as 
being appears.”57 As appearing, being is its own reflection as essence.  
 By not passing into itself or being for-itself, Hegel merely means that being is posited as 
essence; this is why it is not immediately visible. As non-being, it is its other, which is not the 
sensible, but the becoming of the sensible. This is precisely what it comprehends and interiorizes 
as its own limit; the limit being its position, or essence. In other words, this self-negation, 
reflection of the absolute in its other, is at the same time the cancellation of the whole; this is 
why the beginning is itself considered to be nothingness, or the nothingness which becomes 
being in the same movement. In externalizing itself, the absolute is not delimited by its other, its 
other, instead, negates itself in order to become. It severs itself from finite life, it becomes 
infinite life; it is its opposite. On the other hand, the self-limitation of the absolute, which is the 
reflection of its other in itself, is, as we have noted, a determination. Now, the dialectic itself is 
not apparent in the determinations of essence, since essence is merely the appearing of being. 
Yet, as Hyppolite writes, what allows these determinations to show themselves as moments, is 
that the absolute itself is implied in each of the determinations, already there as the first, even if 
it is posited retrospectively as the second. He, hence, argues that:  
The result is that the absolute, by positing itself in each of its determinations, appears 
to itself entirely in each (since each refers to the other). The absolute is their 
mediation, the reflection of one of the determinations into the other, which is at the 
same time external reflection (relation of one to the other), and internal reflection 
(self-relation).
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The external reflection refers to the externalization of being, while the internal is its return to 
itself, its determination as essence.  
 The whole problem on the first level is that in positing essence, being does not pass into 
itself, or does not show itself as for-itself. In turn, then, essence appears to be distinct from 
36 
 
appearance, the other of which it is the reflection. Since it is the negation of the immediacy of 
being, it cannot explain the passage by way of which it becomes its other, in appearing. In other 
words, essence as appearance opens up the contradiction itself, since essence as position is 
simultaneously the negation of being in its other, appearance. As such, Hyppolite writes that 
essence “is the un-resolved contradiction, since it is simultaneously the negation of being and the 
negation of this negation.”59 But isn’t this contradiction, the difference of posited essence and the 
appearance which is not the same as this essence, already the differentiation of the absolute, its 
self-reflection? Isn’t this precisely the question of being which provokes thought to think the 
non-thought so as to determine the concept? Hyppolite will go on to say that the contradiction 
expresses itself due to the self-division of the absolute. What is being said here is that, essence, 
as a particular sense, is itself not distinct from being. It is itself the reflection of being. How so? 
He argues that: “Essence is indeed being-in-itself and for itself, but it is still in itself. Its 
comprehension is not its own comprehension. Essence has reintroduced the immediacy of being; 
this is why it is no longer essence, but concept.”60 Essence reintroduces the immediacy of being, 
since it is itself produced by the dialectical logic of the absolute. Its own appearing is 
recognizable retrospectively, as immediately involved in all of the determinations, as the 
universal logic that connects and posits them, by beginning the process of self-division again. It 
is in this sense that the difference of essence and appearance is itself overcome. It is overcome in 
the self-relation of the absolute as mediation. Hyppolite sums up this thought by noting that:  
the genesis of sense was implicit in the prior spheres; this genesis is the Logic, 
because the Logic is the constitution of being as sense, comprehension, not as 
reference to a thing comprehended distinct from the movement of comprehension, 
but this movement itself as intelligible genesis of the thing. […] The logic is the 
absolute form which is its object for itself.
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 As object for itself, the logicity of being is the universal sense which is already there 
contained in each particular sense. Considered for-itself, or reflected in thought for-itself, it 
shows itself to be immediately there in the field of reflection as the “ground behind the 
appearance as essence.” According to Hyppolite, the logic of sense demonstrates how the 
concept is already there as essence, “being is shown across essence as sense,” or, better yet, “the 
universal expresses it and gets expressed in it.”62 He continues to note that, “it is like a second 
being behind the first, but when we no longer abstract from its position, when we comprehend it 
as self-positing, as self-constituting, then, it is no longer essence but sense.”63 By no longer being 
essence but sense, the absolute challenges any sort of abstraction of essence as an indeterminate 
determination. It overturns its differentiation in the other in order to posit a new position, in other 
words, to begin the cycle all over again. To reiterate, it is able to do this because its self-division 
is immanent in every position. It, therefore, no longer contradicts itself, since it is identical to 
itself in positing itself. This is what is understood as the double negation, or the negation of the 
limitation, by way of which the absolute itself is affirmed in its identity.
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 Such affirmation, for 
Hegel, involves the thought of absolute being, which is posited as a universal sense or concept. 
As universal sense, it “contains intrinsically every particular sense. […] It now knows itself as 
the sense of all of the senses.”65 Or, it is the Logic that explains how the essence as particular 
sense appears in the universal, and how this universal underpins the particular.
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 Hyppolite 
concludes his text by noting that: “Hegelian Logic is the absolute genesis of sense, a sense 
which, to itself, is its own sense, which is not opposed to the being whose sense it is, but which 
is sense and being simultaneously.”67 By briefly exploring essence and appearance we have, 
hence, demonstrated how the being of sense and the sense of being are involved in one and the 
same dialectical development of the absolute. Or how the “circle of Essence takes up that of 
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Being, and the circle of the Concept that of Essence.”68 This duality in unity is the rationale 
behind Hyppolite’s claim that immanence is complete in Hegel’s philosophy.  
 As the reader will notice, Deleuze’s primary position in the appendix to Logic and 
Existence is to affirm, alongside Hyppolite, that ontology must be ontology of sense. The whole 
problem, however, lies in the positing of this sense. Deleuze articulates this problem when 
writing: “The difference between thought and being is sublated in the absolute by the positing of 
the Being identical to difference which, as such, thinks itself and reflects itself in man. The 
absolute identity of being and difference is called sense.”69 To a Hegelian, this articulation may 
appear as though proposing no problem whatsoever, or, alternatively, if it is perceived as 
problematic, the problem would lie in Deleuze’s formulation of Hegel’s logic. From Deleuze’s 
perspective, however, the difference made cannot be sublated in the absolute. Such a sublation, 
for him, is merely the reduction of difference to the identity of the concept. Besides the vague 
argument that difference cannot be reduced to identity, what is behind Deleuze’s objection? In 
order for Hegel to eliminate the contradiction that he has himself posited in his system of 
thought, he must reduce the differentiation of the absolute to the position already stated. In other 
words, the sense of being, which is the highest knowledge for Hegel, is proposed as identical to 
the being of sense, but it is not adequate to its genesis, or becoming. It is as though, in thinking 
the absolute itself, Hegel closes the circle where the absolute opens itself up to a new position, a 
higher differentiation; contradiction gives birth to ground. He sacrifices difference to ensure the 
consistency of the position; to preserve the status of the copula, or identify the sides of the 
absolute which he frames as contradictory. But when Deleuze critiques Hegel sense of being, he 
does not merely seek to reform his logic, so as to render it more consistent with the philosophy 
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of difference. He seeks to uproot the entirety of the logic. This is reflected in the series of his 
inquiries in the conclusion of the review:  
Can we not construct an ontology of difference which would not have to go up to 
contradiction, because contradiction would be less than difference and not more? Is 
not contradiction itself only the phenomenal and anthropological aspect of 
difference? […] Is it the same thing to say that Being expresses itself and that it 
contradicts itself? […] Does not Hyppolite ground a theory of expression where 
difference is expression itself, and contradiction is merely the phenomenal aspect?
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Scholars have placed the emphasis on the first question as the central one that will preoccupy 
Deleuze in Difference and Repetition. As Leonard Lawlor writes, Deleuze is inquiring into “what 
concept of difference is needed for an ontology of sense to be adequate to a philosophy of 
immanence?”71 The other aspect of this philosophy of difference is, however, to render 
contradiction superfluous, or to show it as the mere anthropological aspect of difference. When 
Deleuze proposes that contradiction is the anthropological aspect of difference, he is taking issue 
with the whole notion of the absolute as Subject, which differentiates itself by reflecting itself. In 
this sense, ontological contradiction is the same as ontic negativity, the latter being projected 
onto the former.  
 That contradiction is itself modelled after phenomenal opposition is likewise a point of 
contention for Hyppolite, who asks:  
If it is the case that [Hegel] speaks of one self-same negativity is there an 
equivocation here? We cannot [sway away from] asking this question, and the issue 
is especially to discover whether Hegel has more or less transposed an ontic 
negativity into an ontological negativity, a real opposition into a logical 
contradiction.
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Hyppolite’s response to this question is in the negative, since the absolute thinks itself in its 
other. It is in no way limited by the phenomenal realm. According to him, Hegel’s dialectical 
method is adequate to being. In contrast, Deleuze argues that it is not the same thing to say that 
being expresses itself and that it contradicts itself. It is not clear in the review as to why he 
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distinguishes between the expression of being and its self-contradiction. But having in mind that 
Deleuze will go on to write a minor thesis on Spinoza, entitled, Expressionism in Philosophy, we 
see that this distinction is the germ of the development of a new logic. Deleuze cannot be 
reconciled with Hegel precisely because the dialectical logic cannot be rearticulated so as to 
reflect a new philosophy of difference. For Deleuze, “the source of the difficulty was already 
there in the logic,” this is why he will go on to posit an alternative logic by turning to Spinoza.73 
Let us stay with the idea that Hegel’s dialectic cannot be rearticulated so as to reflect a new 
philosophy of difference by briefly turning to the central argument that Deleuze puts forth 
against him in Difference and Repetition.  
 In his defence of the Hegelian position in “Limit, Ground, Judgement… Syllogism: Hegel, 
Deleuze, Hegel and Deleuze,” Jay Lampert argues that Deleuze reduces the Hegelian ground to 
the Leibnizian notion of convergence, when the ground is “the source of still more difference.”74 
The problem for Deleuze is not that Hegel appears to have conceived of difference as sort of 
convergence as Leibniz had done, neither is the idea that the absolute realizes itself with ever 
more differentiations put into question by him, since the ground is indeed the rendering infinite 
of the concept, so requiring ever more differentiations. The point is that, the ground as ‘still more 
difference’ does not save Hegel from a Deleuzean critique. It is instead the basis of such a 
critique. It is not enough to extend the ground in order to demonstrate how difference works on 
its terrain. What Hegel calls contradiction is radically reformulated in Deleuze’s philosophy as 
the moment of differentiation, expressed in the questioning instance, what difference is there; a 
difference that pertains to the movement from one level of repetition to another. For Deleuze, 
difference does not “resolve itself” in the ground as it does in Hegel. It is primary, meaning that 
it is the moment of groundlessness showing itself in the ground as erecting the ground itself. The 
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entirety of the process of erecting the ground from the perspective of groundlessness presents the 
difference; it is the singular event itself in the making. The so-called higher position for Deleuze 
does not involve “reaching the infinite” of contradiction, or raising difference to contradiction. 
What is this higher moment but the affirmation of absolute knowledge, the realization of the 
dialectical logic itself in the concept, in which the essence of the finite is said from the 
perspective of the infinite?  
 There is a significant reversal of this moment in Deleuze’s philosophy, here referred to as 
the paradox of sense or the Event of thought. This moment is not a preservation of what came 
before. It is not a raising up. It is a releasing in the highest affirmation in which the difference is 
made. This is why Deleuze claims that “difference is light, aerial and affirmative. To affirm is 
not to bear but, on the contrary, to discharge and to lighten.”75 In other words, when we claim 
that Hegel seems to have closed the circle, or that he reduces difference rather than raising it up 
to a higher position in contradiction, we are arguing alongside Deleuze that the dialectical circle 
saves the whole in a “gigantic memory;” that the ground is the “power of memory” which carries 
“the average forms to infinity.”76 In the place of the selection of difference on the basis of re-
presentation, Deleuze argues for a repetition that would affirm the “formless power of the 
ground.”77 In contrast to representation, “repetition is the formless being of all differences, the 
formless power of the ground which carries every object to the extreme ‘form’ in which its 
representation comes undone.”78 This unlimited return of difference is Deleuze’s univocal being, 
the ontology of sense, which expresses itself in the same sense. But doesn’t this mean that 
difference is left undetermined? This is precisely what Lampert asks in the concluding arguments 
to his paper. He writes:  
If each determination if already a difference, then making it different will not negate 
it. But does this mean that difference has no determinate content? If each 
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determination were a general ‘mixture’ […], then while the upside would be that 
identity [is] lost, the downside would be that so was difference. But if differences are 
indeed determinate, why not call them negative? After all, they would override 
boundaries, flee constraints, abstract from properties, become-other, etc.
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In The Logic of Sense Deleuze warns against this sort of interpretation of difference. He notes 
that: 
what is common to metaphysics and transcendental philosophy is, above all, this 
alternative which they both impose on us: either an undifferentiated ground, a 
groundlessness, formless nonbeing, or an abyss without difference and without 
properties, or a supremely individuated Being and an intensely personalized Form. 
Without this Being or this Form, you will have only chaos.
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Deleuze is not satisfied with expressing difference under the concept. Neither is he willing to 
leave difference indeterminate. The difference made in the doubled affirmation, what he will call 
the eternal return, is the ground made from the perspective of groundlessness, not the other way 
around. It is a reversal, a kind of turning inside out of the surface, in which identity is said of 
difference, groundlessness as raising the ground, and determination as both determination and 
indetermination at once. Having outlined the core of Deleuze’s critique of Hegel’s dialectical 
logic, we will now turn to his development of an alternative logic by way of Spinoza. 
 
A Spinozist Expression: Toward a New Logic 
 
 
When introducing Hyppolite’s central thesis in Logic and Existence, we briefly highlighted 
that, for him, Hegel was able to realize the doctrine of complete immanence that Spinoza had 
fallen short of fulfilling. Hyppolite sums up the problem that Hegel has with the Spinozist system 
when writing: “The Spinozistic substance still lacked the principle of self-reflection. It was in 
itself pure activity, self-causing, but its activity did not exhibit itself as mediation, as self-
becoming.”81 We wrapped up the discussion by emphasizing Deleuze’s remarks on Hegelian 
dialectical logic. Those remarks characterize the fundamentals of Deleuze’s project, which is to 
43 
 
develop a philosophy of difference that is not only an alternative to Hegel’s, but also realizes the 
endeavour initiated by Martin Heidegger. Deleuze’s position on Hegelian negation is elaborated 
in Difference and Repetition, in which he argues that dialectical movement is an artificial 
movement. His critique of dialectical movement echoes Hegel’s refutation of Spinoza. 
According to Deleuze, it is Spinoza—a thinker he acclaims as a philosopher of pure 
affirmation—who realizes immanence, with the Ethics being a book of pure ontology.82 
Hegel’s position on Spinoza’s system is clearly articulated in two brief sections of the 
Science of Logic.
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 Hegel does not outright refute Spinoza’s philosophy as false. He, instead, 
seeks to demonstrate that his thought, despite lacking dialectical development, nevertheless 
marks a progression towards the form of thought which is of the highest standpoint. This is 
consistent with his position that “the true system as the higher must contain the subordinate 
system within itself.”84 Hegel argues that Spinoza’s system can only be refuted if we are able to 
show that the dialectic is already immanent to the relations of substance, and that such relations, 
in turn, lead to the concept. The crux of his refutation is the following:  
[Spinoza] does not advance to a cognition of negation as absolute, that is, self-
negating, negation; thus his substance does not itself contain the absolute form, and 
cognition of it is not an immanent cognition. True, substance is the absolute unity of 
thought and being or extension; therefore it contains thought itself, but only in its 
unity with extension, that is, not as separating itself from extension, hence in general 
not as a determinative and formative activity, nor as a movement which return into 
and begins from itself.
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Because the attributes are not themselves opposed in Spinoza’s system, there is no movement in 
it. In other words, since there is no opposition, there is no becoming in the attribute. As there is 
no becoming in the attribute, especially the attribute of thought, Hegel argues that thought is an 
external reflection in Spinoza’s system, leaving substance itself indeterminate. According to 
Hegel, Spinoza’s philosophy stops at an indifferent substance, because it does not reach the 
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“highest standpoint,” which is the self-negating negation of substance, or alternatively, the 
absolute determinateness of the Notion or concept.  
The problem is that Hegel interprets extension and thought as two substances, which must 
be opposed in order for one to become the other. He is, hence, mobilizing a specific lens through 
which to read thought and extension as two substances, the reciprocal relations of which, results 
in the identity of the concept. For him, then, 
the Notion, the totality resulting from the reciprocal relation, is the unity of the two 
substances standing in that relation; but in this unity they are now free, for they no 
longer possess their identity as something blind, that is to say, as something merely 
inner; on the contrary, the substances now have essentially the status of an illusory 
being, of being moments of reflection, whereby each is no less immediately united 
with its other or its positedness and each contains its positedness within itself, and 
consequently in its other is posited as simply and solely identical with itself.
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This positedness or position is the substance as cause of itself, but now reflected for-itself in the 
concept. It is not merely in itself, but being for-itself, it displaces the opposition or contradiction 
of two substances, in order to reflect its identity, or become absolutely determined in thought as 
purely self-related. Here we see that in the same move, Hegel both refutes Spinozism as having 
reinstalled Cartesian dualism, while showing that the attributes, which he mistakes as two, must 
be raised to contradiction, so that the reflection of the absolute becomes an immanent reflection 
rather than an external one. In contrast, Deleuze will spend a significant chunk of his 
Expressionism in Philosophy defending the idea that Spinoza displaces such a dualism. This 
defence is strategic, since there is no mention of Hegel, only the refutation of the Cartesian 
system by Spinoza.  
Before we move on to consider the logic of expression, we want to note that Deleuze 
corrects the Spinozist system, or rather, accentuates different elements of it, in such a way that he 
not only dissolves the basis on which Hegel refutes Spinoza’s philosophy, but also develops a 
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philosophical system which he claims to be consistent with the pillars of Spinoza’s logic. We 
will see that Deleuze also finds substance itself problematic. His Nietzschean correction of 
Spinoza, will delve on the same point, but from an entirely different perspective than Hegel. The 
logic of expression which is set up in Expressionism in Philosophy will, nevertheless, remain as 
the genuine logic of univocal being, affirmed in Spinoza’s philosophy, and advanced by Deleuze 
in his other works. Expressionism in Philosophy, published in 1968, but written in the late 
1950’s,87 is Deleuze’s minor thesis accompanying his major thesis, Difference and Repetition 
(1968). The latter work along with The Logic of Sense, published a year later, and some fourteen 
years after the appendix to Hyppolite’s text, are works that Deleuze’s is no longer dedicating to 
the history of philosophy, but texts in which he is “doing” philosophy. In all of the works 
mentioned, he is developing the ontology of univocal being, which promises to be an effective 
displacement of Hegel’s absolute being that expresses itself or says itself in language.88 In other 
words, he is seeking to lay out a univocal being that likewise is not simply a human expression, 
but the discourse of being. According to Deleuze, such a univocal being is affirmed by the 
Spinozist system, because that system furthers the logic of expression. The logic of expression is 
the only one which is able to realize the doctrine of complete immanence. In this subsection, we 
will inquire as to how the logic of expression is furthered by what Deleuze calls Spinoza’s plane 
of immanence.
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On the Univocal Nature of the Attributes 
 
 
The whole of Spinoza’s Ethics hangs on the primary definition of the absolute with which 
he opens the text. Absolute being whose essence it is to exist in itself, as opposed to finding its 
existence in another, nevertheless requires philosophical demonstration in order to be explicated. 
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This seemingly simple definition is not hypothetical; it is itself a definitive ontological 
proposition demonstrative of the act of thought from which all else expressed follows. The 
Ethics is consistent with the logic of expression in Expressionism in Philosophy, if we pay close 
attention to the terminology of essence and existence deployed by Spinoza. The subtle shifts in 
expression produce different levels of reality. On the absolute, Spinoza writes: “by cause of itself 
I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived 
except by existing.”90 As we read this definition along with Deleuze’s insights, we already find 
within it a genetic function which acquires expressivity in the attribute of thought. Deleuze 
employs this definition, along with those that follow, to argue for the primary triad of expression 
consisting of substance, attributes and essence: “substance expresses itself, attributes are 
expressions, and essence is expressed.”91 Spinoza’s first use of the concept of expression is in 
D6, when he conceives of the attributes in relation to substance, writing: “By God I understand a 
being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each 
one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.”92 Deleuze captures the relation of substance, 
attribute, and, essence, through the prism of expression by arguing for the distinction of terms, 
each having a definitive function in the logic, insofar as it is conceived of in relation to the other 
two. Substance and attributes are distinct because attributes express essences. Essence is distinct 
from attributes, insofar as essence is the “expressed of substance.”93 While, as expressed, it has 
no existence outside of the attribute, it is distinguished from it by being the essence of 
substance.
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 Attributes are not themselves essences, they constitute the existence of substance, or 
are the forms through which substance finds expression, rather than remaining bound up 
potential. Conversely, we cannot confuse essence with substance, since essences find expression 
through the attributes themselves. Deleuze sums up the introduction to the structure of 
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expression, noting: “It is through attributes that essence is distinguished from substance, but 
through essence that substance is itself distinguished from attributes: a triad each of whose terms 
serves as a middle term relating the two others.”95 
Now that we have set up the first triad of the logic of expression, we will explain the 
relation of the terms by turning to the fundamental idea that makes such relation possible. This is 
the real distinction of the attributes themselves. In order to demonstrate the distinction of terms, 
Deleuze focuses in on Spinoza’s differentiation of real from numerical distinction, which is also 
the basis of Spinoza critique of the Cartesian system of thought. The argument is that: “there are 
not several substance of the same attribute, and numerical distinction is not real.”96 The second 
argument, which is drawn from the conclusions arrived in the first, is that there is only one and 
the same substance for all attributes. The idea that attributes are expressive of substance poses 
some difficulties which we will present in order to demonstrate what this notion of the expressed 
consists of. The principle problem lies with the attributes themselves which present multiple 
substances, while at the same time conceive of one and the same substance which, by being 
independent of other substances, is in itself indivisible. The question that dominates the first part 
of Spinoza’s Ethics is, hence, can there be more than one substance, and, if so, on what basis can 
we distinguish one from another? This is also the question that Deleuze attempts to resolve in the 
first section of his study. According to Deleuze, there is an ambiguity in Descartes dual aspect of 
attributes, particularly, the way in which attributes relate both to substance and to the modes; the 
movement of “really distinct to really distinct things.” That attributes qualify substance is not in 
question. The problem is that the distinction in substance of attributes relies on the modes 
themselves which share the same attribute. The modes, which are thought to distinguish one and 
the same substance of an attribute, introduce a numerical distinction. Spinoza objects on two 
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fronts: firstly, modes are not substances distinguished by a single attribute, and, secondly, if we 
were to presume that more than one substance existed of an attribute, it would have to be 
numerically distinct rather than really distinct. By refuting the notion of modes as substances that 
distinguish one and the same attribute, Spinoza is stating that the attributes cannot be 
numerically distinguished by modes, as if parts constituting a whole. His rationale is that such 
parts, now conceived of as numerically distinct substances, are limited by one another, hence, 
finding their cause in something external to the attribute which is now made finite. Again, this 
sort of demonstration is based on the premise that two things can only be distinguished by the 
attribute they hold in common; an attribute which is presupposed as infinite. “Two or more 
distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of 
substance or by a difference in their affections.”97 Since modes are finite, if we presume that they 
themselves distinguish the attribute which they hold in common, then the attribute itself cannot 
be infinite. If we are to presume, however, that substance is indeed infinite, then, we must search 
for the cause of the distinction of things in something other than numerical distinction.
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For Spinoza, numerical distinction is not a substantial distinction, because it supposes 
substances which are produced by something other than themselves, hence, putting into question 
the notion that substance is “what can exist by itself.” Or, as Deleuze notes, two substances rely 
for their distinction by sharing one and the same attribute, so that the numerical distinction of 
substance is contradictory to the nature of infinite substance.
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 Numerical distinction belongs 
primarily to finite modes, rather than to the substance of attributes since parts, even if considered 
from the perspective of a whole, cannot “reach” infinity. Deleuze himself concludes the 
discussion by writing:  
there cannot be several substances with the same attribute. From which one may 
infer: from the viewpoint of relation, that one substance is not produced by another; 
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from the viewpoint of modality, that it belongs to the nature of substance to exist; 
and from the viewpoint of quality, that any substance is necessarily infinite.
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The finite modes therefore are not substances or substantial parts which distinguish one and the 
same attribute. This distinction is important to setting up not only the real distinction of 
attributes, but also the distinction of the essence of substance, and the essences of modes. Once 
Spinoza has demonstrated that numerical distinction is not a real one, he goes on to make a 
substantial shift by arguing that there is only one substance for all the attributes. Deleuze 
explains this fundamental shift by noting that there is continuity in Spinoza argumentation from 
the dismissal of numerical distinction, to the claim that attributes are not themselves numerically 
distinct substances constituting one and the same substance, as if parts relating to the whole. He 
writes that, since “numerical distinction is never real; then conversely, real distinction is never 
numerical […] so there is only one substance for all attributes.”101 How is the real distinction of 
the attributes conceived of in the Ethics? On the real distinction of the attributes, Spinoza writes 
in A5: “things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through 
one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.”102 As we have 
seen, the nature of the attributes is infinite, proven a posteriori by the notion that finite modes 
themselves cannot be substances which distinguish an attribute. Or, the attribute in question 
cannot be determined by the division of finite things, or by the modalities of thought. What is at 
stake in such a claim? We have a more concrete sense of what is at stake in the distinction, when 
Spinoza writes that: “It follows…that God, or all of God’s attributes, are immutable. For if they 
change as to their existence, they would also change as to their essence, that is … from being 
true become false, which is absurd.”103 An attribute such as thought, must be infinite, one and the 
same for all modes sharing in the attribute. Again, these distinctions are based on the idea that 
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substance must be infinite or unlimited by a finite part or thing, which would “deny existence to 
its nature.”104  
But if we have shown that the substances of attributes are infinite, how has this 
demonstrated that they are distinct? Spinoza writes that:  
God’s attributes are to be understood [as] what expresses an essence of the divine 
substance, that is, what pertains to substance. The attributes themselves, I say, must 
involve it itself. But eternity pertains to the nature of substance […] Therefore each 
of the attributes must involve eternity, and so they are eternal.
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Moreover, he goes on to say that, “the existence of substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth 
[…] and from this we can infer in another way that there is only one [substance] of the same 
nature.”106 According to Spinoza, then, the attributes express the essence of substance, but the 
existence and essence of substance is one and the same. Hence, it must be so that the attributes 
are infinite in nature, while together constituting the absolute infinity of substance. The attributes 
following from the nature of God, thus, must themselves be infinite according to Spinoza: “For 
since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, 
the more power it has, of itself, to exist. Therefore, an absolute infinite Being, or God, has, of 
himself, an absolutely infinite power of existing. For that reason, he exists absolutely.”107  Each 
attribute must express an infinite essence, while Being itself must consist of attributes that are 
infinite, because it is absolutely infinite. Attributes, which are like points of view on substance, 
express the existence of substance, which is one and the same. As expressive or attributive, the 
attributes according to Deleuze are genetic or dynamic elements. The attributes must be affirmed 
as such genetic elements, in order to demonstrate how substance “explicates” itself. The 
existence of substance is affirmed by the real distinction of attributes through which it 
“explicates” itself. Since it is the attributes which constitute or qualify the existence of substance, 
the more attributes that qualify a thing the more reality or perfection it has.
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 The structuration 
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of the logic of expression, as Deleuze rightly recognizes, depends upon the real distinction of the 
attributes. In order to assert that substance, finding expression in the attributes which are by its 
nature infinite, so as to affirm itself as the same thing, we must distinguish them really and not 
numerically. Not only is the real distinction of the attributes fundamental in demonstrating the 
existence of one substance, which is the cause of itself, it has a pertinent role in refuting the 
Hegelian critique of Spinoza. Deleuze, thus, spends a bulk of the first section dealing with the 
Cartesian elements in Spinoza’s philosophy, in order to show that the distinction of the attributes 
is consistent with the idea of an indivisible substance. Real distinction as the foundation for 
refuting Descartes’ position is also meant to debunk the Hegelian refutation of Spinoza.  
The analysis of real distinction, Deleuze argues, is the only one which “shows it to be 
possible to ascribe all attributes to one being, and so to pass from the infinity of each attribute to 
the absoluteness of a being that possesses them all.”109 The attributes considered as substances 
are qualitatively distinct, or they qualify substance, but they are not ontologically distinct from 
the perspective of substance. 
The idea of expression, in the Ethics, adapts this initial step: the essence of substance 
has no existence outside the attribute that express it, so that each attribute expresses a 
certain eternal and infinite essence. What is expressed has no existence outside its 
expressions; each expression is, as it were, the existence of what is expressed.
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Now, the difficulty of this position shows itself when the multiplicity of the attributes is 
affirmed, but all together they are thought to express one and the same essence of substance.
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Again, Deleuze reiterates that the essences expressed are not the essences of attributes, but 
ontologically one and the same essence of substance. What is expressed of substance in the 
attributes is its sense or essence, but what expresses itself in the attributes is one and the same 
substance. Hence, Deleuze writes that: “the rule of convertibility states that every essence is the 
essence of something. Essences are really distinct form the viewpoint of the attributes, but 
52 
 
essence is single from the viewpoint of the object with which it is convertible.”112 By delving 
into the multiplicity of attributes as expressing one and the same substance, Deleuze is inquiring 
as to how multiple attributes or divine names can designate one and the same thing or object. He 
resolves this dilemma by arguing that the essence which is the expressed of attributes, is 
distinguished from them, insofar as what expresses itself in essence is “one in the same thing for 
all attributes,” which are only formally distinct.113 If we inquire as to 
 what exists through itself, in such a way that its existence follows from its essence? 
This is clearly substance, the correlate of essence, rather than the attribute in which 
essence has existence solely as essence. […] All existing essences relate or are 
attributable to substance and this inasmuch as substance is the only being whose 
existence necessarily follows from its essence.
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To reiterate, the expressed essence or sense itself has no existence outside of the attribute which 
is expressive of it. It is not the sense of the attributes, but of what expresses itself through them.  
What does it mean for a substance to be the same for all attributes or to have an identical 
being in all of them?  What does it mean for all attributes to designate one and the same 
substance? Ontologically, God’s existence is equal to his essence. Deleuze conceives of 
substance then in the following way: attributes constitute the essences of substance, but they 
have the identity of being or “designate” one and the same substance because that which is 
expressed by them expresses itself in the same sense of all the attributes. When arguing that they 
designate one and the same thing, the attributes must not be confused with the modalities of 
attributes, which would be properties attributed to substance. Spinoza himself opposes such a 
formulation when writing that “the actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, like will, desire, 
love, and the like, must be referred to Natura naturata, not to natura naturans;” the former 
pertains to what follows from God’s nature or from his attributes, while the latter is conceived 
through itself.
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 We have yet to prove the way in which it the attributes are “said” in one and the 
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same sense, but the logic of expression, thus far, simultaneously preserves the “identity of being 
and distinction of formality.”116 The attributes which are expressive of substance, tell us that God 
is a thinking Being and an extended Being. But what expresses itself, is precisely the same thing 
from the perspective of substance, as it has the same sense in both attributes. The attributes 
follow from it in the same way, or as Deleuze notes, “each attribute is a verb, a primary infinitive 
proposition, an expression with a distinct sense; but all attributes designate substance as one and 
the same thing.”117The relevance of this first conception of sense or essence in Spinoza 
according to Deleuze is that it demonstrates that the attributes affirm the univocal being. By 
univocal being, he means that being expresses itself in the same way in all the attributes. Now, 
these attributes, which Deleuze interprets as infinitive propositions in that text, are re-expressed 
in the modes as “‘participal’ propositions which derive from the primary infinitive ones.”118 
 
On Univocal Causality 
 
 
Having set up the first triad of the logic of expression, Deleuze turns to the re-expression of 
substance in the modes through the attributes. The rationale behind conceiving the expression of 
substance in modes as a re-expression is that the essence of substance, which finds expression in 
the attributes, is not the same as the essence of modes. The difference is precisely that the 
essence of modes is dependent upon the modification of substance, which, as before, finds 
expression in the attributes. It is in this sense that we can say that the modes are affections of the 
attributes, or that the attributes are re-expressed in the modes. In other words, while the essence 
of modes is contained in the attributes, the attributes themselves are not constitutive of this 
essence. It is the modification of substance that is expressed by the attributes in the modes. 
Deleuze frames the second triad of the logic of expression in the following way:  
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Each attribute expresses itself, the dependent modes are expressions, and a 
modification is expressed. […] A modification has no existence outside the modes 
that expresses it in each attribute, but it is expressed as a modification of substance, 
the same for all modes differing in attribute. […] In principle, a mode is an affection 
of an attribute, a modification an affection of substance. One is understood formally, 
the other ontologically.
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Before we specify how the distinction formulated in the latter part of the above quotation 
will be the problem that preoccupies Deleuze in the second part of his study, we would like to 
highlight that, despite claims to the contrary, the notion of re-expression is not foreign to 
Spinoza’s thought.120 This is demonstrated in the Ethics when he writes:  
Since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely, those which 
follow necessarily from his absolute nature and others had to be produced by the 
mediation of these first things, it follows […] that God is absolutely the proximate 
cause of the things produced immediately by him […]. For God’s effects can neither 
be nor be conceived without their cause. [Nevertheless] God cannot properly be 
called the remote cause of singular things, except perhaps so that we may distinguish 
them from those things that are produced immediately or rather, that follow from his 
absolute nature. […] All things are, are in God, and so depend on God that they can 
neither be nor be conceived without him.
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This quotation demonstrates that the two triads of expression are not exclusive of one another. 
What follows immediate from God’s absolute nature (natura naturans), which is its essence 
expressed by the attributes, cannot be severed from what is expressed by the attributes in the 
modes (natura naturata). But the modes are expressive of an effect, insofar as this effect is 
attributed to a modification immediate to substance, its acting power as cause. This is God’s re-
expression; it is the cause of all things in the same way that it is the cause of itself. Modes as the 
effect of God’s cause are conceived through the attributes, which is to say that their cause is 
found in God and not the attributes.  
In the previous discussion, we point out that the attributes are formally distinct, while 
designating one and the same thing ontologically. This argument is the basis on which the second 
triad of expression is built. In turn, the second level of expression must maintain the integrity of 
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that argument. Even while we explore two points of view on the modes, we must maintain the 
univocal nature of the attributes. The modes themselves are grasped as the affections of 
attributes, and affections or modifications of substance. As Deleuze noted, the former is 
understood formally, while the other ontologically. This is not to say that the affections of 
attributes themselves do not presuppose the modifications of substance, but only that there are 
two ways of approaching the modes. We can either understand them through their effects 
external to the cause; or we can comprehend them through the complication or modification of 
substance which is their cause. As we are invoking comprehension, however, in each case they 
are grasped through the attributes, since the attributes are the common forms of substance and 
modes. If we are to understand them as affections of attributes, then we must deal with the 
problem of epistemological parallelism, which nevertheless, as we noted, implies the 
modification of substance. That demonstration will return us, however, to the modification of 
substance itself, or what Deleuze refers to as ontological parallelism. There we must inquire as to 
how a modification can be conceived under two powers, all the while ontologically being one 
and the same modification. The entirety of Deleuze’s demonstration is not only meant to depose 
opposition in the attributes, but also contradiction on the ontological level.   
Most readers of Spinoza are familiar with the identity of order of the attributes, or what is 
more typically referred to as parallelism. This idea is demonstrated by Spinoza in few short 
passages in “Of the Mind.” There he argues that the object of the mind is the body, insofar as the 
ideas of the affections of the body exist in God, rather than existing in the mind itself. 
Alternatively, one and the same modification of God is expressed in multiple ways by different 
modes of attributes simultaneously, or as Deleuze puts it: “Because attributes constitute one and 
the same substance, modes that differ in attribute form one and the same modification.”122 Does 
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this mean that the mind knows the body? This is clearly not the case. Even though “the object of 
the idea constituting the human mind is the body,” whether it is my body or another, the 
intelligence does not directly know the body, neither is it the cause of changes in the body.
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While the same modification is expressed in a mode of the attribute of extension, and a mode of 
the attribute of thought, the two attributes maintain their separate spheres of expression. This is 
what Spinoza means when writing that:  
The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered 
under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under 
any other attribute. […] For each attribute is conceived through itself without any 
other. So the modes of each attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, but 
not of another one.
124
  
 
The central idea reinforcing the equality of the attributes is the modifications of substance. Each 
attribute must be conceived through itself, rather than being thought through the other, as though 
the other were its opposite.  
As Deleuze argues, however, because the attributes refer to one and the same substance, 
there is a constant relation between them. What happens in one is reflected in another. He 
interprets such an identity of order to take place between two things or two series, “which bear to 
each other a constant relation such that there is nothing in one to which there corresponds 
nothing in the other, while real causality between them is excluded.”125 The idea that the modes 
of attributes form a correspondence, all the while maintaining their autonomy, is an idea that will 
influence Deleuze in The Logic of Sense. In the “Fourth Series of Dualities” and elsewhere, sense 
will be considered as an effect expressed in the dual series of propositions and things, in general. 
More broadly, Deleuze’s philosophical style in The Logic of Sense, the short series which seem 
to end abruptly, bearing little continuity with what follows or has been said, can be understood as 
reflecting what he finds in Spinoza’s philosophy, including his method.126 The problem that The 
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Logic of Sense reflects, simply by way of the style in which it is written, is also one that Deleuze 
explores as the Spinozist problem in Expressionism of Philosophy. Because the modes of 
attributes are expressive of effects, the question is: Can the effect give us knowledge of the 
cause? Or, alternatively, how can we arrive at the adequate knowledge of the cause? It seems as 
though knowing by virtue of the effect, only gives us common notions or the ideas of affects, not 
the third kind of knowledge. For the most part, Spinoza will argue that knowing by the effect, or 
having common knowledge is sufficient, even if it is not the highest form of knowledge. Indeed, 
a large section of his Ethics is indicative of this type of knowledge, having been written on the 
affects. The question, nevertheless, remains, and in a sense bridges Expressionism in Philosophy, 
and The Logic of Sense: Can the continuous variation or modification of being be thought on its 
own terms? How, if in any way, is it implicated in the effects themselves? 
Thus far, we have repeatedly invoked the modification of substance without explaining its 
significance. In order to consider modification on the ontological level, we must return to the 
opening statements on the second triad of the logic of expression. The second triad, indeed the 
modification of substance itself, is a response to the question of production: “Why does God 
produce anything at all?” This is essentially the question: Why does God re-express himself? On 
the most basic level, modification itself is the sufficient reason behind the existence of things or 
modes. But having said that the essence of modes is not the same as the essence of substance, 
insofar as modes explicate the modifications of substance through the attributes, how are we to 
grasp such production? We must approach production from the perspective of power. In 
discussing the attributes in the previous section, we noted that the attributes express the essence 
of substance, which is its absolute infinite power of existing. It is in this same sense that God 
produces anything at all. Deleuze writes that:  
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To say that the essence of God is power, is to say that God produces infinity of things 
by virtue of the same power by which he exists. He thus produces them by existing. 
Cause of all things ‘in the same sense’ as cause of himself, he produces all things in 
his attributes, since his attributes constitute at once his essence and this existence.
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Since God produces all things by virtue his power of existing, his existence is equal to his power 
of action. Or alternatively, God creates as he exists so that his power of action is always realized, 
or is one and the same as his power of existing. As infinity of modes proceed from God’s power 
of existing, then, God, Deleuze notes, has the capacity to be affected or modified in infinity of 
ways. This capacity to be affected, of which God is the active cause, therefore, corresponds to his 
power.
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 Because God is always the active cause of his affections, meaning that he is not acted 
upon, or does not suffer action by something external to substance, his existence is identical to 
his essence. This argument preserves the one laid out in the first triad of expression, which is that 
the essence of substance, its quantity of reality or perfection, is identical to its existence, which, 
as we have seen, is its capacity to be affected.  
The image gets more complicated on the level of the modes. As we noted, God is cause of 
himself in the same sense as he is the cause of the modes. By virtue of its participation in the 
absolutely infinite power of God, the essence of a mode is likewise its power to exist. It is a 
degree of power. By this degree of power we mean that it too has a certain capacity of affection, 
which is specific to it. However, while God exists through himself, or is self-caused, the essence 
of a mode cannot be said to be the cause of its existence. Deleuze writes that “finite beings do 
not exist and are not preserved by their own power, but are dependent for their existence and 
preservation on a being able to preserve itself and to exist through itself.”129 A finite being, 
therefore, has a certain essence or degree of power, because it participates in the power of God. It 
participates in the power of God, by explicating this power in the attributes themselves. It is in 
this sense that the attributes contain the essence of modes. Does this power, however, remain 
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fixed or does it vary? This is one of the central problems that Deleuze will have to tackle in his 
study of Spinoza. The question revolves around the way in which a mode exercises such power. 
Unlike substance, a mode is a part of nature, which means that its power of affection is 
“exercised, either in affections produced by external things (those affections called passive), or 
in affections explained by its own essence (called active).”130 Broadly speaking, active affections 
increase our power to act, because they enable us to think the cause behind such affections, while 
passive ones confine us to the imagination. The former can be explained by the mode’s 
participation in the power of God, since, in essence, God cannot suffer action or a limitation on 
the power of action, while the latter cannot be attributed to him. Doesn’t the passage from the 
infinite to the finite introduce an inconsistency in the doctrine of complete immanence? Let us 
briefly turn to what Spinoza means when he says that a mode is a part of nature.  
According to Deleuze, there are two ways in which the mode is a part of nature. Since 
modes explicate substance through the attributes, or the attributes contain the essence of modes, 
we must inquire as to how modes are parts without introducing a numerical distinction in the 
attributes. The attributes being infinite qualities, are indivisible. As a part, a modal essence is a 
degree of power, or, as Deleuze refers to it, an intensive quantity. “Modal essences are thus 
distinguished from their attribute as intensities of its quality, and from one another as different 
degrees of intensity.”131 This is their intrinsic distinction. In this respect, a modal essence does 
not divide the quality of the attribute, but simply exercises a certain degree of such a quality 
according to its capacity. That modal essences are degrees of power or quantitative intensities 
pertains to all attributes, not merely the attribute of Thought, but also the attribute of Extension, 
in which no part as such exists prior to the production of modes. It is in this sense that one mode 
can be conceived of as distinct from another, without introducing numerical distinction in an 
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attribute. Moreover, once we conceive of modal essences as different degrees of power, meaning 
that they individuate the attributes in different ways, then, we can change our perspective to 
consider them as extrinsic or extensive parts in their relative separateness from one another. It is 
in this respect, also, that we can say that the essence of a finite thing is distinct from its modal 
existence. A mode’s determinate existence, in general, does not depend on itself; it has as its 
cause another mode or part, which also exists. Even while “the essence of such a mode is itself a 
degree of power […] the mode cannot exist unless it actually has an infinity of parts,” which 
configure the horizon or limit in which its degree of power is exercised.
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 Alternatively, the 
limit of an essence of a mode corresponds to extensive infinity, or the extrinsic parts acting on 
one another, in such a way as to form “greater or lesser infinite wholes.”133 But having separated 
the modes extrinsically from another by virtue of their differential individuation of the attributes, 
now we must explain how it is that in their separateness, they do not compromise the univocity 
of cause. The trouble is that while the distinct essence of each mode may be accounted for by the 
different quantity of a quality or attribute, we still do not have an adequate idea as to how 
substance itself modifies, and, conversely, how it is that the modes themselves affect one another 
externally without endangering the doctrine of immanence. The most forceful argument able to 
explain, simultaneously, how the modification of substance expresses itself as the variation of a 
power of a mode, and how its capacity of affection as its essence can remain fixed or limited in 
experience, is that of relation. The theory of relation upholds the univocity of cause.  
What is a relation in Spinoza’s philosophy? The simplest expression of what a relation is 
for Spinoza is found in the second part of the Ethics, when he writes that: “By singular things I 
understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. And if a number of individuals 
so concur in one action that together they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to 
61 
 
that extent, as one singular thing.”134 Singular things are like points of view on a relation. We can 
conceive of a relation as having an effect on the terms involved, but also, as being one singular 
thing that produces an effect. When a being inquires as to what the singular essence of a thing is, 
it cannot approach this being apart from a relation, even if, for now, this relation is an extrinsic 
point of view on substance. “A modal essence,” Deleuze writes, “expresses itself eternally in a 
certain relation, within its various different levels. […] But we should not confuse the essence 
and the relation in which it expresses itself.”135 A difficulty follows from this modal distinction. 
As we have said, the modal essence which expresses itself in a relation, does not determine the 
formation of such a relation. But, then, doesn’t the mode itself, in accordance with its capacity to 
be affected enter into specific types of relations? Deleuze writes in “What Can a Body do?” that:  
A horse, a fish, a man, or even two men […] do not have the same capacity to be 
affected: they are not affected by the same things, or not affected by the same things 
in the same way. A mode ceases to exist when it can no longer maintain between its 
parts the relation that characterizes it; and it ceases to exist when ‘it is rendered 
completely incapable of being affected in many ways.’ In short, relations are 
inseparable from the capacity to be affected.
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There are two ways in which one could resolve the apparent difficulty. Firstly, finite beings do 
not always have encounters in which they exercise active affections explained by their own 
essence. Nevertheless, even in suffering an affection or experiencing passive feelings, its 
capacity is being exercised. It is all that it is going to be in this very moment. Secondly, we can 
explain the distinction from the perspective of the attributes. Deleuze writes that “each existing 
mode explicates the attribute in the relation that characterizes it, in a way extrinsically distinct 
from other ways in other relations.”137 In other words, not only is the essence of a mode 
exercised in different relations, but modes themselves explicate the attributes in different ways in 
accordance with the relation in which they find themselves. Since modes do not cause the 
existence of the essence of different modes, but are only the causes of affections on existing 
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modes, it cannot be said that essence is the same as relation. It can only be said that an essence is 
exercised in a particular way in accordance with a relation.  
The question that now arises, the one we have been skirting around, is: how can we know 
the singular essence of something? This is the same as asking: how can we have adequate 
knowledge of its cause? In order to tackle this question, we must turn to the other power which is 
implied in ontological parallelism. By briefly looking at epistemological parallelism, we saw that 
a mode of the attribute of thought corresponded to a mode of the attribute of extension. The 
series of dualities or idea-object pairs, demonstrate that to every idea in the attribute of thought, 
there corresponds an object of that idea. Or as Spinoza puts it: “A mode of extension and the idea 
of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways.”138 Rather than looking at 
the idea-object pairs, under ontological parallelism, Deleuze is inquiring as to how they are one 
and the same thing by having an identity of being. We have already shown that God’s capacity of 
existing and acting is identical to his formal essence, which is constituted by the attributes. 
Furthermore, we argued that, by existing, God produces infinity of things, the essences of which 
are contained in the attributes. But because God understands himself as he produces, to the 
power of existing we must add the corresponding power of thinking, the latter being God’s 
capacity “to think infinitely many things in infinitely many ways.”139 According to Spinoza, 
everything which God creates also exists as an idea in his understanding. The thing which exists 
by virtue of God’s power of existing likewise exists as an idea of an affection of God. When we 
say that an idea exists as such, we want to make a distinction between the attributes, and the 
being which expresses itself. Deleuze’s argument is that the two powers of God cannot be 
identical to the two attributes that are known by human beings. By this, he means that the power 
of existing is not the same as the attribute of Extension, since the things of the understanding 
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have existence as well. In turn, the modes, of which there is a conception in God, need not be 
expressed in the attribute of Thought.  
However, if we want to have an objective idea of an affection of God, this idea must be 
reflected in the attribute of Thought. If God has a conception of a thing that exists as such, and 
this idea can only be reflected objectively in the attribute of Thought, then, the infinity of things 
will be reflected an infinite amount of times in the attribute of Thought. “Given a substantial 
modification,” Deleuze writes, “it will be expressed only once in each of the other attributes, but 
an infinity of times in infinite understanding, and therefore, in the attribute of Thought.”140 This 
is the sense in which the attribute of Thought has a privileged status in Spinoza’s philosophy. 
God’s idea can only find objective expression in the attribute of Thought, even while, by virtue 
of existing, it may express itself an infinite amount of times in the infinite attributes. As such, we 
can have an adequate idea of some singular thing that exists, if we have an idea of God as its 
cause, since the idea of this singular thing exist in God as a modification of substance, or an 
affection of God. The idea of the affection of God is reflected in the attribute of Thought, as the 
idea of the idea of this affection. To have an objective idea of God is, therefore, to have an 
adequate knowledge of the cause. This is to say that we are ignorant of the cause of the effect 
that a relation produces, so long as we have inadequate knowledge of the objective idea of God, 
as the cause of a singular thing. By virtue of the connection of causes, God is the cause of a 
singular thing, in the same sense that he is the cause of an idea of this thing in the attribute of 
Thought. Because in either case, the expression is identical, according to Deleuze, there is no 
contradiction. We do not have knowledge of the singular thing through itself, but due to a 
modification of substance, which expresses itself objectively in the attribute of Thought. What is 
expressed, in accordance with this logic, is the sense or essence of a singular thing. “The 
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knowledge of God’s essence, of particular essences as they are in God, and as conceived by 
God,” these three aspects of the logic of expression do not form a contradiction in  Spinoza’s 
philosophy.
141
 The only way in which a finite being can realize this kind of knowledge, is by 
exercising its capacity to be affected in a relation, whether this relation be with itself or another. 
We have explained how it is possible to have an adequate knowledge of the cause by looking at 
the identity of being. Next, we would like to outline the experiential aspect which realizes such a 
possibility.  
On the Knowledge of Singular Things 
 
 
Thus far, we have mentioned the three types of knowledge in Spinoza’s philosophy. The 
first type of knowledge revolves around the affections of the body. This is why in “Spinoza and 
the Three ‘Ethics,’” Deleuze refers to the first type of knowledge as knowledge of signs. A sign, 
he writes, is  
always an effect. An effect is first of all the trace of one body upon another, the state 
of a body insofar as it suffers the action of another body. It is an affection—for 
example, the effect of the sun on our body, which ‘indicates’ the nature of the body 
and merely ‘envelops’ the nature of the affecting body.142 
  
When the mind has images of the affections of bodies, then, according to Spinoza, it merely 
imagines, or experiences things through the senses. This is, for him, the lowest type of 
knowledge because we are at the whims of sensations, feelings, or emotions, which can shift and 
vary depending on what sort of encounters we find ourselves to have made. Of course, this type 
of knowledge, just as what Deleuze interchangeable refers to as a sign, effect, or affection, is 
implied in the other forms of knowledge, but under the form of the attribute of Thought. We 
discussed the second form of knowledge when exploring what Deleuze calls epistemological 
parallelism. Here, Spinoza’s argument is that to a thing desired, loved, envied, or hated, there 
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corresponds an object that is also desired, loved, envied or hated. He calls these common 
notions, because they are ideas of affections that are common to our body and another. Being 
themselves adequate ideas, the common notions compose Spinoza’s practical philosophy, or the 
practical principles by which one can live one’s life in a satisfactory way. They form the 
condition that enables us to attain the third type of knowledge.    
Earlier, we defined the essence of a mode as its capacity to be affected. These affections 
are understood in two ways by Spinoza. When the capacity of being affected is not explained by 
the mode’s essence, the mode undergoes passive affections. An active affection is explained by 
the mode’s essence, because it increases its power of action. While this capacity varies 
depending on the sort of encounters a mode makes or what sort of relations it is entangled in, at 
each moment, the whole of its capacity is exercised. Since a mode is a finite thing involved in a 
variety of relations, its capacity to be affected is, according to Deleuze, always a mixture of 
passive and active affections. By this he means that  
the proportion of active and passive feelings is open to variation, within a fixed 
capacity of being affected. If we manage to produce active affections, our passive 
affections will be correspondingly reduced. And as far as we have passive affections, 
our power of action will be correspondingly ‘inhibited.’ […] Both together, in their 
varying proportions, constitute the capacity to be affected.
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When asserting that the capacity of affection is both of these types of affection in inverse 
proportion, Deleuze is saying two things: firstly, that the passive affects do not explain the 
essence of a mode, because they merely express the imperfection of its finitude. The passive 
affects are involved in the capacity of the mode, not because they constitute its essence, but 
because they inhibit what it can do. When a mode experiences passive affections, it exercises its 
capacity to be affected in an active sense, even if this is minimal. The being makes a life, even if 
it is not the good life. Once Deleuze has asserted that the active affections alone constitute the 
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essence of a mode, he says that a mode’s essence or capacity to be affected, not only varies, but 
is magnified, the more affections it is able to experience. By arguing that an essence varies, he 
wants to say that there is no metaphysics of essences in Spinoza’s thought. This is what Spinoza 
essentially means when writing that: “He who has a body capable of great many things has a 
mind whose greatest part is eternal.”144 The opposite would be that a mode’s active affections are 
inhibited by passive affections, such as sadness, so that its ability to experience affections of the 
body in great many ways is limited. 
If a mode should exercise its capacity of affection in the active sense, then, its power of 
action or force of existing would show itself to be equivalent to its essence. Knowledge of the 
third sort arises when a mode is overcome with active joys or affections as it comprehends its 
power of action, or knows itself as the formal cause of its own essence.
145
 It combines this power 
of action, with the understanding. As Deleuze notes, when a mode exercises the “capacity of 
being affected by active affections, [...] the capacity appears as a force or power of acting. The 
power of understanding or knowing is the power of acting proper to the soul.”146 It is by virtue of 
the amplified power of acting, that the essence of a mode becomes expressible in the attribute of 
Thought. It is able to think itself, its other or things, and God. Now, what does this essence itself 
express, or what is affirmed by it? Deleuze writes that:  
Essences are […] expressive: not only does each essence express all the others in the 
principle of its production, but it expresses God as this principle itself, containing all 
essences, and the principle of which each particular essence depends. Each essence is 
part of God’s power, and is thus conceived through God’s essence, insofar as God’s 
essence is explicated through that essence.
147
  
 
Forming an idea of one’s essence means knowing how another essence is involved in the 
expression of our own, by virtue of having an adequate idea of the principle of production of all 
essences or how such essences depend on God for their genesis. Having an adequate idea of the 
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principle of production, therefore, involves understanding God as “containing all essences, and 
comprising all in the production of each.”148 This type of knowledge, which we discussed under 
the heading of univocal causality, allows us to affirm the existence of great many possible things, 
or how other essences are produced by having an adequate idea of our own. Now, in 
understanding how each essence is part of God’s power as his affection, we also grasp how the 
adequate idea of our essences is caused by the idea of God, because it is “conceived through 
God’s essence,” or the attribute of Thought, which constitutes his essence. It is in this sense that 
we have an objective idea of God as a thinking thing. “From this kind of knowledge,” Spinoza 
writes, “there arises the greatest satisfaction of mind there can be, that is, joy; this joy is 
accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently it is also accompanied by the idea of God, 
as its cause.”149 The third type of knowledge reproduces the active affections, by allowing us to 
affirm the power of action of the mind itself. For Spinoza, such power allows us to exercise our 
freedom, because we become more capable of producing active affections. These active 
affections are not meant to keep others in servility or bondage, but are likewise directed at 
affirming their freedom. Hence, Spinoza’s practical principles by which one can live his or her 
life in a satisfactory way.   
In many ways, our study of sense in Deleuze’s philosophy reflects the three fundamental 
determinations of expression that he outlines in his concluding remarks to Expressionism in 
Philosophy. There he writes that  
the concept of expression applies to being determined as God, insofar as God 
expresses himself in the world. It applies to ideas determined as true, insofar as true 
ideas express God and the world. It applies, finally, to individual determined as 
singular essences, insofar as singular essences express themselves in ideas. So that 
three fundamental determinations, being, knowing and acting or producing, are 
measured and systematized by this concept.
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These three determinations preserve the doctrine of complete immanence in Spinoza’s 
philosophy, as they unfold according to the logic of expression. We have seen that this logic is 
triadic, that which expresses itself, the expression, and what is expressed, are distinguished. In 
the first place, we demonstrated how the logic of expression affirms a univocal being which 
expresses itself in the same sense in all the attributes. We next turned to the second triad of 
expression to show how the essences of modes are expressions, the attributes express 
themselves, and what is expressed is the modification of substance. In the last part on 
knowledge, we touched on what it means to have an adequate idea, or “what expresses itself in a 
true idea.”151 In each case, according to Deleuze, “the paradox is that ‘what is expressed’ has no 
existence outside its expression, yet bears no resemblance to it, but relates essentially to what 
expresses itself as distinct from the expression itself.”152 We saw this paradox arise when we 
discussed how singular essences, the essences of the modes, involve, not only the affections of 
God, but the essence of God, in their expression. In upholding the immanence of expression, 
what such a formulation allows us to do is express an idea of a singular essence, without being 
able to extricate it from its production. This is precisely because the modification of substance is 
what expresses itself as the expressed of the expression. Though Deleuze does away with 
substance entirely, the expressed itself is maintained in his philosophy as sense. Sense always 
finds its place in the logic as that which is expressed. In our exposition of Expressionism in 
Philosophy, we have shown that the three ways in which Deleuze goes on to articulate the 
expressed in The Logic of Sense, as infinitive, as effect, as ideal sense, can be found in their 
initial state in his study of Spinoza.
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The Nietzschean Sense of Affirmation 
 
  
In an interview “On Philosophy,” Deleuze comments: “I’ve tried in all my books to 
discover the nature of events; it’s a philosophical concept, the only one capable of ousting the 
verb ‘to be’ and attributes.”154 After giving due credit to Spinoza as a thinker who had affirmed 
univocal being, how does Deleuze intend, in the first place, to oust the verb ‘to be’? Why would 
displacing this verb play such a pivotal role in his philosophy? In Difference and Repetition he 
argues that in Spinoza’s philosophy  
there still remains a difference between substance and the modes: Spinoza’s 
substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on 
substance, but as though on something other than themselves. Substance must itself 
be said of the modes and only of the modes. Such a condition can be satisfied only at 
the price of a more general categorical reversal according to which being is said of 
becoming, identity of that which is different, the one of the multiple, etc. That 
identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a principle 
become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a 
Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own 
concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in a general, 
already understood as identical. Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal 
return.
155
  
 
When Deleuze claims that substance must turn around the modes, it is not as though he is saying 
that the modes are the same as the being of becoming. He is, however, arguing that the only 
thing that can be affirmed of being is the becoming or metamorphoses of the modes. In this 
respect, being is said in the same sense of all of becoming: Becoming returns! Being is said of 
difference.
156
 The idea that becoming returns was already apparent when in our discussion of 
Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence, we referred to Deleuze’s “Of Paradoxes of Pure Becoming.” 
The being of becoming is not merely the Nietzschean correction of Spinoza,
157
 it is meant to 
displace the identity of the concept or sense that realizes itself in the dialectical logic. In our 
study on Spinoza we placed the emphasis on Deleuze’s new logic, in this section on Nietzsche 
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we want to demonstrate how the identity of being cannot be anything more than the affirmation 
or repetition of difference, a formulation that completes the logic. Deleuze’s philosophical 
quarrel with Hegel is not simply over the dissolution of difference in the concept, but of how 
being expresses itself, or what sort of discourse is the discourse of being.  
 
Eternal Return:  
Displacing the Verb “To be” 
 
 
Earlier we claimed that Spinoza had affirmed univocal being. Now we are saying that the 
eternal return is the Nietzschean correction of Spinoza. Are we being inconsistent? In Difference 
and Repetition, Deleuze places the accent on three moments in the history of philosophy in 
which the univocity of being has been advanced. Spinoza holds second place in these three 
moments, the third being Nietzsche’s eternal return. With the eternal return, Deleuze argues, 
univocal being is not merely thought as in Duns Scotus’ philosophy, or affirmed by Spinoza, but 
“effectively realized.”158 What we intend to do in this section, is show how the eternal return 
realizes the univocity of being, by focusing in on the role Nietzsche plays in Deleuze’s efforts to 
displace the verb to be. While we cannot take up Deleuze’s overturning of Platonism here, it is 
the common root that binds him to Nietzsche, in his endeavour to displace the verb to be. 
Equally, whether or not Nietzsche actually overturned Platonism, being Heidegger’s question, is 
something that we cannot consider.
159
 In what way does Nietzsche, however, set out to overturn 
Platonism, or, more specifically, the antinomy of being and becoming? In “The Overturning of 
Platonism and the New Meaning of Appearance,” Michael Haar presents the sequential 
development of the problem in Nietzsche’s thought. In some of his earliest writings, Nietzsche 
seeks to displace the notion of the true world by praising the life lived amongst appearance: “My 
philosophy, Platonism overturned: the further one moves away from true being, the purer, the 
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more beautiful, the better it is; Life in the midst of appearance as goal.”160 But in affirming 
appearance, Haar asks, doesn’t Nietzsche nevertheless maintain the antinomy, for what else 
could appearance be but illusion? Doesn’t a life in the midst of appearance reinforce nihilism 
which revert us to its other, the true being? Nietzsche’s answer in The Twilight of Idols is a 
definite no: “We have rid ourselves of the true world: what world are we left with? Perhaps that 
of appearances? […] But no! Along with the true world, we have also rid ourselves of the 
apparent world.”161 Perhaps it is not even a question of overturning the Platonic antinomy, but 
more so, as Nietzsche notes, of unlearning it. Isn’t the one who is capable of living life amidst 
appearances, skimming the surface or skin depth of things, the one who has indeed unlearned it? 
Once we put aside the antinomy, what do we have left, however? We have a being whose goal is 
the willing of the endless return of appearances. No longer resenting the passage of time itself, 
for Nietzsche, only such a being is capable of extracting a form from chaos. “To impress upon 
becoming the character of being—this is the highest form of the will to power. […] That 
everything returns—here a world of becoming comes closest to the world of being.”162 To realize 
Nietzsche’s eternal return, which impresses the mark of being upon becoming, we must unlearn 
the antinomy. 
Nietzsche recognizes the doctrine of eternal return in Stoic teachings, who according to 
him had inherited the concept from Heraclitus. Nietzsche, for whom Heraclitus plays the role 
that he himself plays in Deleuze’s philosophy, claims that the Stoics had made an “old song” of 
the eternal return. One can turn to his early writing, “Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks,” in order to grasp the comparison that I have drawn. In that piece, Nietzsche contrasts 
Anaximander, who had left coming-to-be in the indefinite, to Heraclitus who did away entirely 
with the duality of indefinite being and definite beings,
163
 by cancelling being altogether as 
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separate from the world of becoming. The aim of the two Hellenistic philosophies is different, 
one inquiring into the passing of beings as a sort of atonement for having separated from being, 
the other testifying to the innocence of existence, of the becoming of beings. A fragment 
demonstrating Heraclitus’ position is too interesting for us to skip over for the sake of brevity: “I 
see nothing other than becoming. Be not deceived. It is the fault of your myopia, not of the 
nature of things, if you believe you see land somewhere in the ocean of coming-to-be and 
passing away.”164 But if there is not such land in the ocean of coming-to-be, in what way can the 
eternal return express that being is becoming? Heraclitus notes that becoming is like the 
“everlasting wave beat and rhythm of things. And what did I see? [I saw] lawful order, unfailing 
certainties, ever-like orbits of lawfulness.”165 For Heraclitus, this eternal coming-to-be expresses 
nothing but the world of play, the innocence of creating and dissolving a form, so that we may 
create once again by starting the game anew. “In this world only play, play as artists and children 
engage in it, exhibit coming-to-be and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any 
moral additive, in forever equal innocence. […] Such is the game that the aeon plays with 
itself.”166 We can now see why Nietzsche thought that the Stoics, like Zarathustra’s caricature, 
had made an old song of the eternal return. For him, the Stoics had already made a useful 
doctrine of it; they evaluated the doctrine for the purpose of conceiving a morality. And so, he 
writes, that the Stoics misinterpreted Heraclitus, “dragging down his basically aesthetic 
perception of cosmic play to signify a vulgar consideration for the world’s useful ends.”167 
In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze recognizes that, in affirming becoming, Heraclitus is 
Nietzsche’s precursor. But, what does it mean to affirm becoming? What is affirmed of 
becoming? His response to these questions frames the way in which the eternal return will be 
further explicated in Difference and Repetition. He writes that:  
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In the first place, it is doubtless to say there is only becoming. No doubt it is also to 
affirm becoming. But we also affirm the being of becoming we say that becoming 
affirms being or that being is affirmed in becoming. Heraclitus has two thoughts 
which are like ciphers: according to one there is no being, everything is becoming; 
according to the other, being is the being of becoming as such. A working thought 
which affirms becoming and a contemplative thought which affirms the being of 
becoming. […] For there is no being beyond becoming […]; becoming is the 
affirmation of being.
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That being is becoming means nothing more than that being cannot be conceived of as separate 
from becoming, it is becoming as such. In what sense is it becoming, however? Deleuze argues 
that only in its returning is being becoming. In being affirmed of becoming, being is affirmed 
for-itself as the repetition of becoming. There are two affirmations, or a double affirmation, 
involved in the realization of the eternal return: the affirmation of becoming and the affirmation 
of the being of becoming. This double affirmation, in the place of the Hegelian double negation, 
will remain relevant for us throughout this dissertation for a number of reasons, the primary one 
being that we are attempting to understand the relationship of a singular or simulated sense 
articulated of becoming, and the being of becoming itself. The two are not separate. When we 
say along with Deleuze that becoming is affirmed and then that the being of becoming is, in turn, 
affirmed, we do not mean that this is their order of production, even if it is their order of 
presentation. As we will see, the eternal return, as the synthesis of time that works in reverse, 
forms a single becoming. But this is precisely why the whole is quite complex.  
Because in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and elsewhere, Nietzsche refers to the eternal return as 
a tortuous circle, how is the return of becoming itself not the return of the identical? This is the 
question to which Difference and Repetition, right to its concluding arguments, serves as a 
response. The whole of the philosophy of difference is compromised, if we are unable to 
demonstrate how the eternal return breaks the vicious circle to then form a line or, as Nietzsche 
calls it, the “supreme constellation of being.” It is not as though Hegel does not conceive of a 
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constellation of being, his genius lies therein. But Hegel imprisons himself in his logic. He 
cancels the gaping abyss or nonsense, in order to affirm the circle of the absolute. As though 
addressing Hegel, Nietzsche writes in Thus Spoke Zarathustra:  
‘Behold,’ I continued, ‘this moment! From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal 
lane leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not whatever can walk have 
walked on this lane before? Must not whatever can happen have happened, have been 
done, have passed before? And if everything has been there before—what do you 
think, dwarf, of this moment? Must not this gateway too have been there before? 
And are not all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all 
that is to come? Therefore—itself too? For whatever can walk—in this long lane out 
there too, it must walk once more.
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There are two affirmations in Nietzsche formulation of the eternal return: it is continuation and 
moment. The difficulty of articulating the eternal return as embracing these simultaneous 
conceptions of time is likewise evident in Deleuze’s colloquium on Nietzsche, when he inquires:  
How does one explain that [the eternal return] is both cycle and moment: on the one 
hand continuation; and on the other, iteration? On the one hand, a continuation of the 
process of becoming which is the World; and on the other, repetition, lightning flash, 
a mystical view on this process or this becoming? On the one hand, the continual re-
beginning of what has been; and on the other, the instantaneous return of a kind of 
intense focal point, to a ‘zero’ moment of the will?170  
 
There are two ways in which these two directions of the eternal return are explained, which, 
nevertheless amount to the same thing. In the first place, as Nietzsche writes, when one says “yes 
to a single moment [they] say yes to all of existence.”171 To say yes to a single moment, means 
not only to affirm that which has been, but to will it yet again without dwelling in the past. Listen 
to Heraclitus’ dictum, there is no land in the ocean of becoming. This willing is always oriented 
towards the future, the moment is itself conceived as the creation of the world anew. This is 
tragic joy. Once a form has been found, it must be lost to the abyss, because a being that says yes 
to becoming, cannot will anything other than the continuation of such becoming. Therein is its 
ethical decision. The ring must be a broken one, lest we appropriate beings to not-being, which 
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would be violent. Deleuze, too, joins continuation and moment together when arguing that the 
eternal return is the repetition of the future. All of time unfolds as a function of the caesura, 
being itself the moment that decenters the circle. How does Deleuze show this?  
In joining peak and abyss together, Nietzsche formulated a paradoxical logic in which 
chaos and necessity are both affirmed, their synthesis being conditional upon the circle itself 
being a broken one.
172
 If amor fati or the love of destiny is affirmed in the eternal return, this is 
only from the perspective of a chance point that gathers the degrees of being in a supreme 
constellation. The chance point of pure affirmation, is the “the celestial necessity that forces even 
chance events to dance in stellar formation.”173 How can the supreme constellation of degrees of 
being embrace necessity, while also being a formation of chance events, which are these 
degrees? A detailed response to this question can be found in chapter 3 of this dissertation. Here, 
we will only demonstrate how this is possible. Deleuze interprets Nietzsche’s events as degrees 
of intensive quantities or differences, which, from one to the other, form the continuous variation 
of the constellation of being. The constellation is not presented all at once, but repeatedly 
differentiated from one degree to another, from one intensive difference through all the degrees 
which repeat one another. In being bound to repeat that which is singular to a life, the repetition 
of the different degrees of being, is the in-itself of the past. Throughout Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze will refer to the presentment of the degrees of being as a sort of effect, “like 
an optical effect, or rather the erotic effect of memory itself.”174 Only once this constellation 
becomes a “freeze-frame” is a simulated sense articulable.175 But the problem is not merely that 
it becomes articulable, but “under what conditions it becomes language.”176 Stated otherwise, by 
what necessity does a form emerge from chaos? It emerges by the same necessity that the whole 
of the constellation itself arises. As that which unfolds the line or constellation of being, the 
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eternal return is the formlessness which insinuates itself in the form that it creates. Once 
becoming is itself affirmed, the eternal return “comes back and flows back through all the 
modifications,” showing itself as that which is repeated in all of the degrees of being, as their 
reason for differentiation.
177
 By being that which is repeated in each repetition of difference, it is, 
according to Deleuze, the differentiator that causes ‘chance events to dance in a stellar 
formation.’ But doesn’t the eternal return, then, lend its affirmation to the form of becoming? 
Why does it dissolve the form in showing itself as the differentiator of the constellation? Here is 
where Deleuze’s thought reaches the highest peaks, thinking that which is supremely elusive—
showing simply that it is ‘there’:  
There is eternal return in the third time (the repeated, the future, repeats itself): it is 
here that the freeze-frame begins to move once more, or that the straight line of time, 
as though drawn by its own length, reforms a strange loop which in no way 
resembles the earlier cycle, but leads into the formless, and operates only for the third 
time and for that which belongs to it.
178
  
 
In the first place, we become equal to the being of the past, but the past or repetition only arises 
by virtue of that which is repeated each time, the future. This means that the repetition of the past 
happens “once and for all,” it shall never return in its specific configuration. It is in this sense 
that everything which is said of becoming is contingent, it does not occur outside of the 
differential relations of living beings. This is what is beautiful about the idea. As that which 
causes becoming to return, the eternal return, however, “returns for all times, for eternity.”179 
What returns for all eternity is the yet-to-come, “the becoming-identical of becoming itself” on 
the basis of the different.
180
 The identical as continuation is second principle, principle become, 
because it revolves around the different.  
We have returned once more to the following question: What is affirmed in the eternal 
return? According to Deleuze,  
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repetition is the condition of action before it is a concept of reflection. We produce 
something new only on condition that we repeat—once in the mode which 
constitutes the past, and once more in the present of metamorphosis. Moreover, what 
is produced, the absolutely new itself, is in turn nothing but repetition. […] [The 
eternal return] causes neither the condition nor the agent to return: on the contrary, it 
repudiates and expels these with all its centrifugal force. It constitutes the autonomy 
of the product.
181
  
 
Again, here is where we find Deleuze’s profound insight. Along with being the repeated of the 
constellation, the status of the eternal return is to pose itself as a problematic. In posing itself as a 
problematic, the eternal return gives way to a solution, the solution itself being a new repetition 
on the basis of the different. If a simulated sense only remains in the infinitive, this is because in 
the eternal return it becomes possible for us to replay it in a different way, depending on what 
sort of solution we find to the problematic that the eternal return poses. Seeing that the agent that 
becomes equal to the past is expelled, the eternal return demands the creation of a novel 
response. This is precisely why a simulated sense is dependent upon the ontological sense of the 
eternal return as its cause. Deleuze, hence, writes:  
There is a necessary linkage between the ontological sense and the simulated sense. 
The second derives from the first; in other words, it remains adrift without autonomy 
or spontaneity, a simple effect of the ontological cause which plays upon it like a 
tempest. How could representation not profit from this? […] This means [that] the 
identity of the simulacra, simulated identity, finds itself projected or retrojected on to 
the internal difference. The simulated external resemblance finds itself interiorized in 
the system. The negative becomes principle and agent.
182
  
 
As you probably already suspected, this is the juncture at which Hegel and Deleuze become 
irreconcilable. It is precisely in the reversal that Hegel would have argued that the absolute must 
negate the negation in order that it is affirmed. As we have already noted, Hegel interprets this 
simulated identity as being the end of the different, when, for Deleuze, such identity is the mere 
consequence of the eternal return.
183
 On the whole, Hegel negates difference in order to affirm 
the identical or the resemblance of the two senses; the moment when ground is made. Because he 
78 
 
succumbs to the image of identity, for Deleuze, Hegel’s selection, his philosophical 
determination of the concept, is indicative of an exhausted will that cannot create the novel. Can 
anything novel be created with Hegel? 
Deleuze does not only argue that the eternal return is affirmed of a singular becoming, but 
that it is itself the doctrine that realizes univocal being. Repetition for-itself gives us the 
imperative to think being as that which is common across all differences. By common, we mean 
how differences are “inter-expressive” with regards to their sense. As the being of becoming, the 
eternal return can be said to be the same across all forms of becoming. Demonstrating this idea, 
Deleuze writes: “being is said in a single and same sense, but this sense is that of eternal return 
as the return or repetition of that of which it is said.”184 That of which it is said is difference 
itself, or the Different. Or, to put it another way, due to this doctrine, what is common across all 
differentiations, is the return of difference. More than this, in being the said of difference, “the 
univocity of Being signifies that Being is Voice that it is said, and that it is said in one and the 
same ‘sense’ of everything about which it is said.”185 Wasn’t it Nietzsche himself that declared in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, that “here, the words and word-shrines of all being open up before me: 
here all being wishes to become word, all becoming wishes to learn from me how to speak.”186 
All becoming seeks to express itself in the same way. Each becoming can be said to unfold in the 
same sense and by the same logic, even while each must not be mistaken as having an identical 
sense. As Deleuze notes, being “is equal for all [distinct senses] but they themselves are not. It is 
said in the same sense, but they don’t have the same sense.”187 Not only does this mean that, that 
which differs expresses itself, or that differentiation is itself expression, but that the discourse of 
being has been transformed entirely. It is now a discourse of the return of difference, or of 
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differentiation. The discourse of difference becomes the “single language which expresses” the 
multiplicity of senses, even while they themselves are not the same.
188
  
In light of the way in which we have framed this new discourse, we can begin to 
understand why the language of The Logic of Sense must be a language of becoming without 
pauses and rests. Isn’t the discourse of being as the return of differentiation indeed the other 
language that Deleuze seeks out in Plato’s Cratylus, but just as well could be Dionysus’ music? 
What sort of expression can articulate this other language? Deleuze’s response is that the 
discourse of being is not merely brought to light in philosophy. Neither is it found to be the logic 
of linguistic expression alone. Unlike Hegel’s dialectic being which is realized in philosophy, 
and has as its other artistic expression, expressionism in Deleuze’s work deals with three 
different things, concepts, affects and percepts. Each of these has a distinct relationship with the 
plane of immanence we have been describing. The plane of immanence, he argues along with 
Guattari, is a prephilosophical plane, or better yet, as he notes elsewhere, it is a life. In the 
introduction to this dissertation, we noted that the plane of immanence cannot be immanent to 
anything, whether this would be the concept, an actual being, or something else transcendent, 
such as God. The sense produced cannot be extricated from the genesis of its production, so as to 
identify with the predicate. When interpreted as one and the same as the predicate, sense is taken 
as an end in the form of judgement; it is vulnerable to being appropriated by the moral vision of 
the world.
189
 Extricated from the genesis, it is the mere essence of this or that thing, an essence 
which is either becoming realized, or an essence to be realized. In contrast to the moral image, 
Deleuze defines the sense of something in accordance with what it can do. What a thing can do 
defines its multiple manners of being:  
People, things, animals distinguish themselves by what they can do, i.e. they can’t do 
the same thing. […] If I say that reasonable, is not the essence of man, but it is 
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something that man can do, it changes so that unreasonable is also something that 
man can do. To be mad is also a part of the power of man.
190
  
 
Because sense is produced concretely by what a thing can do, there is no way of determining a 
priori, or once and for all, what a thing is. This is an ethical position, an ethology, in contrast to 
the moral vision. Deleuze concludes that:  
The ethical discourse will not cease to speak to us, not of essences, it doesn’t believe 
in essences, it speaks to us only of power, that is, the actions and passions of which 
something is capable. Not what the thing is, but what it is capable of supporting and 
capable of doing. And if there is no general essence, it is because, at this level of 
power, everything is singular.”191 
 
 
A Note on Learning Something New 
 
 
Nietzsche’s problem is the problem of life, in part, because it is not enough that we 
denounce the anthropological illusions that philosophy itself perpetuates. It is indeed the case 
that, after Nietzsche, it is possible to direct criticisms against those who conceive of 
consciousness as having the force to unify the manifold of intuitions. And against those who 
conceive of the conscious ego as the cause of its own thoughts, which, in turn, enables it to treat 
the body as its instrument, including other living beings that supposedly do not possess thought. 
And against those who, by perceiving it as the locus of knowledge, believe themselves to have 
grasped the essence of action. These fictions of consciousness are fortified by language, since it 
is only in language that such a thing as a subject announces itself. It announces itself as the 
measure of all things. It designates things as though conforming to the world of perceptions that 
it has conceived for itself. It imprisons itself from all existence, so as to prolong itself. The 
problem of the conscious ego runs deep. To it, nothing further from its sphere of influence has 
existence. Even those conceptions that it mimics as its own, have little to no value to it. All 
habituations which it entails become the route to nihilism. It is a happy accident that it is self-
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destructive. Surely such criticisms show that consciousness no longer has a stranglehold on 
thought, and, by extension, on knowledge, that it used to.
192
 But the problem of life is greater 
than philosophy. By transforming itself, philosophy can merely join in the effort to overcome 
anthropocentrism. The criticisms of the conscious ego are not sufficient to overcome it. 
Nietzsche’s goal is not merely to critique the subject. His cleverness lies in having posited the 
body as the locus of thought, due to which the traditional concept of the subject is displaced. 
 It is the body which can teach us something new. This is because by learning we mean 
something very specific. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes: “To the despisers of the 
body [...] I wish them neither to learn afresh, nor teach anew, but only to bid farewell to their 
own bodies—and thus be dumb.”193 Nietzsche’s novelty lies in him having conceived of the 
organism as a thinking thing. By organism, he did not merely mean the human organism, but all 
living beings. Because all living beings have a specific capacity to contemplate or incorporate 
the world, each thing is a thinking thing.
194
 But one might ask oneself, what do organisms 
contemplate? Organisms contemplate inorganic life. It is in this sense that an organism can be 
thought to have a memory. The act of incorporation is itself simultaneously memory. Haar writes 
that:  
In every operation of the unconscious or in every perception—even more than in 
every conscious and pondered action—the entire organic past is reactivated and 
prolonged. ‘In every [contemplation], the whole organic prehistory comes to play.’ 
As well as being the summary of the entire past of the biological line, the [organism] 
is also bearer of the whole future of that line.
195
  
 
Each act of contemplation is a repetition of the in/organic past of the organism. Sure, the 
organism itself has a past that is specific to it, but the process of contemplation is itself a tracing 
of another sort of memory, an impersonal one, that the organism shares with the world. This is 
what Deleuze seeks to demonstrate with the three syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition, 
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themselves based around this relationship of organic and inorganic life. If the organism itself 
thinks as it incorporates that which is foreign to it, then, conscious thought is merely the 
metastable state that emerges at the end of that process. It is, as Nietzsche notes, “nothing but a 
crude and simplified form of that thought.”196 But precisely because conscious thought is the 
mere result of an unconscious process that such a thing as a subject could be mistaken as the 
cause of actions. The error lies in perceiving the brain as the locus of knowledge, rather than 
viewing it as a complex organ of the organism as a whole.
197
  
The oldest illusion, the one that originates with the ancients, is that knowledge is followed 
by action, that we can build this bridge between the two.
198
 If we carry through with Nietzsche’s 
proposal that indeed it is the organism that now thinks, doesn’t this mean that knowledge is itself 
compromised? If we do not base our actions on knowledge, what are they based on? In the “The 
Unknown World of the Subject” Nietzsche writes: “Is it not the ‘dreadful’ truth that [...] no 
matter how much we know about an act this knowledge is never sufficient to accomplish the act, 
that the bridge connecting the knowledge of the act with the act itself has never yet been built?” 
Is it possible to build this bridge? Isn’t this the same question that was posed with regard to 
Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge? This comparison is not coincidental, since Nietzsche 
recognizes Spinoza as a precursor. In a letter he outlines his similarities with Spinoza, “namely 
[their joint tendency] to make all knowledge the most powerful affect.”199 But the point is that 
even if we achieve this knowledge, if we realize knowledge as the most powerful affect, we still 
cannot say that the act itself is determined by it. An action itself implies the unknown. As 
Deleuze notes: “[Of what] else can one write but of those things which one doesn’t know, or, 
knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having something to say. We write on the 
frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and 
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transforms one into the other.”200 The bridge connecting knowledge and action remains 
problematic in Deleuze’s corpus. On the one hand, knowledge has a dogmatic role to play. This 
is precisely why it is replaced with the theory of learning in relation to which thought becomes 
the most powerful affect. One never begins to think by decidedly engaging in thought. Rather, 
thinking itself is generated by something ‘non-thought,’ or outside of thought, that forces itself 
upon it. On the other hand, knowledge is not altogether abandoned, since the creation of concept 
in relation to a problem is a type of knowing, while the problem is a type of intuition. 
Nevertheless, for Deleuze, even if we replace knowledge with the concrete process of learning, 
the bridge connecting it with action continues to be put into question. 
 
Sense, Evaluation, and Critique 
 
 
There are two major ethical pronouncements that stand out in Deleuze’s philosophical 
corpus. In Difference and Repetition, he tells us that there are two principles that define his ethics 
of intensive quantities: “affirm even the lowest, [secondly] do not explicate oneself (too much),” 
or do not explicate once and for all.
201
 To the first one, we must add another fundamental insight 
from the twenty-fifth series of “Univocity” in The Logic of Sense. When reflecting on what it 
means to accomplish the event, Deleuze says something peculiar, hitherto unaddressed in the 
secondary literature:  
It would be necessary for the individual to grasp herself as event; and that she grasps 
the event actualized within her as another individual grafted onto her. In this case, 
she would not understand, want, or represent this event without also understanding 
and wanting all other events as individuals, and without representing all other 
individuals as events. Each individual would be like a mirror for the condensation of 
singularities and each like a distance in the mirror. This is the ultimate sense of 
counter-actualization.
202
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While these pronouncements may appear disconnected, they follow directly from the highest 
affirmation in the eternal return. They are directed at one and the same thing. In not explicating 
too much, not once and for all, one understands others as events. Why would understanding other 
beings as events have any significance? If the eternal return is the affirmation of the being of 
becoming, then, in affirming the becoming of beings, we must let beings become what they 
already are. This is the sense in which we grasp Nietzsche’s ecce homo; how one becomes what 
one is. Letting beings become what they already are means affirming their futural possibility of 
becoming-other or different, since, even when minimal, this is the sort of affirmation necessary 
to making a life.
203
 We do not merely affirm others as events because we create a life with 
them,
204
 but because we come to understand how it is that all beings implicate being in their 
becoming. Since this kind of affirmation is central to us when thinking about the singular sense 
of the becoming of beings, the infinitive that is expressed of this becoming, we will later return 
to these assertions. For now, we want to stress that affirming the possibility of beings to become-
different involves two mutually inclusive things: it involves furthering their ability to be affected 
in a great number of ways, so that their power of action (their power of existing) enhances.
205
 In 
being able to individuate in great number ways, we must assert that a singular thing has a 
multiplicity of senses, each depending on the sort of relation it is involved in. Moreover, 
affirming the becoming-different of another, involves not explicating this other once and for all, 
or saying everything all at once.
206
 We cannot fix what this or that thing is once and for all, not 
only because a simulated sense depends upon the ontological sense, but because in affirming 
becoming, we affirm it for the third time only. The being of the past never returns in the same 
configuration, just as the actor never responds in same way to the problem set before it. By 
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exploring how Deleuze discusses sense in Nietzsche and Philosophy, we intend to propose what 
this problem could be.  
Deleuze argues that by introducing sense and value into philosophy, Nietzsche was able to 
accomplish the critical project which Kant had inaugurated, but failed to carry out to the end.
207
 
The claim that Kant was unable to grasp that the value of values are themselves evaluations that 
presuppose modes of being or ways of existing, in-themselves having no other inherent value 
beyond what is made of them, is a familiar one. That sense is a concept that Nietzsche had 
brought to philosophy, however, is strange idea to propose. How does Deleuze interpret the 
concept of sense in Nietzsche’s thought? The primary definition of sense is the following:  
We will never find the sense of something (of human, a biological, or even a physical 
phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which 
exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an 
appearance or even an apparition, but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in 
an existing force.
208
  
 
Sense, at least in Nietzsche and Philosophy, corresponds to the quality or type of force that is 
expressed by the ‘thing.’209 A ‘thing’ as such is no longer anything but a sign or symptom of a 
force, while a force, by appropriating it, has a certain quantity of reality. As Michael Hardt points 
out in his introductory remarks to the text, much like the ‘thing’, an utterance is a symptom of a 
type of force, since it is indicative of a way of living. It allows us to inquire as to “what mode of 
existence is needed in order to be able to utter it?” 210 An utterance is, thus, equally symptomatic 
of a quality of force that appropriates a quantity of reality. By proposing that we find the sense of 
this or that thing by studying the sort of force that appropriates it, Deleuze is arguing that things 
themselves do not have some sort of an inherent sense, and that a thing is able to embrace a 
plurality of senses, all the while having an essence or force that is specific to it. In a seminar on 
Nietzsche, he claims that:  
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A thing never has only one sense. Each thing has several senses that express the force 
(1) and the becoming of forces (2) at work in it. Still more to the point, there is no 
‘thing,’ but only ‘interpretations’ hidden in one another, like masks layered one on 
the other, or languages that include each other.
211
  
 
We find the sense of something, when we come to understand the mode of existence that is 
expressed in it (verbs imply modes of existence that things actualize in different degrees). Since 
the same thing changes sense depending on the force that appropriates it, according to Deleuze, 
the history of a thing, in general, can be understood as a “variation of sense(s).”212 What is he 
aiming at with the idea that a thing never has one sense and, in turn, that sense itself varies 
depending on the becoming of forces? In the first place, he wants to demonstrate that a thing can 
have a plurality of senses, without these senses being contradictory. In taking this position, 
Deleuze wants to show that Nietzsche’s “pluralist idea that a thing has many senses, the idea that 
there are many things and one thing can be seen as ‘this and then that’ is philosophy’s greatest 
achievement, the conquest of the true concept, its maturity and not its renunciation or infancy,” 
as Hegel believed.
213
 Second, pluralism does not mean that all evaluations are themselves equal. 
Instead, the critique of the evaluation of values emerges together with the pluralist idea. We hope 
to show this in what follows.  
The reader will notice that we have mentioned at least two aspects of force, one which 
appropriates the thing, and the other as the force that the things itself expresses. The two should 
not be confused, but neither are they separate. The first refers to the quality of force expressed in 
some thing, the second to the quantity of force. A quality corresponds to a difference in the 
quantity of force. When Deleuze argues that the thing is an expression of force, he is reading 
Nietzsche alongside Spinoza. For him, the capacity to be affected is one and the same thing as 
the expression of force. Just as the capacity to be affected is exercised in a relation, there is no 
such thing as a singular force, only a relation of forces that produce this or that quality of force, 
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broadly understood as active and reactive. Deleuze, hence, argues that: “every force is essentially 
related to another force. […] The relation between forces is in each case determined to the extent 
that each force is affected by other, inferior or superior, forces. It follows that will to power is 
manifested as a capacity to be affected.”214 This idea is reiterated in on Foucault, where Deleuze 
writes: “force is never singular but essentially exists in relation with other forces, such that any 
force is already a relation, that is to say, power: force has no other object or subject than 
force.”215 In order for a being to be affected, it must implicate itself in a relation, which it 
explicates in accordance with its own capacity to be affected. No force is exercised without 
varying a being’s expression of force. In being exercised, the capacity to affect is a reflection of 
the capacity to be affected. It is a reflection of what sort of sensibility a thing is capable of. One 
cannot think of the sensation or effect of a joint act and an encounter, without also thinking of it 
as an affect upon one and the same being. That is to say, force is a “thing which affects and is 
affected.”216 If Deleuze reads Spinoza’s passive affects in much the same way as Nietzsche’s 
reactive forces, this is because those that further reactive forces do not merely subjugate others, 
but themselves in turn. The whole question is in what way can we distinguish between reactive 
forces that subjugate a living being when expressed by it, from the active ones which do not? 
Though this question seems to have been resolved in Nietzsche and Philosophy, in an interview, 
“Portrait of Foucault,” it arises yet again: “What is this ‘line,’ or this relation that’s no longer a 
power relation? Isn’t it foreshadowed earlier on?”217 In the work under consideration, Deleuze 
writes that essence “will be defined as the one, among all the senses of a thing, which gives it the 
force with which it has the most affinity.”218 Admittedly, such an assertion is difficult to 
demonstrate. It is meant to distinguish relations in which a being exercises its capacity to be 
affected in an active sense, from those relations in which its expression of force is thwarted. 
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Seeing that all relations imply some sort of inequality, even when the ‘same’ sense is expressed 
by two things, on what basis does Deleuze make such a claim?   
  There are two ways in which inequality is discussed in the text. The first pertains solely to 
the individuation of beings, which accords with their specific capacity to be affected. In “Against 
the Dialectic,” Deleuze writes that:  
In Nietzsche the essential relation of one force to another is never conceived of as a 
negative element in the essence. In its relation with the other the force which [is] 
obeyed does not deny the other or that which it is not, it affirms its own difference 
and enjoys this difference. The negative is not present in the essence as that from 
which force draws its activity: on the contrary it is a result of activity, of the 
existence of an active force and the affirmation of its difference.
219
 
  
To the sensitive reader, the idea that a force makes itself obeyed will be repulsive, while the idea 
that beings enjoy their own difference, or that, indeed, their difference is itself enjoyment, will be 
truly beautiful. What we must keep in mind is that, for Deleuze, what makes itself obeyed in a 
relation is the difference of another; that it becomes an object of affirmation. And “who says that 
there is more thought in labour than in enjoyment?”220 This position is consistent with the one 
that Deleuze puts forth in his study on Spinoza. The exercise of one’s capacity to be affected is 
always an activity. In this respect, even a reactive force draws its activity from an active one, in 
order to deny that which it is not, or negative life in general. It “says No to what is ‘outside,’ 
what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’ and this No is its creative deed.”221 The negative is a result 
of activity, rather than that which renders activity possible. Even when the negative is a violation 
of difference, the affirmation of difference, to whatever degree, is itself necessary if a relation is 
to be maintained. This is why there is no relation without the inequality of forces. A relation is 
not possible between two identical things. In turn, reactive forces mobilize a type of conception 
of difference from their perspective of inequality, in order to establish servile modes of 
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existence. If reactive forces are able to triumph over active ones, doesn’t this mean that they are 
superior? Deleuze argues that reactive forces are not superior to active ones, but that they do 
triumph because they separate active forces from what they can do. Reactive forces direct active 
ones by framing the sort of conditions under which active forces are themselves exercised. But 
we can never affirm the being (the return) of becoming-reactive, precisely because reactive 
forces merely reproduce nihilism.
222
 How can it be said that that which diminishes life is 
responsible for generating it? The negative does indeed contradict itself, but purely on the ontic 
level.  
Earlier, we emphasized that “each thing has several senses that express the force (1) and 
the becoming of forces (2) at work in it.” We have outlined the way in which a thing expresses a 
force, but we have not touched on what the becoming of forces refers to. According to Deleuze, a 
relation cannot be reduced to the forces implied in the same relation. The relation itself has an 
internal will that is not identical to forces, but is involved in it as the differential or genetic 
element of the reciprocal genesis of forces. In order to demonstrate this, he writes:  
We must remember that every force has an essential relation to other forces, that the 
essence of force is its quantitative difference from other forces, and that this 
difference is expressed as the force’s quality. Now, difference in quantity understood 
in this way, necessarily reflects a differential element of related forces—which is 
also the genetic element of the qualities of these forces. […] The will to power is the 
element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the 
quality that devolves into each force in this relation. The will to power here reveals 
its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces. In this synthesis—which relates 
to time—forces pass through the same differences again. [...] The eternal return is the 
synthesis which has as its power the will to power.
223
  
 
A reader unfamiliar with Deleuze’s philosophy would probably find it quite difficult to discern 
what is being said in this long passage, so we will do our best to simplify the matter without 
being reductive. The internal will, which Deleuze grasps as the will to power in Nietzsche’s 
thought, is the synthesis of the relation between two beings.
224
 It is not reducible to either one, 
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since it is the genesis of their respective individuations. It is, as it were, that which is affirmed in 
a relation, which insists in a relation, at each point that a relation itself is renewed. Each 
encounter that implies this or that relation, insists the repetition of the whole of the past, 
consisting of the degrees of that which is synthesized of a given relation. The repetition is not the 
relation, but what is impersonal in a relation, belonging to neither one of the terms. Even if this 
internal will is implicated in this or that essence as it expresses itself, essences are not identical to 
the quantitative differentials of the genetic field. The degrees of that which is synthesized of a 
given relation is the second way in which Deleuze understands the unequal. By unequal degrees 
of differentiation, he does not mean that there is some sort of a hierarchy of forces reinforced by 
the will to power. It would be ridiculous for us to claim that this internal will is one and the same 
thing as the relation of force to force, since it in no way constitutes a power relation. Rather, if it 
is to serve as a genetic element of any relation whatsoever, it must be the power of the eternal 
return. Because it is the power of the eternal return, it cannot be said that it is the same thing as 
that which it conditions. Conversely, that which is conditioned does not transcend the genetic 
field itself. Instead, it is the differentiation of the whole of the field that makes possible a higher 
affirmation, another sort of individuation, a new way of feeling and acting. Nietzsche expresses a 
similar sentiment when writing: “we are more than the individual: we are also the entire chain, 
with the tasks devolved upon all the futures of the chain.”225 The eternal return frames the 
problematic, while our constitution is a response. It is in this sense that a mode of existing is 
already an evaluation.  
Wherein lies the problematic? We have to briefly return to the degrees of being in order to 
sketch out our problem. What are these degrees of being which constitute the becoming of 
beings? Deleuze argues that “the will to power itself has qualities, sensibilia, which are like the 
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becoming(s) of forces.” 226 This formulation is rooted in Nietzsche’s conception of the will to 
power as a primitive affective form. It is likewise motivated by what Spinoza’s calls affections of 
God.
227
 In Difference and Repetition these affective forms constitute what Deleuze will refer to 
as the sentiendum or that which can only be sensed, rather than represented, from the perspective 
of the transcendental use of the faculties. Such affective forms have a special relationship to 
thought. If the thinker proceeds through the degrees of being without being aware of thinking, as 
though a spectator of the whole process, this is because these syntheses are passive. It is only 
once this affective power is brought to its height, once the thinker is metamorphosed, that 
becoming says itself or expresses itself. Why this awkward expression? How could becoming 
say itself? Despite his questionable reference to a subject, Haar rightly recognizes that the fatum, 
the voice, “does not come from me. […] It is impossible to separate what belongs to the subject 
and to the fatum, which is not object but not merely intimately the subject.”228 We say that sense 
is said of becoming, or, that becoming says itself in the expressed, rather than referring to a 
subject that manifests the saying. The sense expressed of another being, cannot be severed from 
the becoming of beings which itself triggers a thinking belonging to no subject. But it is 
precisely because sense is said of becoming that one of the aspects of the problematic is posed on 
this level of affirmation. The question becomes which one is the being? Traditionally, this 
question is “what is it?” This is what Deleuze finds illuminating in Nietzsche:  
We are led to essence only by the question: which one? For essence is merely the 
sense and value of the thing; essence is determined by the force with affinity for the 
thing and by the will with affinity for these forces. Moreover, when we ask the 
question ‘what is it?’ we not only fall into the worst metaphysics but in fact we 
merely ask the question ‘which one’ in a blind, unconscious and confused way. 
Essence, being, is a perspectival reality and presupposes a plurality. Fundamentally it 
is always the question ‘What is it for me’ (for us, for everyone that sees etc.).229  
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These thoughts render the problem multidimensional. The being is not what it is perceived to be. 
It is pure enjoyment, the enjoyment of its own difference. How do we evaluate its essence as 
such? We evaluate it in this way because it is concretely affirmed as such in the becoming of 
beings. The answer to the question which one is it arises with the movement in reverse of the 
constellation of being. It marks the return of differentiation, or the continuation of the becoming 
of beings. Now, the sense of the being presupposes a plurality, not merely because it is an object 
of affirmation for me, or because it exercises its capacity to be affected in multiple relations, but, 
also, because, by affirming it in this way, we reject all of the senses, in general, that appropriate 
this being in such a way as to reduce its capacity of existing. We part ways with history, 
including the perceptions of our time; we “blow up the history of mankind in two,” as Nietzsche 
said.
230
 How loud is this event that blows up history in two, however? “I have unlearned belief in 
‘great events’ whenever there is much bellowing and smoke about them. And believe me, friend 
infernal-racket! The greatest events—they are not the noisiest but our stillest hours.”231 We must 
not misunderstand the negativity involved in such an act as being the same as that of reactive 
forces. According to Deleuze, critique as a kind of negativity grows out of an affirmation. 
Evaluation gives birth to the critique of ways of living that diminish life.
232
 The problem that the 
eternal return leaves the actor with is precisely that, the problem of life. The actor asks her or 
himself: How can something new become expressed as the new in being?  Deleuze responds to 
the first question as Nietzsche does, we must invent possibilities of life by rendering something 
visible in a new light.
233
 We must intervene in our own time for the benefit of a time to come. 
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The Split in the Pathway of the Articulation of Sense 
The Virtual and the Actual Object 
 
You will either be forced to abandon logic,  
or else you will be led to invent one!
1
 
 
 
In the first chapter, we left off by emphasizing a kind of double optics around which the 
paradox of sense begins to become apparent. When discussing what Deleuze will call the 
question-problem complex, we referred to the transcendental field, the determinations of which 
are like virtual images of past events, and the actual object itself, which appeared as though 
severed from the field once the constellation was brought to a halt. This double optics is of 
immense importance for Deleuze. One of his last essays, entitled, “The Actual and the Virtual,” 
is a testament of his continued effort to articulate the fundamental idea that orients his 
philosophy.
2
 He opens up that piece by arguing that “philosophy is the theory of multiplicities, 
each of which is composed of actual and virtual elements. Purely actual objects do not exist 
[even if it can be said that only actual objects exist as such]. Every actual surrounds itself with a 
cloud of virtual images.”3 Thus far, we have pointed out that objects, according to Deleuze, are 
signs. They are signs because the virtual is part of the real object itself, or, rather, the object 
points to the virtual aspect which is its objective dimension. “Every object,” Deleuze notes, “is 
double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another, one being a virtual 
image and the other an actual image. They are two unequal odd halves.”4 Echoing Alexius 
Meinong’s theory of objects, the idea objects, having a quasi-sein, subsist between realities, but 
cannot be thought to exist in actuality.
5
 We placed the emphasis on ‘between’ realities, because 
the virtual and the actual “correspond to the most fundamental split in time.”6 How do these idea 
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objects relate to actual objects according to Deleuze? While we cannot flesh out this relation in 
great detail here, we will begin to do so in order to frame the discussion which follows.  
 Just as the constellation of being embraces two unequal compositions, there are two paths 
through which the complex entanglement of the actual and the virtual can be approached. If there 
are two paths, away and toward the virtual, this is because a double movement happens at once. 
The actualization of the virtual on the one hand, and the dissolution of the actual object as it 
becomes indiscernible from the virtual, on the other, are two paths laid out simultaneously, even 
while the sort of process implied by each is different. The actualization of the virtual corresponds 
to the fragmentation of the continuum of virtual images. Since the constellation of being is 
composed of singular determinations or virtual elements, which are like cuts in the continuum, 
the process of actualization happens with these cuts on the plane. This is why Deleuze argues 
that the “the process of actualization undergone by the actual is one which has as great an effect 
on the image as it does on the object.”7 The process of actualization marks the limit of the 
unchangeable and the changeable. That is to say, in one direction it is the complete determination 
of the object, and, in the other, it is the progressive determination of the transcendental field, as it 
constitutes what Deleuze defines as a singularity. We should not mistake the actual with 
actualization. “The actualization of the virtual is singularity whereas the actual itself is 
individuality constituted. The actual falls from the plane like a fruit, whilst actualization relates it 
back to the plane as if to that which turns the object back into a subject.”8 The products of 
actualization themselves form a dimension of solutions, a distinct line of the constitutions of the 
actual object. Before we pinpoint why, according Deleuze and Guattari, the products of this 
pathway are the supreme object for science, we would like to briefly turn to the dissolution of the 
actual object as it becomes indiscernible from the virtual.  
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Turning to the other pathway, Deleuze traces another aspect of the transcendental field as 
though now being an entirely different plane. He writes that  
the actual and the virtual coexist, and enter into a tight circuit which we are 
continually retracing from one to the other… [There is] no longer an actualization 
but a crystallization. Pure virtuality no longer has to actualize itself, since it is a strict 
correlate of the actual with which it forms the tightest circuit.
9
  
 
Earlier, we stressed that what is affirmed in the eternal return is becoming itself. This is precisely 
the process that Deleuze is tracing out when he argues that the virtual elements form the tightest 
circuit with the actual to the degree that we can no longer distinguish the two.
 
This means that 
the actual becomes a pure virtuality; the sign which “forces sensation and that which can only be 
sensed are one and the same thing. In effect, the intensive or difference in intensity is at once 
both the object of encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility.”10 With this 
idea, Deleuze wants to stress that virtual elements communicate “directly over the top of the 
actuals which separate them.”11 Now the field is traversed at an infinite speed without any 
divergences in the continuum. The field has become a problematic object for-itself. It is what 
Deleuze calls pure immanence. In “Immanence: A life,” he defines pure immanence as 
“everything prior to that which constitutes the subject and the object.”12 But what is this 
‘everything’ prior to the subject and the object? The plane of immanence, he notes, is “a singular 
essence (or Event), a life,” which consists of virtualities, singularities, events.13 It is distinct from 
ego consciousness, because consciousness is posited once the subject and the object are 
produced outside of the transcendental field. However, “as long as consciousness traverses the 
transcendental field at an infinite speed everywhere diffused, nothing is able to reveal it;” it is 
immanent to the entirety of the plane of immanence, rather than the plane of immanence being 
immanent to it.
14
 Although it is not our intension to make one pathway the focal point of 
philosophy over the other, it is our aim to stress, alongside Deleuze and Guattari, that the 
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supreme object of philosophy is to give this pre-philosophical plane, implied by both, a 
“consistency without losing the infinite (or absolute speed) into which thought plunges.”15 By 
juxtaposing the point of actualization of the virtual as the object of science, and the field 
becoming problematic as the object of philosophy, we already see that the task of philosophy is 
distinct from the one that science sets for itself.  
 In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari argue that philosophy is concerned with 
the continuous variations of the plane of immanence, which it attempts to render consistent by 
creating concepts. They think the plane of immanence as moving at an absolute speed, a single 
continuous wave of intuitions if you will, while concepts are “like multiple waves” of intensive 
features that together aspire to become that speed of thought; a thought without an image. Acting 
as infinitive, the concept, has no spatiotemporal reference or fixed reference points: “it is self-
referential; it posits itself and its object at the same time it is created.”16 The object of the 
concept is not a state of affairs, but the inseparability of its components that together enunciate a 
problem.
17
 While the components themselves are relative to one another, as it surveys all of its 
components, the concept arguably achieves an absolute speed of thought. This thought, the 
enunciation of a problem, has a special relationship with the plane of immanence, which acts as a 
horizon of conceptual events. It is “the reservoir or reserve of pure conceptual events: not the 
relative horizon that functions as a limit, which changes with an observer and encloses 
observable states of affairs, but the absolute horizon […] which makes the event as concept 
independent” of them.18 The plane of immanence is like a reservoir of pure conceptual events, 
since, according to the authors, it is that which presents the non-thought, or the outside of 
thought, to which the act of thinking addresses itself.
19
 The plane is not the concept of all 
concepts, because this would mean that concepts are no longer created in response to the 
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singularity of a problem. Their distinction maintains the continued importance of the 
philosophical endeavour, which is the creation of new conceptual events that have the potential 
to transform the state of affairs of our time. In contrast, the authors argue that science  
relinquishes the infinite, infinite speed, in order to gain a reference able to actualize 
the virtual. […] In the case of science it is like a freeze-frame. It is a fantastic 
slowing down, and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought 
able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualized.
20
 
 
Science, then, concerns itself with the point at which the actualization of the virtual gives itself a 
referent, states of matter or mixtures, presented in the form of functions, and related to discursive 
systems as propositions. Its task is to map out what the authors understand as a plane of 
reference, or what Deleuze refers to in Difference and Repetition, as the field of scientific 
solvability. Science is understood as a fantastic slowing down, because the variables which it 
plots on a plane of reference are successive actualizations of the virtual. The challenge that 
science has is to extract these products from the virtual, without cutting them off from the 
processes of production, thereby creating a closed system. “It is difficult to see,” the authors 
write, “how the limit cuts into the infinite, the unlimited. Yet it is not the limited thing that sets 
the limit to the infinite, but the limit that makes possible a limited thing.”21 While scientific 
solvability has a separate domain from philosophy, the two distinct planes that they construct, 
share a point of intersection.  
Although the two pathways imply one another, the first, from the virtual event to its 
actualization, best captures the point of intersection of the object of science and philosophy. 
Here, the continuous variations of the plane of immanence are no longer inseparable.
22
 Instead, 
the repetition of differentiations forms the relative limit that prepares the actualization of the 
virtual event. In the first chapter, we expressed this relative limit as a point of articulation; the 
splitting and intersection of two orientations. The essential question was: Which one is the 
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object? Better yet, the question is: Which way, towards or away from the virtual? When we delve 
into this question, aren’t we delving into the precise intersection where the “symmetry between 
the saying and the said” in the proposition breaks?23 This point is the relative limit, or the 
effectuation of the virtual event, that, both, relates and disjoints what will become the 
proposition, and the state of affairs that serve as its reference.
24
 This complex relationship, which 
we will attempt to lay out in the next section of this study, is explored by Deleuze in the first half 
of The Logic of Sense. But if the plane of immanence always renews itself in the direction of the 
future, or doubles itself by reversing, this is because the event itself is subtracted from states of 
affairs. “The event is pure immanence of what is not actualized or what remain indifferent to 
actualization, since its reality does not depend upon it. The event is immaterial, incorporeal, 
unlivable: pure reserve.”25 It is pure reserve because it has always begun again, never having 
ended. It is from this perspective that the counter-actualization of the event becomes possible. 
Although counter-actualization does not belong to philosophy by right, philosophy, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, aims to speak the event in order to “give a new event” to beings.26 A large 
section of The Logic of Sense is dedicated to the ethics of the event, or what it means to counter-
actualize the event. Before we turn to a more nuanced study of the first pathway of articulation 
and leave the second for a later time, we would like to explain why it is that Deleuze deems it 
necessary to insert himself in a debate on logic, despite his claim that of all finite thought, logic 
is, by far, the most reductionist branch of science.
27
  
Why does Deleuze deem it necessary to critique well established theories of sense when 
putting forth a new “Image of Thought” in Difference and Repetition? In what way does the act 
of thought itself figure into all of this?  While his critique of the dogmatic image of thought is 
not geared solely against logicians, when Deleuze questions whether the traditional notion of 
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sense is adequate to the genesis of thought, or, alternatively, whether the form of recognition can 
be conflated with sense, the work of Gottlob Frege comes to mind. Allow us to highlight Frege’s 
position on sense. In “On Sense and Reference” (1892), Frege argues that “connected with a sign 
(name, combination of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which may be called 
the reference of the sign, [is] also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the 
mode of presentation (thought) is contained.”28 Frege distinguishes between two domains 
connected with the sign of the object. The thought to which the sign is connected, is the sense of 
an expression, while the object that the sign denotes is the reference. We see here that the sign 
corresponds to a definite sense and to a specific reference, but it is unclear as to how it is that the 
sense and the reference connect, since they are two distinct dimensions of a proposition. The 
sense is not the same as reference, since two sentences with the same reference can have 
different cognitive values. Is the sense of the morning star and the evening star identical? Frege’s 
response is that, while the reference is the same, the sense is not. The two are defined differently: 
“If we say ‘The Evening Star is a planet with a shorter period of revolution than the Earth,’ the 
thought we express is other than in the sentence ‘The Morning Star is a planet with a shorter 
period of revolution than the Earth.’”29 The question of interest here becomes, what is a thought 
according to Frege? In on “Thought” (1918), he clearly states that a thought is not an idea which 
the person discovers and has ownership of, but, rather, something that already exists to which the 
person “comes to stand in a certain relation” with.30 According to Frege, thought has an objective 
content that is commonly recognized by everybody, or it is the common property of many, rather 
than being a psychological entity discovered by the person (for example, the Pythagorean 
Theorem). A thought can stand alone. In some cases a sign may have a sense without necessarily 
having a reference. However, Frege argues that because logicians seek after truth, their task is to 
100 
 
progress from sense to reference. For him, not only is truth assessed from the perspective of the 
reference, but the value of a thought depends on this advancement. As we saw with the famous 
example of the evening star and morning star, the truth value of the statement is not decided 
from the perspective of the change in sense, but from the perspective of the reference itself. In 
this respect, the truth or falsity of a proposition appears to be indifferent to sense, even though, to 
begin with, an expression must have a sense as its condition to be evaluated as true. It is indeed 
difficult to specify how it is exactly that we are able to progress from sense to denotation.  
 In the “Image of Thought,” Deleuze cuts straight to the heart of the problem. He argues 
that while sense is thought to be the condition of the true, it is conceived of as indifferent to what 
it grounds or conditions. In this case, truth and falsity continue as though unaffected by this new 
value of sense. He writes:  
Either too much is said, or not enough: too much, because the search for a ground 
forms the essential step of a ‘critique,’ which should inspire in us new ways of 
thinking; not enough, because so long as the ground remains larger than the 
grounded, the critique serves only to justify traditional ways of thinking.
31
  
 
In the first place, too much is said because the condition itself is not the condition of real 
experience, but a condition of possible experience. Sense grasped in this way serves as the 
formal condition of the possibility of truth, rather than being its intrinsic genesis. Deleuze 
intervenes in this debate on logic precisely because, for him, the discovery of the new dimension 
of sense has profound implications for how the grounded is conceived. This means that the 
dimension of sense becomes something other than what Frege understood by it. “We cannot 
accept,” he writes, “that the grounded remains the same as it was before, the same as when it was 
not grounded, when it passes the test of grounding.”32 A designated state of affairs, that which is 
constituted, now has an immediate relationship with sense. Its process of constitution depends 
upon it. Designation, he notes, “would never be grounded unless it were understood as the limit 
101 
 
of a genetic series or the ideal connections which constitute sense. If sense points beyond itself 
towards the object, the latter can no longer be posited in reality exterior to sense, but only at the 
(relative) limit of its process.”33 Conversely, whenever the designated is grasped as external to 
the genesis of sense, what we have are mere examples, cases, and hypotheticals, with which 
logic seems to be preoccupied. Meinong adequately expressed why it is that we cannot entrust 
logic with the task of thought, when writing: “A science of the object of cognition: does this 
mean anything more than the demand that what is already known as the object of cognition now 
be made the object of science, and thus the object of cognition for a second time?”34 The act of 
thought is sacrificed whenever we reduce it to an encyclopedia of knowledge, or that to which it 
inevitably leads to, everyday forms of recognition which presuppose natural common sense, and 
good sense in the form of the identity of the object: Are the morning star and the evening star the 
same? Is it Theodorus or Theaetetus passing by? This brings us to the second aspect of the 
problem. According to Deleuze, too little is said because sense as condition in formal logic 
seems to be merely abstracted from that which it conditions. This means that the transcendental 
is implicitly modelled in the image of empirical content. Forms of recognition, which find their 
compliment in already actualized objects, entirely sidestep the intrinsic genesis of sense. More 
will be said about this later, but for now, it suffices for us to reiterate that, for Deleuze, actual 
state of affairs are considered to be the solutions of a problem, the two realms bearing no 
resemblance.  
Sense, being ideal or like the idea, is located in the problem itself.
35
 According to Deleuze, 
it is the extra-propositional dimension of the proposition. “The failure to see,” he writes, “that 
sense or the problem is extra-propositional, that it differs in kind from every proposition, leads us 
to miss the essential: the genesis of the act of thought.”36 When we confuse sense with the form 
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of recognition, we miss the genetic power of thought, the problem itself. In order to give a new 
image to this act of thought, Deleuze calls the Fregean sense signification,
37
 while referring to 
the instance of grounding as sense; the extra-propositional dimension of the proposition. Sense 
now becomes that which is imperceptible from the perspective of the form of recognition, while 
being that which can only be sensed from the point of view of the transcendental use of the 
faculties. It is this sensed that gives itself to language. It makes language possible. Deleuze 
writes that:  
Sense was first discovered in the form of an impassive neutrality by an empirical 
logic of propositions, which had broken with Aristotelianism; and then, for the 
second time, sense was discovered in the form of a genetic productivity by 
transcendental philosophy which had broken away from metaphysics.
38
  
 
With this new theory of sense, Deleuze does not seek entirely to do away with propositional 
knowledge, instead, his aim is to lay out a transcendental logic capable of, both, grounding it, 
and critiquing it. Now, in order for us to grasp how thought itself “produces something 
interesting when it accedes to the infinite movement that frees it from the truth as supposed 
paradigm and reconquers an immanent power of creation […] it would be necessary to go back 
up the path that science descends, and at the very end of which logic sets up its camp.”39 So as to 
grasp the genesis of sense, we must turn to the virtual, the sphere that Deleuze conceives of as 
Thought-Nature; the non-thought that addresses itself to thought. Here, “logic is silent, and it is 
only interesting when it is silent.”40  
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A Stoic Inspired Drama: Sounds, States, Surface 
 
“What is most deep is the skin.”41 
 
 
If thinking has a specific topography, what it means to be oriented in thought as Kant said, 
then, the Stoic reorientation was the earliest image of thought capable of displacing Platonic 
dualism. As Deleuze argues, the dualism is not between the Ideas and that which receives the 
action of the Idea, the copies that participate in them. It is instead a dualism of Ideas and the pure 
becoming of simulacra that elude them. The Platonic image of thought suffered from a certain 
slippage at each point it had to confront the simulacra, mixtures of pure becoming without 
measure, which it cast as rebels.
42
 We see the problem of the simulacra crop up in the Cratylus 
when Plato erects an idealist language that attempts but fails to capture flux, but also when he 
has Socrates ask the essential question: What is x? Whenever his interlocutors are asked about 
such signifieds as beauty, they designate an object or offer an example. These are dismissed 
straightaway, being incapable of attaining the Essences.
43
 Deleuze argues that it is these 
denotations that hurl us into the depths, the pure becoming of things, since they evade 
signification. Having posed the problem badly, Plato leaves us in a compromising situation. As 
Deleuze notes, either we ascend to the level of the Essences, which have no measure for the 
perpetual flux of living things, or we are hurled into the depths of things, where linguistic 
expression is reduced to sound without sense. Deleuze finds a way out of this situation by 
turning to the Stoics. With the Stoics “everything (that was eluding the Idea) now returns to the 
surface” where sense is produced.44 The surface of incorporeal or ideational entities, as the 
Stoics conceived of them, assist Deleuze in reorienting the image of thought. The simulacra are 
no longer rebels that evade the Idea, but change their nature when climbing to the surface. The 
Idea no longer refers to height. It becomes these superficial and simulated effects which do not 
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have existence apart from the compounds of bodies, even while having a sphere of combination 
of their own.  
The autonomy of the surface independent of, and against depth and height,” Deleuze 
writes, is due to “the discovery of incorporeal events, meanings, or effects, which are 
irreducible to ‘deep’ bodies and to ‘lofty’ ideas. […] For the principle frontier is 
displaced. It no longer passes, in terms of height, between the universal and the 
particular; nor, in terms of depth, does it pass between substance and accident.
45
  
 
What, then, are these incorporeal surface effects? How do they make verbal expressions possible 
without doing away with becoming?  
 
Two Planes of Being: Existence and Subsistence 
 
 
Stoic philosophy is composed of three parts, physics, logic, and, ethics, each of which has 
a place in The Logic of Sense. Although it is questionable how far afield Deleuze follows the 
Stoics in each of the three tiers composing their philosophy, or if the Stoic vision is consistent 
with all aspects of his philosophical project, we find that, along with other French intellectuals of 
his time, and scholars of formal logic, he deemed their contributions to be essential. The Stoics, 
including the Stoic tendency that Deleuze finds in the works of Lewis Carroll, are of great 
interest to him, because they distinguished two planes of being or two types of something 
(quid/what): that of the mixtures of bodies, and, incorporeal entities (void, place, time, and 
expressible/to say, or lekton/legen). Because the Stoic ontology only embraces singular entities, 
the non-something which are universal concepts, or ideas like Platonic entities, are outside of the 
domain of something.
46
 Let us firstly outline the corporeal plane. Akin to Spinoza’s system, at 
least in this respect, the Stoics conceived of all states of matter as generated by two interacting 
and inseparable forces: that-which-acts, and, that-which-is-acted-on, or passivity.
47
 What is 
perhaps most relevant about the physical theory of the Stoics is that, due to the inseparability of 
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these forces, bodies are not external to one another, one acting and the other being acted upon, as 
though already constituted. A mixture or compound, as Chrysippus conceived of it, implies the 
mutual penetrability of bodies, which are causes amongst themselves, or for each other. This 
means that passivity is not the effect of a cause, but refers to the hyle or unqualified matter that is 
shaped by the action.
48
 We should like to say that one and the same body acts on itself by acting, 
but this is not entirely accurate, since passivity is meant to capture the change of a body, or 
responds to the problem of physical change, and no two bodies can occupy the same space. 
These forces are central because, together, they demonstrate the reversibility of the positions of 
bodies as, both, active and passive, in their intermingling. To show the reversibility of the active 
and the passive, Deleuze asks a strange question which points to an exchange, a relation, that is 
irreducible to the corporeality of beings (to eat): “do cats eat bats?” or “do bats eat cats?” We 
could also ask: when in an embrace, does the left hand clasp the right one or the right hand the 
left? Perhaps a more puzzling question would be related to what Deleuze understands as 
contemplation after Plotinus: Does the flower smell itself by smelling what composes it?
49
 Let us 
leave aside this notion of contemplation for a later time, as well as the act of clasping, which is 
gesturing an incorporeal, in order to further elaborate on the states of affairs of bodies.  
Deleuze agrees with the Stoics that only corporeal beings exist in the present, or that only 
the present is corporeal, since it is the actual temporality of their blending. The “living present,” 
Deleuze writes “is the temporal extension which accompanies the act, expresses and measures 
the action of the agent and the passions of the patient.”50 The passions of the patient, what is 
‘left’ in the body, would point to the past and the future as dimensions of the present. Now, 
because the limited present of specific state of affair consists of partial encounters, Chrysippus 
calls these imperfect mixtures.
51
 Conversely, according to Stoic cosmology in general, a perfect 
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mixture would consist of the chain of causes, or all combinations at once, that constitute the 
living cosmic present. Because the totality of combinations cannot be known, even by the wisest 
of sages, a more powerful agent was conceived so as to interconnect all of the parts. In order to 
extend the chain of causes all the way up to the cosmic level, the Stoics thought of a self-moving 
element pervading all matter, serving as the ultimate blender or crafter.
52
 In other words, the 
ultimate blender, Zeus or the “Through,” would be the active element pervading all compounds. 
As Deleuze notes, this permitted the Stoics to extend the chain of causality to encompass an ever 
growing present able dissolve the dimensions of the partial present. While Deleuze does not 
critique Stoic cosmology, it is clear that he cannot follow the Stoics all the way up the cosmic 
level, at which point they thought it was necessary to install the One as the ultimate measure. 
Instead, he emphasizes the mistrust that the Stoics themselves held in their ability to provide a 
measure for each partial mixture. He expresses this mistrust in a dramatic way when saying that 
Chronos wants to die. Being extended to the cosmic level, the good present can no longer 
provide a measure for the partial present. The present becomes measureless as the past and the 
future take revenge of Chronos.
53
 Deleuze accentuates the other aspect of Stoic philosophy, 
which is that mixtures of bodies are causes of effects that essentially subvert the present by 
outright disturbing the chain of causes. This subversion turns us to the other plane of being, to 
which Deleuze dedicates much of his efforts in The Logic of Sense. 
While causes are reserved for the realm of bodies, the question is, what do these causes 
give way to? Deleuze argues that causes give way to something that differs in kind from them, 
incorporeal events, which are the effects or ‘results’ of mixtures. Being inseparable from that 
which exists, these event-effects have a minimum of being in that they subsist or inhere in the 
present state of affairs. It is due to their subsistence that the present loses its measure as it is 
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subdivided in two directions at once. In turn, it is their continuous subdivision that directs us to 
the unlimited becoming of events that elude the present, hence, giving way to another reading of 
time, that of the line of Aion. When Deleuze argues that events are like crystals, growing at the 
edges, he is referring to the effects that are produced by the relations of beings. Even while they 
are brought about by existing beings, incorporeal effects, being like doubles, escape corporeality. 
He depicts these virtual events in an interesting way, when writing that: “Events, differing 
radically from things, are no longer sought in the depth, but at the surface, in the faint 
incorporeal mist which escapes from bodies, a film without volume which envelops them, a 
mirror which reflects them.”54 While effects can be said to mirror the relations of beings, they 
are thought to have their own sphere of organization. Deleuze finds the Stoics useful precisely 
because they split the causal relation in order to express the distinction of the corporeal and the 
incorporeal. One of the tricky aspects of the text is this split. It is unclear how effects are 
produced by the mixtures of bodies, all the while maintaining their autonomy. With the notion 
that effects have an autonomous sphere, Deleuze wants to demonstrate that, while effects are not 
causes in relation to each other, they do have a bond which is itself quasi-causal. The self-
referential surface of events, which has a peculiar way of producing events, is what he will call 
the transcendental field, referred to with respect to Stoic vocabulary, as the line of the Aion. In 
light of this ideational cause, events now refer to two environs. The Stoics, he writes, “clearly 
saw that the event is subject to a double causality, referring on one hand to mixtures of bodies 
which are its cause, and on the other, to other events which are its quasi-cause.”55  
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The Event and Language 
 
 
Once events leave the realm of bodies they climb to the surface. But “what does the wise 
man find at the surface?” Deleuze writes that they find a complex of event-effects that “release 
the purely expressible with its two uneven halves.”56 This purely expressible is the verb, but this 
verb in the infinitive, he notes, is silent. The question for Deleuze is how this silence, which is a 
speaking without speaking, becomes, both, verbal expression and attributable to actuals in which 
sense occurs. The latter two, propositions and actual states of affairs of bodies, form series of 
two unequal halves within which the event is expressed. Their inequality does not imply 
something negative or an opposition, but the circulation of sense throughout the series.
57
 We will 
discuss this threefold structure in a moment. What matters for now is that, according to Deleuze, 
the surface of events itself makes language possible by tearing sounds away from the corporeal 
in which they would be nonsensical, or alternatively, the purely expressible gives way to the 
expressed in the form of language. There is an essential relation between the event and language 
for Deleuze: “it is the characteristic of events to be expressed or expressible.”58 This is indeed a 
thought provoking position. The statement is an indicator of two different organizations of 
language, and, in our view, it invokes a traditional philosophical problem of great importance. 
The event is meant to capture the essence of what it means to speak. It is, as he notes, the essence 
of speaking. In line with the Stoics conception, the incorporeal event is the lekton or legein, most 
adequately translated as “to say.”59 Different images of thought are produced depending on the 
way in which a thinker posits the connection of logos and legein. In the first section of this 
dissertation, we attempted to set up the ground for Deleuze’s transcendental logic. We intended 
to set up the ontological status of legein, by tracing the sort of philosophical trajectory that 
influenced Deleuze’s image of thought. To us, this was a necessary move, in part because 
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contemporary authors continue to have problems with what this legein is. With respect to the 
Stoics, the problem is exacerbated when views promoted in modern formal logic are 
superimposed upon the former. As Charles Kahn argues, “in certain respects an ancient doctrine 
may be obscured rather than revealed by a reconstruction in terms of 20
th
 century logic.”60 While 
modern scholars seem to be in agreement that the ideality of legein is distinct from the Platonic 
essences, in order to grasp what it is, the overwhelming reference point is Frege’s theory of 
sense. This is the case even though it is commonly understood that the Stoic theory of meaning is 
essentially non-referential or intentional.
61
 Because the Stoics identified two things along with 
the legein, the comparison seems to be justified. These three things are laid out by Sextus:  
The Stoics say that three things are linked to one another: what is signified, what 
signifies, and what exists. Of these, what signifies is the sound, e.g. the sound Dion; 
what is signified is the very thing which is suggested by the sound and which we 
apprehended to subsist with our thought […]; and what exists is the external object, 
such as Dion himself. Of these things two are bodies, namely sound and what exists, 
one is not a body, namely the thing signified, [or] the lekton.
62
  
 
These three things have led commentators to identify legein with Frege’s mode of presentation, 
because what formal logic is interested in is how meanings have an objective value apart from 
the mind. In other words, how it is that meanings can be commonly held regardless of the 
individual mind. While we are in agreement that the subject does not create meanings, meanings 
taken in the Fregean sense disconnect the Stoic theory of nature from their logic. Stoic sayings 
are in no way commonly held thoughts. They are singular expressions that are attributable to 
states of affairs. What seems to be the problem is the sound itself as sign, which would bring us 
back to Plato’s Cratylus. Are names arbitrary or do they themselves carry some sort of an 
objective essence that realizes itself historically?  
For his part, Deleuze is not reconstructing Stoic logic. He is, instead, experimenting with 
their concepts in order to produce a new theory of sense. The transcendental field, being itself a 
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modern conceptual invention, cannot be attributed to the Stoics. Nevertheless, the Stoic bond of 
events captures what Deleuze wants to communicate with the idea that singularities compose the 
plane of immanence. This idea is expressed again with respect to temporality, when he writes 
that it is the “essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events at the surface 
as effects (Aion).”63 To some degree, we have already discussed how these events compose what 
Deleuze conceives in Difference and Repetition as the being of the sensible, or that which can 
only be sensed. The being of the sensible, being imperceptible from the perspective of the 
empirical use of the faculties, addresses itself to thought. It is the outside of thought, without 
which we would never begin to think. This connection is what Deleuze refers to as Thought-
Nature. If transcendental logic is silent, this is because, in our view, it is essentially a gathering 
or composition of the logos that make language possible.
64
 In the Nietzschean sense, Deleuze 
asserts that if we ask ‘who speaks?’ sometimes we answer with the one who manifests, other 
times, it is the combinatory of these singularities together with the abyss that speaks; to speak 
without speaking.
65
 In other words, it is the complex of singular events that expresses itself. This 
position resonates with some aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy.66 In light of Heraclitus, who 
had influenced Stoic logos, Heidegger argues that logos is a gather-ness of Being, a gathering 
which is an essential coming into unconcealment (an optics/a showing), that directly gives itself 
to legein. In its relation to logos, legein is the gathering that apprehends.
67
  
We will return to this gathering of virtual events in the third chapter when discussing the 
past. Here, we want to stress that events compose the transcendental field or a surface, an idea 
that allows us to distinguish two readings of the event, which is, as we noted, doubly caused. In 
The Logic of Sense, Deleuze places the emphasis on the superficiality of events, meaning that we 
are in the realm of sense whenever we begin to speak. In order to make sense, we need not 
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reflect upon what is being said. We, on the other hand, have pointed to the other reading of the 
Event, the event as an encounter with a sign that forces thinking: the Event of thought. Are these 
two readings contradictory? Not necessarily. Let us consider what Deleuze says in Difference 
and Repetition with respect to this question. He writes: “The privilege of sensibility as origin 
appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces sensation (the sign) and that which can only 
be sensed are one and the same thing, whereas in other cases the two instances are distinct.”68 In 
an encounter, the sign itself becomes one and the same object as that which can only be sensed, 
while in other instances, a sign and the being of the sensible are not the same object of thought. 
There seems to be a delay between the two. This conception of the sensible may not be entirely 
foreign to the Stoics. Referring to Sextus’ writings, Adam Drozdek highlights that an existing 
thing (what we take to be a sign) is “that which activates the cognitive presentation;” it activates 
something in the soul by “inducing a corresponding sensation.”69 This corresponding sensation is 
not a corporeal. Rather, as Sextus asserts, it is an intelligible that inheres in the thought. 
The distinction we have drawn between the two readings of the event has returned us to the 
other area of inquiry: how is the event related to a state of affairs? In effect, we are again asking 
how the event gives way to verbal expression, but now from the perspective of the series. We 
have already put forth a working definition of legein or to say, and its linkage to states of affairs 
and sounds, by referring to Sextus’ reflections on the Stoics. The Stoic notion of legein as the 
signified is quite fascinating, even paradoxical. According to them, it is not the actual object 
indicated by the sound that becomes meaningful, rather, it is the sound that gets the sense or 
meaning. To utter and to say are two distinct things.
70
 Deleuze often refers to this nuanced 
distinction by quoting Chrysippus’ saying: “if you utter something, it passes through your lips.”71 
In this case, what passes through your lips is not the sense of the actual object, say a house, but 
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its mere utterance, a breath, which is itself a nonsensical corporeal just like the actual object. 
With respect to the incorporeal, then, what we say when we utter the sound ‘house’ is not the 
house itself, “but the incorporeal meaning which the house gets.”72 In turn, the sense which lends 
itself to the sound ‘house’ cannot itself be called a house. Being something other, it opens up an 
indefinite regress in language, or its infinite proliferation. One of the paradoxes of sense is this 
regress, “I never state the sense of what I am saying. […] But on the other hand, I can always 
take the sense of what I say as the object of another proposition whose sense, in turn, I cannot 
state.”73 Similar to Heidegger’s conception of the house or dwelling as the first term of art in The 
Origin of the Work of Art, for Deleuze, what we call a ‘house’ is a compound of sensations, the 
being of which are nonhuman becoming(s).
74
 The sense is equivalent to this compound of 
sensations. In other words, the sense is made in concrete occasions.  
Now, in order to demonstrate the linkage between the saying and the state of affairs, 
Deleuze relies upon Emile Brehier’s account. It is worthwhile quoting Brehier’s position here:  
When the scalpel cuts through the flesh, the first body produces upon the second not 
a new property but a new attribute, that of being cut. The attribute does not designate 
any real quality […], it is, to the contrary, always expressed by the verb, which 
means that it is not a being, but a way of being…This way of being finds itself 
somehow at the limit, at the surface of being.
75
  
 
The incorporeal event is not a corporeal entity, since it is a way of being, or as Deleuze calls this 
coming-to-be, a becoming. In its expressed form, this incorporeal is sterile: it neither acts, nor is 
it acted upon. A way of being is expressed by the infinitive form of a verb, like to clasp, to green, 
to cut, while compounds determine qualitative and quantitative states, the clasping of hands, the 
green of a tree, the cutting of flesh; utterances that make no sense without it or as Deleuze would 
say, events “confer on these elements an expressive value and a function of ‘representatives’ 
which they did not have by themselves.”76 But because the former has an operation of its own, 
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effects only being bound to other effects, an event escapes the present. As the infinitive suggests, 
an event is always in the process of becoming, it has never ceased becoming. Moreover, as the 
attribute of states of affairs, the event subsists in the present, pulling it in two directions at once. 
As Deleuze writes, it is “that which has just happened and that which is about to happen, but 
never that which is happening.”77 If we were to assume that the verb as disposition or attribute of 
states of affairs was somehow realized from the standpoint of corporeality, then, the state of 
affairs would cease becoming, meaning that the verb would no longer be attributable to the states 
of affairs. Conversely, if a thing was identified in accordance with some classification system as 
conforming to this or that form, then, likewise, we would cease being able to say something 
meaningful of it. The idea that what can only be said of things is their singular becoming is the 
ethics of saying. It essentially affirms of things singular ways of being.  
 
The Fourth Dimension of the Proposition 
 
 
After having shown that it is characteristic for events to be expressible as the sense given 
to an utterance, Deleuze goes on to consider the way in which sense is then related to other 
modes or dimensions of the propositions. His study of the dimensions of the proposition 
demonstrates that he was not only an avid reader of the philosophical tradition, but that he also 
knew the kind of debates that were being had in modern formal logic. Deleuze notes that three 
relations in the proposition have been recognized by most authors: denotation, manifestation, 
and, signification. As discussed, denotation is the relation of the proposition to the actual object, 
which serves as its reference. A denotation refers to a particular state of affairs, and fulfills the 
criterion of true or false when the object itself corresponds to the selected image or sign.
78
 
Another dimension is that of manifestation, usually referring to the person who begins to speak 
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in order to express desires and beliefs. Because manifestation refers to the personal, it is thought 
to be the dimension that makes denotations possible. Where a discrepancy has been found 
between the two, philosophers have attempted to correct it, by constituting a transcendental 
subject or the cogito, which serves as the ground of judgements for denotations.
79
 The third 
dimension, being signification, refers to universal or general concepts, but also more broadly, it 
deals with “elements of propositions ‘signifying’ conceptual implications capable of referring to 
other propositions, which serves as premises of the first.”80 In the latter case, Deleuze is referring 
to the range of significance of the function, which is also referred to in formalized logic as the 
concept. The logical value of signification is that it constitutes the condition of the true. 
However, as we see with the work of Bertrand Russell, the range of significance of the function, 
or its conceptual implications, not only constitutes the true and the false, but also gives way to 
the absurd.
81
 The absurd implies a state of affairs that is non-existent. The pertinent line of 
inquiry for Deleuze is, which of these dimensions of the proposition is primary with respect to 
the others, and to which dimension does sense belong, if any?  
The question of primacy arises because there are two dimensions serving as foundation. 
We first noticed that manifestation is what makes denotation possible, but then said that 
signification is the condition of the true. With manifestation as the ground for denotation, it is the 
‘I’ which begins. Having the capacity to unify all of its intuitions, it is always the transcendental 
subject which begins in the order of speech. The problem with manifestation as foundation, 
however, is that significations are presupposed whenever we set the transcendental subject or the 
cogito as beginning point. In order to demonstrate this presupposition, Deleuze points to 
Descartes’ cogito, which envelops other conceptual components, such as being rational, that are 
immediately involved whenever one manifests. Manifestation therefore already envelops a world 
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of conceptual significations, which form the domain of language. We have considered this 
domain by briefly looking at how language functions according to Hegel. Language is 
considered to be a kind of archive of memories of the existential aspect of thought, which is 
naturally implicit or immediate whenever the subject speaks. We must then seriously consider if 
signification is capable of grounding denotation. Having dealt with the problem of representation 
in greater depth in Difference and Repetition, in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze focuses in on the 
primacy of signification from the perspective of modern formal logic. Russell’s theory of types, 
nevertheless, invokes Deleuze’s study of Aristotle. It is no coincidence that Deleuze should 
revisit Stoic logic rather than relying upon Aristotle, the founder of logic. The Stoics were the 
first of the ancients to have put forth an original logical theory after Aristotle.
82
 Deleuze’s basic 
problem with the system of organization that underlies Aristotle’s logic is that it subsumes 
difference under the identity of an undetermined concept. Aristotle’s logic functions around three 
terms, genus, species, and, individual, which determine the hierarchical distribution of beings by 
a process of division. Deleuze is most interested in the process of division through which 
Aristotle determines the essence of beings from the most general to the most specific. Through 
the process of division or the distribution of beings, we see that the greatest difference can be 
found at the specific level of the individual. The key problem for Deleuze is that genera, being 
predicated of things and essentially implied in their definition, are logically prior to difference, 
while difference is dependent upon the genera, which dissolve this difference. As Henry Somers-
Hall notes, “the highest point in the hierarchy […] cannot itself be the result of differentiation, 
as, if it was, this would presuppose a higher genus, from which genus would itself be divided.”83 
This is precisely what Aristotle does. He distinguishes the differentiae, the genera, from the 
genus, which is now predicated of them. But being predicated of the genera, it is predicated of 
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itself, despite being the highest term of differentiation, which itself is not dependent upon it. 
Somers-Hall accentuates this contradiction, showing that in order to uphold the system, Aristotle 
leaves the genus undetermined. This opens him up to Deleuze’s critique that there seem to be 
“two ‘Logoi’ differing in nature, but intermingled with one another” in Aristotle’s philosophy:  
the logos of species, which depends upon the identity of the concept of genera, and the logos of 
Genera, which is implicated in diversity, while being entirely separate of it.
84
 The contradiction 
is not delimited to the universal form on which all subsequent division is dependent. It is 
apparent at the level of specific differences as well, the consideration of which demonstrates a 
definitive divergence between Deleuze’s project in The Logic of Sense and Aristotle’s logic. For 
Aristotle, the essence of the individual is fixed. All of its states up to the present moment are 
continuous with it, meaning that its prior states are taken to be states of matter that progressively 
fulfil the potential of form. Perhaps Aristotle has something important to underline, however, 
when proposing that the essence of a being is grasped only once it has ceased to be. As Somers-
Hall points out, “essence as ‘what it was to be a thing,’ is essentially retrospective. This means 
that the becoming of [a being] is related entirely to an atemporal state of being.”85 From the 
perspective of Stoic logic, once a thing has ceased to be, or, in this case, once its essence has 
been determined, nothing can be attributed to it. Determined retrospectively, essence opens up a 
contradiction on the specific level. It can simultaneously be said that a thing is and is not. This is 
perhaps why Hegel finds Aristotle to be of great interest, despite the distinct way in which the 
undetermined concept determines itself in his philosophy.  
While the importance of Aristotle’s logic for the comprehension of Deleuze’s project is 
undeniable, here we only wanted to highlight the problem that afflicts it, in order to reflect upon 
Russell’s theory of types from a certain vantage point. Russell’s theory of types runs into the 
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same contradiction that Aristotle encounters with respect to the genus.
86
 He attempts to correct 
this contradiction by proposing that no class of all classes is a member of itself. A proposition 
about all members of a class is nonsensical or meaningless. How does Russell arrive at this 
conclusion? Take the following contradiction considered by him: “Epimenides the Cretan said 
that all Cretans were liars, and all other statements made by Cretans were certainly lies. Was this 
a lie? The simplest form of this contradiction is afforded by the man who says ‘I am lying’; if he 
is lying, he is speaking the truth, and vice versa.”87 Here, it is presumed that Epimenides the 
Cretan is both lying (x) and not lying (not x or w). In this case ‘w,’ would be the class of all 
classes which is not a member of itself. But then, as Russell notes, the logic must follow that ‘w 
is not a w,’ giving way to y, and so on indefinitely. He writes that this  
makes it evident that the notion of ‘all propositions’ is illegitimate; for otherwise, 
there must be proposition […] which are about all propositions, and yet cannot, 
without contradiction, be included among the propositions they are about. [When we 
suppose] the totality of propositions, statements about this totality generate new 
propositions which, on pain of contradiction, must lie outside the totality. It is useless 
to enlarge the totality, for that equally enlarges the scope of statements about the 
totality.
88
  
 
Russell’s claim that no class of all classes can be asserted, or alternatively, that there is no such 
thing as a proposition about all propositions, seems to have resolved the contradiction, except 
that now we must inquire as to what this higher type might be, by virtue of which no totality may 
be asserted. This higher type is of course the undefined or general enunciation, which constitutes 
the range of meaning of a propositional function. The propositional function is not the same as 
particular enunciations, which are the values of a function. For Russell, the propositional 
function (for example, x is rational) constitutes the possibility of meaning, the range of 
significance of the function, although it is obviously not one and the same as its values.
89
 The 
scope of significance of the function is considered to be the condition of all possible values, or 
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“all arguments for which the function is true, together with all the arguments for which it is 
false.”90 Whatever does not fit the criteria is considered outside of the function, thereby being 
nonsensical. Deleuze’s argument is that Russell resolves the contradiction that presents itself by 
abstracting from the conditioned. In other words, signification is only able to found denotation 
insofar as it gives itself a ready-made denotation. The argument is made again in What is 
Philosophy?, where Deleuze and Guattari argue that of all finite thought, logic in general is, by 
far, the most reductionist branch of science. Indeed, the authors go so far as to question its 
scientific validity when they sever scientific statements from logical propositions, which they 
claim are mere forms of recognition. It is questionable whether the act of thought can be 
entrusted to logic. The fundamental problem with the propositional function is that, because it 
“considers empty reference in itself as simple truth value, it can only apply it to already 
constituted states of affairs or bodies, in established scientific propositions or in factual 
proposition, […] or simple opinions.”91 It suffices to say that, for Deleuze, Russell’s higher type, 
the empty or undefined reference, cannot serve as the condition of denotations.  
Thus far, we have moved within what Deleuze calls, after the Russellian expression, the 
vicious circle of the three dimensions of the proposition. While the response is probably already 
apparent, the question is, can sense be interpreted as one and the same as signification. This 
distinction seems to get at the crux of Deleuze’s philosophy as a whole. In Difference and 
Repetition, their difference is stated clearly: “We must distinguish sense and signification in the 
following manner: signification refers only to concepts and the manner in which they relate to 
the object conditioned by a given field of representation; whereas sense is like the Idea which is 
developed in the sub-representative determinations.”92 As the ideational stratum which is 
expressed in the proposition, sense must be its fourth dimension. Such a dimension should not be 
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superimposed a posteriori, but must be shown as generating the other dimensions of the 
proposition from within. Deleuze points out that we can already infer it from the vicious circle of 
the proposition, which has shown that the other dimensions cannot provide the real genesis 
behind the conditioned. The ideal stratum of sense is a truly revolutionary discovery. In the first 
section of this dissertation, we explored some of Deleuze’s writings on sense prior to his 
publication of The Logic of Sense. We put forth a reading of the simulated and ontological sense, 
in order to show that the simulated sense is a kind of product that does not sever itself from the 
process of its production.
93
 These two aspects of sense are synonymous with the two readings of 
the event in The Logic of Sense. Sense, as Deleuze writes, “is at once both the site of an originary 
truth and the genesis of a derived truth.”94 It is jointly form and abyss: that which exists as the 
expressed of the proposition, and that which is extra-propositional or silently subsists, as it does 
not merge with the proposition itself. This distinction is artificial of course. We are saying one in 
same thing, but considering it from two viewpoints. Now, the simulated sense which lends itself 
to the sound does not merge with it, meaning that we can never say the proposition and the sense 
simultaneously. The problem of contradiction arises precisely when we suppose the sense as 
merging with signification. Sense is the expressed of the proposition, not the expression itself. Its 
neutrality demonstrates that it is indifferent to the general, the personal, and the particular. “The 
Stoics said it all: neither word nor body, neither sensible representation nor rational 
representation.”95 Being neither one, the event is thought to make language possible precisely 
because it is the frontier that separates sounds from states of affairs. This means that sense frees 
sounds from other corporeal entities, thus, rendering them capable of becoming expressive.  
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However, as we saw through our study of the logic of expression, while that which is 
expressed does not exist outside of its expression, it is not the sense of the proposition itself, it is 
said of things. Deleuze writes that  
the event subsists in language, but happens to things. Things and propositions are 
less in a situation of radical duality and more on the two sides of a frontier 
represented by sense. This frontier does not mingle or reunite them […]; it is rather 
something along the line of an articulation of their difference: body/language.
96
  
 
If the event is indeed said of things, how does it maintain its neutrality or autonomy? It would 
seem as though sense is the same as denotation. With the help of Brehier, we highlighted earlier 
that sense as the attribute is not a quality; it does not qualify a being. Instead, it is becoming (a 
way of being) best articulated by the verb. Rather than reflecting the actual object, the ideal 
stratum of sense is like its other side reflected in a mirror. It is the virtual half which consists of 
the effects of relations of beings. Sense is neither intrinsic signification, nor does it relate to an 
extrinsic denotatum, or an already constituted object.
97
 Later we will see how the verb, just as the 
event, has a double role to play once the event is determined and actualized in individuals. With 
respect to the actualization of the event in the present, the verb becomes conjugated in relation to 
the other dimensions of the proposition; it inheres in the proposition as verb.
98
 In contrast, in its 
infinitive mood, it is that which escapes the present, carrying off becoming without division. 
Deleuze writes that:  
in light of the relations and complex connections between the expression and the 
expressed, between the interiority of the expressor (l’exprimant) and the exteriority 
of the expressed, between the verb as it appears in language and the verb as it 
subsists in Being, we must conceive of an infinitive which is not yet caught up in the 
play of grammatical determinations […]. This would be a neutral infinitive for the 
pure event, […] representing [its] extra-propositional aspect.99  
 
Once the infinitive becomes determined, it is expressed in the two series, meaning that it is 
conjugated in light of persons, individuals and cases. But before we can consider the relation of 
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sense to these other dimensions of the proposition, we must consider the relation of the 
expression to the expressed; the “region where language no longer has any relation to that which 
it denotes, but only to that which it expresses, that is, to sense.”100 Stated otherwise, “in order 
that there be language, together with the full use of speech conforming to the three dimensions of 
language, it [is] necessary to pass through the verb and its silence, and through the entire 
organization of sense and nonsense.”101 We will now turn to this organization.  
 
 
The Virtual Structure of Language: Sense and Nonsense 
 
Always extraordinary are those moments  
in which philosophy makes the Abyss speak.
102
 
 
 
 
In many respects, The Logic of Sense is a product of its time. It can be thought of as a 
result of French structuralism. We see this when Deleuze conceptualises language as a virtual 
structure, not unlike Jacques Lacan’s formulation of the unconscious as structured like a 
language. Written in 1967, the shorter piece, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?” is the 
basis of a more extensive exposition of non-verbal language as structure in The Logic of Sense. 
The criteria by which we recognize structuralism are to a large extent repeated in The Logic of 
Sense, except that in the latter, they are considered from the perspective of the Stoic framework. 
It seems as though the former is a sort of preparatory work. Deleuze may have been interested in 
structuralism because he found that it had affinities with Stoic thought.
103
 Take the determining 
criteria of any structure as Claude Lévi-Strauss conceived of it, or consider Lacan’s presentation 
of meaning as effect in light of the Stoic topography in Encore. Two series are necessary in order 
for a structure to become productive, one signifying and the other signified. The signifier is a 
sign which presents an aspect of sense, while the signified is an ideal logical attribute that 
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distinguishes itself from the expression.
104
 It is clear that this elementary starting point of any 
structure echoes the Stoic relation of the sound which signifies, and the signified, which lends 
itself to the sound as the attribute of sates of affairs.  
The most pressing question for us is, by what process does sense lend itself to the 
expression of the proposition, if it is not to be identified with the proposition itself? While 
Deleuze has already responded to this question in Difference and Repetition and other works, in 
The Logic of Sense he appeals to contemporary perspectives with which he has affinities. A 
particularly useful starting point is Lévi-Strauss’ idea of the void of sense. The void is defined by 
him as the “symbolic value zero, that is, a sign marking the necessity of a symbolic content 
supplementary to that which already charges the signified, but able to take any value whatsoever, 
on the condition that it belong to the available reserve.”105 For Lévi-Strauss, the void plays the 
essential role of producing the relation of the two elementary series. It subsists in the signifier as 
a perpetually displaced place without an occupant, and inheres in the signified as the 
supplementary content that displaces its realization.
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 In Deleuze’s reading, the void conjoins 
the two elementary series, leading them towards a converging point, while also continuously 
ramifying them, thereby producing new events. Because the void has an enigmatic role, 
circulating through the series while belonging to neither one, Deleuze refers to it as the 
paradoxical element or instant of nonsense. This element, he writes, “has the function of bringing 
about the distribution of singular points; of determining as signifying the series in which it 
appears as excess, and, as signified, the series in which it appears correlatively as lacking, and 
above all, of assuring the bestowal of sense in both signifying and signified series.”107 Before we 
explore all that is implied in this line of argument, it might prove helpful to frame the 
problematic to which the tripartite relation serves as a response. This tripartite relation is meant 
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to articulate the two distinct terms of a relation in which sense is expressed as product, without 
splitting this product from the process of production. The paradoxical instant must explain how a 
part of the event which is becoming actualized in the present, and another aspect of the event 
which never ceases to become otherwise, are two directions of one and the same entity consistent 
and continuous with one another, even while the series that it develops are not. For Deleuze, “the 
distinction […] is not between two sorts of events; rather, it is between the event, which is ideal 
by nature, and its spatiotemporal realization in a state of affairs.”108 We intend to discuss this 
distinction in more detail later. For now, it suffices to say that the doubling of the event is meant 
to explain how language is endlessly born by virtue of this virtual structure.  
We highlighted that the paradoxical element of nonsense has the function of bringing about 
a distribution of singular events.
109
 The concept of singularity is not foreign to us, since we have 
been exploring it all along as event-effect. Here, we are considering the bond of effects among 
themselves. Deleuze uses the term singularity so as to point to the constellation populated by 
events, which, as we saw in the first section, doubles itself by reversing, hence, the idea that the 
line of the Aion moves in two directions instantaneously: one pathway giving way to the 
expressed in the domain of solutions, and the other capturing that which displaces the said as 
soon as it comes to exist in the proposition. Together, they make sense that which either arrives 
too early or too late, but never on time. Even so, how does Deleuze define singularity in The 
Logic of Sense? Singularities are indifferent to the three dimensions of the proposition. They are 
a-personal, pre-individual and a-conceptual entities that mark points of differentiation in a 
constellation or a complex of sense. Thus far, we have understood that a singularity results from 
the relations of things, but cannot be reduced to an actual relation, since it likewise depends upon 
another operation; the bond of event-effects. As “veritable events, [singularities] communicate in 
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one and the same Event which endlessly redistributes them, while their transformations form” a 
becoming.
110
 Earlier, we discussed Deleuze’s displacement of the verb “to be” in light of 
Nietzsche’s eternal return. When he argues that singularities communicate in one and the same 
Event or that they form the same complex theme, we must think of this Event as interchangeable 
with the paradoxical instance of the eternal return, not as the One, as is sometimes done.
111
 In 
The Logic of Sense, Deleuze introduces a peculiar topology so as to show how singularities 
communicate in one and the same Event. The whole organization of the virtual structure is 
summed up in three moments: “the [chance or aleatory] point which traces the line; the line 
which forms the frontier; and the surface which is developed and unfolded from both sides.”112 
To fully appreciate this topology, one requires a working knowledge of the three syntheses of 
time that Deleuze puts forth in Difference and Repetition. Since we explore the intricacies of 
Deleuze’s philosophy of time in the next chapter, we will only sketch out this topology here as it 
reflects the virtual structure of language.  
The most elusive of these three abstract moments is the instant on which the entire 
structure depends. As one might expect, the duality between effect and cause is itself an artificial 
one, while the instant as unlocalizable starting point is not. As Deleuze points out in Bergsonism, 
the division is made between two multiplicities that are different in kind, so that we may be 
oriented beyond the state of experience towards the condition of experience itself.
113
 The 
beginning point is what he refers to in that text as the turn of the line of articulation beyond 
experience, beyond the line of solutions or actualized states of affairs, with which it diverges. 
This turn is “an extraordinary broadening out which forces us to think a pure perception 
(percepts) identical to the whole of matter, a pure memory identical to the totality of the past.”114 
When studying the organization of the virtual structure that underpins language in The Logic of 
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Sense, we are thinking of this same domain, the same turn of the line of articulation that subsists 
in the present. In the latter text, Deleuze presents this instant as a chance point that gathers a 
complex of singular points upon a straight line, the line of the Aion. The line of the Aion is a 
perpetually differentiating line that simultaneously subdivides the present in two directions. It 
subsists in the present because the chance point extracts effects from it, or better yet, it refracts 
them (the turn) in two directions, in this way, completely ramifying the condition. One of the 
tricky aspects of the text is Deleuze’s argument that this paradoxical instant extracts events, all 
the while emitting them. The paradoxical instant does not simply refract an effect in two 
directions, as though being a condition of possibility. Through this process of refraction, it is 
itself productive of a singularity that is actualized in states of affairs. The virtual structure must 
be the condition of real experience. We must take great care in articulating this extremely 
delicate aspect of refraction in which so much is implied, since singular effects are not severed 
from the present completely determined. It is in the process of refraction that they are so 
determined. For Deleuze, the paradoxical instant must distribute the line of Aion, the proximate 
past, in order for a singularity to come about, which would be the direction of the future. While 
the direction of the past is, indeed, that which makes the present pass, the direction of the future 
marks the coming about of another present, in which a singularity is actualized. The entire 
process of emitting a singularity consists of the tracing of the proximate past, a past that is 
relative to the instant because of which it is summoned as the complex theme of a repetition. 
Alternatively, the line of the Aion simultaneously moves in the direction of the future since the 
instant is already enveloped in each singular point that forms a constellation. It is already 
enveloped in them as they are emitted with respect to it. Each unique distribution of the 
constellation of singular points is, for Deleuze, like an ideal dice game played from the 
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perspective of the chance point.
115
 Each throw of the dice ramifies the entire constellation of 
singularities that the instant selects by introducing a differentiation, with the entire operation 
being a singularity—the form and abyss, or ground and groundlessness at once. The paradoxical 
instant is a chance point because it forms a unique constellation each time, meaning that the 
specific distribution will never be the virtual object of another repetition, even while the theme it 
selects might be the object of another repetition. The ideational surface of sense is progressively 
determined meaning that the complex theme of singularities is indeed repeated, only differently. 
This is because each singularity is itself constituted by virtue of what is repeated in it, the future. 
Although the instant cannot be said to exist apart from the present, since it subsists in it as that 
which forms its condition, it perpetually subverts this present by turning the line of articulation 
in two directions instantaneously. It is a mirror, or as Deleuze also refers to it, a crystal, that 
marks the shifting frontier between two sides of a surface which unfold with respect to it.
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“Everything happens at the surface in a crystal which develops only on the edges.”117 
Deleuze employs the ideal game of dice throw in order to show how the game is the 
“unconscious of pure thought,” a thought that is intertwined with the emission of singularities 
each time.
118
 Each throw of the dice, or the emission of a singularity, is thought to transform the 
two elementary series that are determined on each side of the surface. By each side of the surface 
we mean utterances and states of affairs which are determined in relation to it. Deleuze argues 
that, as the absolute frontier which introduces a differentiation in the whole of the structure, 
nonsense “belongs simultaneously to both series, it has two sides. But the sides are never 
balanced, joined together, or paired off, because the paradoxical element is always in 
disequilibrium in relation to itself. […] We are faced with two dissymmetrical halves of an 
ultimate instance.”119 As we have stressed, in one direction, the singularities constitutive of the 
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proximate past together form the relative limit of the line of the Aion. Because the singular points 
form a constellation that repeats a theme, or they themselves make sense only in relation to one 
another, it could be said that they produce sense. This is a valid (in that sense is a world 
expressing itself), but only if we remember that the theme that they repeat depends upon the 
absolute position of the instant that selects them. The cut in the continuum of singular points is 
the relative limit that produces a product, that aspect of the event which is actualized in the 
present. On one side of the frontier unfolds the surface of the signifying series. Nonsense can be 
said to be the word=x of the signifying series, or in Lévi-Strauss’ terms, it is the empty place 
without an occupant. On the other side unfolds the surface of the signified. Nonsense is 
understood in this series as the object=x, or the supernumerary object which does not observe a 
position.
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 For its part, nonsense is not Russell’s absurd. Although it has no sense, for Deleuze, 
nonsense is that which “enacts the donation of sense, [being] opposed to the absence of 
sense.”121 If anything, there is always an excess of sense, rather than a lack. The pivotal role of 
the paradoxical instant intervening as nonsense is to produce sense by transforming the series, 
meaning that sense is not something originary, it is always a produced effect. As Deleuze notes: 
Sense is actually produced by the circulation of nonsense which affects both the 
signifier and the signified. In short, sense is always an effect. It is not an effect 
merely in the causal sense; it is an effect in the sense of an ‘optical effect’ or a ‘sound 
effect’ or even better, a surface effect, a position effect, and a language effect. […] 
[Sense] is a product which spreads out over, or extends itself the length of the 
surface; it is strictly co-present to, and coextensive with its own cause, and 
determines this cause as an imminent cause.
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We have already noted that as product, sense lends itself to the series of the signifier, but does 
not merge with the expression. It “crops up suddenly in the other series (of states of affairs)” as it 
is its attribute; the expression becomes indicative of the actual object itself.
123
 But, as Deleuze 
points out, sense does not merge with the actual object either. This is because the two series are 
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determined in relation to nonsense. Nonsense, being the locus of the ever-present, yet 
perpetually, displaced question “What is it (x)?” does not permit the two sides of the surface to 
merge, even while they tend towards the absolute point, as though to converge.  
That nonsense displaces the merging of the product with either series, captures the idea 
that what is said of the object, what is predicated of it in the domain of signification, never quite 
manages to make it coincide with the expression, but also that, that which is attributed to the 
actual object, is not its essence as such. The actual object does not coincide with its supposed 
identity. These dissymmetrical series correspond to an aspect of the fundamental problem we 
formulated earlier. When identified with the expression, the simulated sense (the product) always 
gives way to a contradiction. The actual states of affairs do not conform to the expression. Here, 
we come to understand why this is the case for Deleuze. The series of the signifier to which 
sense lends itself, expresses this sense as the past of the states of affairs, meaning that the sense 
has already taken flight in the other direction. The event, being that which is attributed to a state 
of affairs, does not cease becoming differentiated in the other direction of the Aion, implying that 
the object itself remains determined through an intrinsic genesis which is its sufficient reason. A 
purely actual object does not exist as such; it does not have some sort of a final resting place. It 
would be erroneous to cut it off from the process of its individuation. The continuous becoming 
of the event shows that language is “endlessly born, in the future directions of the Aion where it 
is established and, somehow, anticipated; and although it must also say the past, it says it as the 
past of states of affairs which go on appearing and disappearing in the other direction.”124 The 
expression is a kind of utterance that always already says the past of states of affairs. Earlier, we 
emphasized that Deleuze argues, alongside the Stoics, that the expression does not say itself and 
its sense simultaneously; there is always a sort of deferral between the two that opens up the 
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infinite proliferation of language. If we were to attempt to express the sense of an expression, we 
would have to multiply the series indefinitely. Here, sense would be the denoted object of the 
proposition that follows the first, while the denoted object of the proposition that follows would 
be the sense of the proposition that comes next. It is perhaps possible to utter it, the sense, but 
only as a nonsensical entity, like those invented by Lewis Carroll, which utter the perplexing 
compounds of things. The indefinite proliferation of the signifying series is now explained from 
the perspective of the ideational stratum of sense. The becoming of the event in the future 
direction of the Aion creates the asymmetry between the saying and the said in the form of the 
verbal expression, by rendering states of affairs and expressions divergent.  
 
The Genesis of Sense: Transcendental and Formal Logic 
 
 
In the previous section, we showed that the transcendental field is itself varied in 
connection with the quasi-cause, the quasi-cause being that which distributes the combinatory of 
singularities or events. The frontier of the transcendental field acts as the point of articulation of 
sense. It distributes sense in two series as that which happens to bodies and that which subsists in 
propositions. It is because of this quasi-cause that sense inherits a genetic power with respect to 
the two series without losing its autonomy or neutrality. Deleuze argues that “as soon as sense is 
grasped in its relation to the quasi-cause which produces and distributes it at the surface, it 
inherits, participates in, and even envelops and possesses the force of its ideational cause. […] 
The cause is nothing outside of its effect, that it haunts this effect, and that it maintains with the 
effect an immanent relation which turns the product, the moment that it is produced, into 
something productive.”125 Here we have the two aspects of sense being expressed. Sense does 
not merely double up with respect to the series, in this way maintaining its autonomy, its 
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incessant becoming, but it is also that which envelops the genetic power of the quasi-cause by 
being produced with respect to it. It itself becomes productive. The difficulty is precisely in 
maintaining these two positions simultaneously. Sense must be synonymous with the 
transcendental field as it has an immanent relation with its cause, meanwhile having the power of 
genesis with respect to that which is conditioned. This is its passage from sterility to genesis. 
This problem, the passage from sense as a mere product to it itself becoming productive, is, as  
Deleuze notes, at the heart of the logic of sense, since it forms the juncture at which the 
transcendental field and propositional knowledge cross paths.
126
 The inquiry into passage from 
sterility to genesis returns Deleuze to Husserl’s well established theory of sense. Although 
Husserl is only mentioned in a few series of The Logic of Sense, he is, nevertheless, a constant 
presence. Deleuze has an ambivalent relationship with Husserl, and the phenomenological 
tradition as a whole. If we broadly survey Husserl’s theory of sense, we might even say that the 
two philosophies share something intimate, that their perspectives are oriented towards the same 
thing. It is only once we closely consider the two approaches, however, that we see the stark 
contrast. Deleuze does not simply engage with Husserl in order to point to a predecessor, but to 
differentiate himself from that project. By outlining the fundamentals of Husserl’s position, we 
intend to show on what points the two part ways. This distinction will create the context in which 
we can posit the passage from sterility to genesis in Deleuze’s philosophy.  
Husserl’s vision is clear. He sets out to constitute a pure science, that of phenomenology, 
capable of grounding all other sciences. This science has two areas of concern. It delves into the 
genesis of all activities in the actual, while also studying the products of such activities. It would 
be able to take the products or results of the genesis as identical forms that are in essence 
repeatable in new acts of judgements, or concepts, and extendable to other actualities.
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 Because 
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of this twofold area of concern, there are also two ways in which we can approach sense in 
Husserl’s work. While both of these refer to one and the same ideal stratum of sense, the sense-
bestowing acts or, the act-species as Husserl calls them, differ in each one. Here, we will 
distinguish the two acts as Husserl has done, in order to eventually show how they cross paths. In 
“Expression and Meaning,” Husserl’s exploration of sense mirrors Frege’s. He distinguishes 
between the expression itself which is the physical or written sign, and the mental state 
expressed in it; that which is expressed means something, or relates the expression to something 
that is meant.
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 The expression in which the sense subsists is called the sense-bestowing 
expression, or expressions themselves are, in general, grasped as meaning-conferring acts. The 
expression allows us to distinguish that which is expressed in it as the objective mental state, 
and, the object of the presentation, that which is referred to. On the one hand, we have the 
meaning-intention, and, on the other, the meaning-fulfilment of the expression. In actual 
experience we never think of the sense-bestowing act itself, but only refer to the object. Actual 
experience manifests the asymmetry between two. We always miss the sense of what we are 
saying. One merely intends the object, not the sense. As Husserl notes, “we do not live in the 
presentation” of the sense, we merely enact it.129 The asymmetry between these two was also a 
basic problem for Frege. As with Frege, Husserl seeks to reconcile them, all the while arguing 
that the sense-intention need not be fulfilled as such, since it must remain the domain of pure 
possibility of manifold of acts of fulfilment; the sense-intention must remain indeterminate so 
that it can become fulfilled in actual experience. This is indeed the case with pure logic, in which 
the ideal fabric of meanings or objectivities is only necessary, not the sense-fulfilment.  
One of Husserl’s basic questions in that piece is how are these ideal unities themselves 
constituted in experience? How do the meaning-intention and the meaning-fulfilment meet up? 
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Husserl’s argument is that in experience, the fulfilling content and the intended content form a 
unity of coincidence; the intended and the given are one and the same thing. He proposes that  
wherever the meaning-intention is fulfilled in a corresponding intuition i.e., wherever 
the expression actually serves to name a given object, there the object is constituted 
as ‘given’ in certain acts, and, to the extent that our expression really measures up to 
the intuitive data, as given in the same manner in which the expression means it. In 
this unity of coincidence between meaning and meaning fulfillment, the essence of 
the meaning-fulfilment is the fulfilling sense of the expression, or, as one may also 
call it, the sense expressed by the expression.
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While such an argument seems to reiterate that the two simply go together, there is something 
significant being said here. Husserl thinks that the meaning-intention ‘fits’ the intuitive content 
like a glove, or it could also be said that the intuitive content finds the sense that is naturally 
suited to it; the sense which is, as it were, already there as a pure possibility. The question, 
however, is by virtue of what sort of act are these two contents identical? It is not enough that we 
merely say that they are. Husserl claims that the  
answer seems clear. The relation, as one of naming, is mediated, not merely by acts 
of meaning, but by acts of recognition, which are here also acts of classification. The 
perceived object is recognized […], known as one, and insofar as the act of meaning 
is most intimately one with the act of classification, and this latter, as recognition of 
the perceived object, is again intimately one with the act of perception, the 
expression seems to be applied to the thing and to clothe it like a garment. But there 
is no classification in experience so the recognitive act in the experience must 
accordingly base itself on the act of perception.
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For Husserl, the belonging of the word and the perception itself of a thing in the actual is 
mediated by the act of recognition, which has the role of synthesizing the two contents. The role 
of recognition is not merely found in the natural attitude itself, but is, in fact, the intentional bond 
that is phenomenological in character. Recognition intervenes not merely as that which mediates 
between the two, but also that which makes it possible that others refer to this sense in an 
objective way. According to Husserl, then, the two acts, the word itself, and the thing, are 
“combined in a single unity of act,” or, rather, the naming and the recognition are one and the 
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same thing.
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 He writes that the “recognitive character of certain acts, which gives them their 
significant relation to objects of intuition, does not pertain to words as noises, but to words in 
their meaningful, their semantic essence.”133 This semantic essence which fits the individual 
intuitive datum as such, remains the general act of signification that enters into a relation with 
the act of intuition; in short, for Husserl, the “object of intuition is known through the 
concept.”134 In this respect, Husserl’s sense-bestowal reminds us of Hegel’s, both are, in a sense, 
revisiting the problem that was set out by Plato in the Cratylus.    
The above comprehension of sense is understood as the static act of fulfillment or 
recognition. The other type of sense-bestowing act to which we turn to now, involves what 
Husserl calls the dynamic form of recognition. While the static act merely presents the result, the 
consciousness of the coincidence of the intuitive content and the meaning-intention, in the 
dynamic form of recognition, the two are presented for themselves and weaved into another.
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The difference between the two act-species of sense-bestowal is likewise demonstrated by 
Husserl, when he distinguishes pure logic from the phenomenological attitude:  
pure logic is interested in the noema (sense), but not with respect to its components, 
but only in so far as it is conceived as exclusively determined by a narrower essence, 
to the more precise definition. If we wish to obtain the full noema of a determinate 
judgement process we must take the judgement precisely as it is intended to in just 
that process; whereas for formal logic the identity of the judgement extends much 
further.
136
  
 
According to Husserl, the noema intended is identical in both cases, even while the act differs in 
transcendental philosophy. How does the act differ? The inquiry into the pure stream of 
consciousness, along with the components of the noema which are its correlates, is an inquiry 
into the phenomenological structure of experience. Husserl tells us that this phenomenological 
structure is there implicitly, subsisting in the natural attitude, yet, we seldom set out to inquire 
into it. The defining way in which Husserl proposes we may perform, what he calls eidetic 
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research, is by bracketing the actual. By putting the actual out of action, we suspend the natural 
attitude itself, along with the judgement acts which it implies. We take on an intellectual attitude. 
This placing in parenthesis of the natural attitude should tell us straight away what belongs to the 
stream of consciousness. Once we bracket the natural attitude, what we have is the 
phenomenological residuum, a region of being distinct from the actual. “Consciousness 
considered in its ‘purity’” he writes,  
must be held to be a self-contained complex of being, a complex of absolute being 
into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip, to which nothing 
is spatiotemporally external and which cannot be within any spatiotemporal complex, 
which cannot be affected by any physical thing and cannot exercise causation upon 
any physical thing.
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While the region of being that is open to eidetic research is distinct from the actual, we do not 
merely bracket the natural attitude in order to do away with it altogether. For Husserl, the 
phenomenological reduction is performed so that we enter into that field of consciousness which 
implicitly persists in the actual, as the reason behind the given as it is given. We always return to 
the actual, albeit with a different eye. According to Husserl, the continuously productive field of 
consciousness which “yields an infinite wealth of cogitations,” is always open to us if we turn 
our mental regard towards it.
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 This turning is a putting into action of consciousness itself, in 
which the mental process acquires a ‘directedness to’ that objective something, which usually 
remains implicit in sense-bestowing acts. When we direct our attentiveness towards the 
phenomenological realm, we change gears from the mode of non-actionality to actionality itself, 
whereby the objective something in consciousness is no longer merely potential, or posited 
implicitly.
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 The objective something is now given absolutely, it is the ‘it itself’, to which 
consciousness becomes immanent.   
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Let us turn to this transcendental stream of consciousness. If we focus in on Deleuze’s 
direct reference to Husserl’s Ideas, we notice that he seems to disregard the comprehension of 
sense in the static act of fulfilment entirely. He, instead, praises Husserl for having uncovered the 
noema as the neutralized double of the expression. In placing the accent on the noematic 
complex itself, he has not only provisionally left behind Husserl’s study of formal logic, but he 
has also intentionally accentuated one feature of the latter’s transcendental philosophy. This 
partial focus is evident when he writes that in Husserl’s philosophy, the  
noema possesses a nucleus quite independent of the modalities of consciousness and 
the thetic character of the propositions, and also quite distinct from the physical 
qualities of the object posited as real. In the nucleus of noematic sense, there appears 
something even more intimate, a supremely or transcendentally intimate center 
which is nothing other than the relation between sense itself and its object in its 
reality.
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Readers of Husserl will find this accentuation of the noematic complex alone rather peculiar, 
especially because, for Husserl, the noema is that which gives itself to a mental process. It is 
composed of a multiplicity of presentations giving directedness to the stream of consciousness. 
Yet, Deleuze’s partial focus is not an oversight. Neither does it involve a flawed reading of 
Husserl. Husserl clearly states that even while the noema and the noises correlate, they involve 
different types of components. However, although these are distinguished by him, Husserl rarely 
approached the noema for itself, or when he does discuss the core of the noematic sense, it is 
only in order to demonstrate how the objective thought is already inherent in it as a common or 
inter-subjective form.  
In the Ideas, Husserl’s basic argument is that every mental process or stream of 
consciousness has an essence that is seized upon as its own intuitive content.
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 In bracketing the 
actual, we delimit ourselves to that stream of consciousness to which corresponds its own 
essence in its specificity, that is to say, “we exclude everything which does not lie in the 
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cogitation with respect to what the cogitation is in itself.”142 The pure ego is an intentional one, 
meaning that it is a consciousness of something. Its essence is precisely that something whereof 
it is consciousness. It is a grasping or a seizing of something given to it as its own. If the ego is 
thought to reflect upon this something, it is because this something is that which directs the flow 
of the grasping, without merging with the flow of the mental process. It is the perceiving as such, 
or the flux of presentations of the perceiving, which not only alter from presented to no longer 
presented, but are each, by themselves, reproductive modifications of a theme, moving from 
determinate to indeterminate potential, which is the horizon of the seeing. As we have noted, to 
this perceiving, for Husserl, there corresponds a mental regard or attentiveness, which is the 
perceived. He writes that “no mental process is presented. That means that the perception of a 
mental process is a simple seeing of something which is (or can become) perceptually given as 
something absolute and not as something identical in modes of appearance by adumbration.”143 
Here, we do not have a strict separation between the perceiving and the perceived; the two 
streams, that of the noesis and the noema, are immanent to one another. How does Husserl 
demonstrate that the mental process is already inherent in the components of the noema? While 
the two streams are disjointed, the noetic moments have as their correlate the noematic moments. 
According to Husserl, there are no noetic moments without these noematic moments which give 
themselves for the seizing in thought. But the object of the noetic moments is distinct from the 
object of the noematic moments. The noetic moments are the directions of the pure ego with 
respect to the bestowal of sense upon the object of the noema. While the stream of consciousness 
is not composed of identical moments, especially because the noetic moments are correlated to 
the noema, they, nevertheless, progressively seize one and the same object, which is unified in 
the sense bestowal act. Husserl writes that the “object found in the noema is intended to as an 
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identical object in the literal sense, but the consciousness of it is non-identical only combined 
continuously united consciousness in the different segments of its immanent duration.”144 On the 
side of the mental process, we have the ‘What’ that is reflected in the core of the noema, but 
weaved independently of its complex. In other words, while the pure intuitions are given to the 
mental process, they belong to the mental process in a different way than in the way in which 
they are given for the seizing.
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 We will show what this ‘What’ intended in consciousness 
produces in a moment, for now, let us shift over to the noema. 
The mental process inheres in the perception-noema, because the noematic core itself has a 
relation to its own object, the object in reality, to which the sense-bestowal act will eventually 
become directed. The mental process arrives at an objective determination of the object, which in 
this case is the content of the noema, precisely because the noema in itself has its own object. On 
this side of the noema, we have the ‘How’ of “its mode of givenness in so far as this mode of 
givenness is found as a characteristic belonging to it.”146 This how of its mode of giving, points 
to the distinct content of the noema itself, which is not itself a unity performed by the mental 
process, but a multiplicity. Or it is the multiplicity which raises the ‘How’ of its mode of giving. 
Every noema has its own content, which is the sense (the meant as meant), by virtue of which it 
is itself related to ‘its’ object.147 As we have noted, the noema consists of separate segments 
which themselves have what is called a noematic core. Husserl argues that the content of the core 
of the noema is the mode in which it is an object of consciousness; it is that which is intended to 
in the mental process. The core is understood to have an objective something, what Husserl calls 
a determinable x, which implies the substrate in the “how of its determinations.”148 The how in 
the noema is the bearer of predicates, which is intended to as the identical predicate in the noesis. 
The determinable x, being the bearer of predicates, is separable from the noema as the object 
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continuously intended to in consciousness. Because it is the thing intended by all consciousness 
as such, Husserl argues that it is the same object despite being presented differently in the 
noema. As it becomes more closely determined in consciousness with the flow of the noematic 
moments, it is recognized as identical, or abstracted from the noema. This determinable x 
permits Husserl to say that it is the same object which is continuously intended in consciousness, 
even while it is presented differently in the determination-content. In the noema, “it shows itself 
only from different sides, whereby the predicates which remained undetermined would have 
become more closely determined.”149 In the mental act, we separate the intentional object from 
the fluctuating predicates. Or as Husserl writes, this x is “separated as central noematic moment 
[…] the pure x in abstraction from all predicates […] and it becomes separated from these 
predicates, or more precisely, from the predicate noemas.”150 The separation of the pure x from 
the predicate noemas is, according to Husserl, permitted by the noema itself, since its moments 
include an object of unity. This object of unity is shown in the reproduction of each of the 
moments with respect to each other. The noematic complex replays a similar theme.   
Now, let us turn to the last moment of Husserl’s stream of consciousness, “the two-
membered nature of the predicative process,” the explication and the apprehension of the content 
of the noema.
151
 This two-membered process is of special importance to us, since our problem is 
precisely this double articulation of sense. According to Husserl, the explicative process in the 
noesis, produces the simplest predicative determination S is p, in light of the horizon of the 
noema. The noema presents this horizon, since it is that which exchanges the indeterminate for 
the determinations of the object, with the horizon leaving open the entirety of the genesis. In 
other words, the flux of the noema implies reproductive modifications in which the horizon is 
constantly displaced, and does not cease to be displaced with explication. Conversely, on the side 
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of the noemata, we have the retaining in consciousness of the substrate S, which is explicated as 
the objective determination p, the sense bestowed on S. Husserl refers to this explication, the 
coincidence of S with p, as copulative spontaneity; the first level of the predicative process which 
is essentially passive in nature. He then turns around on this copulative spontaneity produced in 
consciousness, when writing:  
But when, retaining S in grasp, we pass to its moment p, therefore when we witness 
this coincidence this ‘contraction’ of S is p, we have not yet, for all that, posited S as 
subject in a predictive judgement, and we have not yet determined it as having the 
moment p in the manner S is p. This, rather, is the achievement of a new kind of 
activity.
152
  
 
What does Husserl mean when he says that the contraction S is p does not yet reflect S as subject 
on the first level of predication? This shift is reminiscent of our awkward question: Which one is 
the being? In the stream of pure immanence, the S is p arrives as the primary explication in 
accordance with the moments of the noema. The coincidence of S with p, the predicate, arises 
passively at the horizon of determinations. The mental grasp has not yet turned to S as subject, 
but has stayed with the flow of the noematic moments. For Husserl, it is the copulative 
spontaneity, the passive coincidence S is p, that turns the ego now to S’. Or, as he puts it, “when 
the transition from S to p has taken place in this way, there then develops on the basis of active 
contemplation an interest of higher level in the object-substrate.”153  
In the first place, Husserl conceives of the running-through of the multiplicity as having its 
origin in passivity, rather than the active intension on the part of the ego. Once the multiplicity is 
explicated, it can be actively reflected upon. “If, when a plurality is run through, it is also 
actively taken together, then matters evidently stand otherwise. But then the uniting activity is 
obviously completely other than that which gives unity to an explication.”154 So, how does the 
uniting activity change once we have shed light on S’? Husserl argues that once we have shed 
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light on S’, S’ must likewise be predicatively determined by p in much the same way that S had 
been determined by it. He writes that the “passive synthesis of coincidence between S and S’, 
which was the ground of the common affection, can now be actively apprehended; we say that S 
and S’ are the same—are p; although S still has its moment p, and S’, in turn, has its moment in 
p.”155 What could Husserl mean that there is a coincidence of S and S’? Well, S’ is already 
reflected in the substrate of the noematic complex, precisely because the noematic complex has 
its own object which it determines. This means that, for Husserl, at the least, the two must be one 
and the same in the activity of identification, even though, in the consciousness which directs 
itself to them, they are not two identical moments. The consciousness must reach activity in the 
change of levels from explication to apprehension. According to Husserl, explication is a partial 
identification, while the latter is the total identification in which the object is actively grasped in 
the predicate. There are two ways that this new mode of judgement is viewed thereafter. It can be 
grasped with respect to the substrate as its own individual point of predication, or with respect to 
the predicate as the identical one in a series of substrates. In other words, we can either focus in 
on the substrate or the predicate in the equation S is p. For Husserl, this identification of p in a 
series of substrates  
means that the unity is pre-constituted in the passive coincidence of likeness of the 
moments p’, p’’, and so on, as the unity of the species p: on the strength of this, an 
act of judgement oriented in a new direction is possible, in which, if we return to S’ 
and re-effect the identification, we no longer determine S’ by p’ as its individual 
moment but by p as identically the same in S, S’, and so on.156  
 
The discovery of the identical predicate in the series of substrates allows for the possibility of 
extending the predicative core, belonging on the side of the noetic moments, to other substrates 
as their common form. This means that “the judgement s is p* in which p designates the 
individual moment in the individual object S is completely different from the judgement S is p in 
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which p designates the universal, the eidos.” 157 With the new form of judgement, this same 
universal, p, can be infinitely particularized according to Husserl. It gives itself this infinite 
possibility, because, for Husserl, the horizon of determinations allows the abstraction of the 
predicate from the individual judgment.
158
 In other words, he interprets the open horizon as the 
possibility of extending the predicate itself to other actual objects.
 
In the last instance, Husserl 
places the emphasis on his universal judgement as the crowning achievement of his eidetic 
research.  
The potentials of Husserl’s philosophy are undeniable. His thinking through of the 
structure of intentionality is a substantial contribution. But Husserl essentially betrays its novelty 
when positing the sense as a predicate that is identically repeatable in the empirical. According 
to Deleuze, Husserl’s genesis is a “rationalized caricature of a true genesis.”159 Husserl must 
reduce sense to predictive generality in order to show how the sense is the same objective 
something intended to in consciousness by every ego; indeed, that it is the common form implicit 
in every act of judgment. In order to show how this inter-subjective form is implicit in acts of 
judgment, he must render the something-x in the noema capable of supporting the unification in 
the noesis.
160
 In line with this, Husserl’s task is to make transcendental logic affirm formal logic; 
all that transcendental logic manages to do here is to give a nod to formal logic. For us, the 
gravest error made by Husserl is when he identically repeats the copulative spontaneity in the so-
called higher level of active apprehension. Rather than perceiving the indeterminate as a 
paradoxical instance that essentially displaces the explication of the predicate on the basis of the 
noema, Husserl interprets the indeterminate as lending its weight to the general predicate. This is 
an analogy. We might go so far as to say that it is a ruse; a retrospective resolution of the 
problem that suits the natural attitude. This predicative generality tells Deleuze that “Husserl 
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does not think about genesis on the basis of a paradoxical instance, which properly speaking 
would be non-identifiable.”161 According to him, before this paradoxical instance is covered over 
in the actual, it makes possible a critique of good sense and common sense. We will return to his 
critique of doxa in the closing remarks of this chapter. Here, it is important for us to stress that 
there is a dividing line in philosophy between those who interpret sense as a general predicate 
with infinite extension, and those who determine sense as co-present to paradox. In the former 
case, the search is defined by the effort to reconcile formal logic with the transcendental. It finds 
in the transcendental mere forms of recognition. It actively affirms, for the second time, the 
predicate involved in the expression. It merely generalizes the predicate, takes it to be the final 
word; extends it to the world as a whole as a possibility. While this abstraction appears to be 
derived from a mental process immanent to the noema, thinking itself can only arise when it is 
appropriated to paradox, when it is an abiding attentiveness to a problem, from which thinking 
qua thinking could not sever itself. Husserl simply explicates too much when in a retrospective 
act he eliminates the paradox so as to reinstall the form of recognition. But, then, the question is 
precisely: “What is the fate of philosophy which knows well that it would not be philosophy if 
did not, at least provisionally, break with the particular contents and modalities of doxa?”162 The 
critique of knowledge or the dogmatic image of thought, on the basis of the paradoxical instance 
is, by far, the greatest contribution of Deleuze’s theory of sense. It is the greatest contribution 
precisely because it requires a different idea of sense so as to be carried out.  
 Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1937 essay “The Transcendence of the Ego” had a profound influence 
on Deleuze. Deleuze’s claim in The Logic of Sense is that only an impersonal transcendental 
field can produce a sense co-present to a paradoxical element, while also giving way to the other 
dimensions of the proposition. His critique of sense posited as a general predicate in Husserl’s 
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philosophy has its roots in Sartre’s essay. For Deleuze, the reduction of sense to a general 
predicate does three things: it reduces the sense to an already given signification, it relates to the 
denoted object as an already constituted one, and it presupposes a dimension of manifestation, 
“in the position of the transcendental subject, which retains the form of the person, of personal 
consciousness, and of subjective identity, and which is satisfied with creating the transcendental 
out of the characteristics of the empirical.”163 The problem is precisely that, on both sides of the 
transcendental structure, the product is external to the genesis, or the sense is an extrinsic one, as 
it transcends the field of immanence in order to posit the already determined. Such a critique of 
Husserl is, in large part, found in Sartre’s paper. In that piece, Sartre argues that Husserl 
unnecessarily doubles consciousness with the ego, which, according to him, transcends the 
operation of the consciousness which unfolds and unifies itself in time. This ego that says I 
think, for him, “is precisely not the consciousness that thinks.”164 A consciousness that unifies 
itself is already there in Husserl’s philosophy, so, according to Sartre, Husserl should not have 
allowed for there to be such a thing as the ego which reflects itself in the operation of 
consciousness. He writes that, if the ego indeed existed, “it would violently separate 
consciousness from itself, it would divide it, slicing through each consciousness like an opaque 
blade.”165 Consciousness must be a consciousness of its object, nothing more. It cannot in any 
sense be an object for itself in the ego, which would somehow underlie it. On the whole, the 
problem with the ego is that it is a product of a retrospective look that has moved away from the 
instantaneity of consciousness, the spontaneity of thought. This is why Sartre insists that 
Husserl’s ego “affirms more than it knows.”166 Conversely, the ego can be posited, but only once 
the consciousness has been run-through. Sartre argues that the “I think can accompany our 
representations because it appears against a background of a unity that it has not contributed to 
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creating, and it is this pre-existing unity which, on the contrary, makes it possible.”167 On what 
basis are such arguments made convincing, however? Just like the actual object on the side of the 
noema transcends it, the ego as the double of consciousness, transcends the transcendental field. 
For Sartre, then, this transcendental field, being the condition of experience, must involve an 
impersonal, or an anonymous, consciousness. If the ego were presumed in it, if this 
consciousness was conceived of as my life, then, this consciousness would be closed in upon 
itself. The ego, he writes, “does not have any outside, it can be conceived only through itself and 
this is why we cannot grasp the consciousness of another.”168 Being distinct from the ego, the 
impersonal consciousness is the outside of the ego, that which cannot be experienced by the ego 
as ego, or better yet, that which displaces the ego. By putting the ego out of the play in the 
transcendental, Sartre seems to have completed Husserl’s bracketing of the actual.  
 If the transcendental field is an impersonal one, meaning that the ideal stratum of sense is 
no longer identified by an ego as being the same thing as the predicate, but is, rather, the 
infinitive co-present with nonsense that continually displaces the subject-copula-predicate 
formulation, Deleuze has the difficulty of demonstrating its relationship with the other 
dimensions of the proposition. Even if the idea is flawed, as it implies an account of the predicate 
from the perspective of the empirical, the act of recognition mediating in the sense bestowal 
makes for an easier resolution to the problem. Once we have gotten rid of it and moved away 
from mere possibility, it is much more challenging to show how sense moves from sterility to 
genesis, and how the transcendental field would serve as the ground of propositional knowledge. 
Sean Bowden highlights the difficulty involved in this endeavour, when asking: “How are 
individuals, persons, general concepts, and the relations between them, to be generated by the 
event without reference to any underlying, substantial unity?”169 According to Deleuze, there are 
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two sorts of genesis that are derived from the impersonal transcendental field of singularities or 
events: the static ontological genesis, and, the logical genesis. As with Husserl, the first stage of 
the genesis consists of the individual which is derived from the transcendental field. We already 
expressed this idea, when we outlined in the introduction to this chapter Deleuze’s argument that 
the actualization of the virtual gives way to lines of solutions. The relation of the line of 
singularities with the lines of solutions encapsulates the actualization of the transcendental field 
in the actual individual. The individual essentially expresses a world by virtue of the relations it 
forms with itself or other individuals, and a world, expressed by the individual, consists of a 
series of singularities that are convergent.
170
 But we have seen that singularities are continuously 
displaced with respect to the caesura, how could singular events compose a world expressed by 
the individual? Deleuze argues that, “a singularity may be grasped in two ways: in its existence 
and distribution, but also [as it] extends and spreads itself out in a determined direction over a 
line of ordinary points. This second aspect already represents [the] stabilization and a beginning 
of the actualization of singularities.”171 The extension of singularities over a line of ordinary or 
actualized points is meant to delineate the actualization of the individual, or what it means to 
become actualized. Deleuze tells us that if singularities extend themselves over a line of 
actualized points, then, this means that the singularities actualized by the individual are selected 
in accordance with the rule of convergence.
172
 We could also say that the actualized singularities 
in the ordinary points are predicates in which the world is expressed. If the world expressed 
generates one and the same individual, this means that the world itself is configured by the 
continuation of singularities which are essentially compossible with respect to each other. By 
drawing from Leibniz, Deleuze argues that  
compossibility is thus defined as a continuum of singularities, whereby continuity has 
the convergence of series as its ideational criterion. […] In each world, the individual 
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monads express all the singularities of this world, […] but each monad envelops or 
expresses ‘clearly’ a certain number of singularities only.173   
 
It is, indeed, difficult to grasp the idea of convergence, since convergence gives us a glimpse of 
actualization from the perspective of the past. It merely means that the world expressed by 
individuals renews itself in them; it is itself continued as this world as it inheres in the individual 
as a series of predicates. Since the world renews itself in them, the individual monads together 
express all of the singularities of this world, while each envelops a select number of singular 
events.  
While the world is expressed in the individual, it is nevertheless not the same thing as the 
individual. By arguing that the singular points are actualized in a line of ordinary points, Deleuze 
wants to emphasize that the world itself subsists in the individual as event or verb, even while it 
is actualized by the individual as a predicate. In this case, we do not attribute a predicate to 
Alice, but define the world within which Alice becomes large or small.
174
 Since the predicates 
that inhere in the individual are approached by Deleuze from the perspective of the event, the 
predicate also thereby changes. From the perspective of the transcendental we say that the event 
subsists in the individual as the expressed, while from the perspective of the actual, we say that 
the individual is the expression of the predicate. So as to demonstrate this, Deleuze writes that  
to the extent that what is expressed does not exist outside of its expressions, that is, 
outside of the individuals which express it, the world is really the ‘appurtenance’ of 
the subject and the event has really become an analytic predicate of a subject. ‘To 
green’ indicates a singularity-event in the vicinity of which the tree is constituted. 
[…] But ‘to be green’ or ‘to be a sinner’ are now the analytic predicates of 
constituted subjects.
175
  
 
If individuals are these analytic predicates that pertain immediately to them without any 
generalization, then in what way is Deleuze’s theory of sense distinct from what came before it? 
The difference in Deleuze’s philosophy is that a world is neither composed of predicate noemas, 
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nor infinite forms, that would be explicated in or by the individual. If the individual is said to be 
composed of analytic predicates, this is only because, in expressing a world, it actualizes the 
event to begin with, which, in the course of actualization, becomes this predicate. Or better yet, 
the predicate is this becoming on the part of the individual, its manner of being, in the process of 
actualizing the event. As we saw in Chapter 1, the individual monad actualizes the event in 
accordance with its capacity or power. While the predicate is indeed actualized in the present (to 
be green), the continued becoming of the event in the transcendental field perpetually suspends 
its finality, the limit of actualization, thereby continuously modifying the becoming of the 
individual (to green). The continuous becoming of the event in the transcendental field, then, 
subsists in the becoming of the individual as the reason behind its becoming. This idea is 
articulated from another viewpoint in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, where Deleuze claims 
that Leibniz is the second philosopher of the event after the Stoics. Leibniz is considered a 
philosopher of the event, because he conceived of the event as a verb “irreducible to the copula 
and to the attribute.”176 The unique perspective that Leibniz brings to Deleuze, is that, with him, 
it becomes possible to define the event as a relation: “relations themselves are types of events. 
[…] Events in their turn are types of relations; they are relations to existence and to time.”177 
This conception of the event as relation opens up another perspective on the analytic predicates 
actualized in the individual. In the first place, events are types of relations, they are the pre-
individual mood of a relation; that by which the relation qua relation is renewed as such. We will 
discuss the differential relation in greater depth in the fourth chapter. This differential relation is 
actualized in the individual, meaning that the predicate always points back to the relation as that 
from which it derives. Now, this idea of event as relation makes the above interpretation of the 
relationship of the event and predicate much more consistent, while also explaining why, in fact, 
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the schema subject-copula-attribute becomes displaced with the continued variation of the 
transcendental. It demonstrates why the sense cannot be mistaken as one and the same thing as 
the analytic predicate. In effect, the predicate, as that in which the sense inheres, points back to 
the transcendental in which the event continues. The back and forth movement of actualization 
that we have been emphasizing is meant to capture the becoming of the individual in the 
becoming of the event. The events that compose a world bring their potential to the predicates in 
the course of actualization, while this same actualization envelops the individual in the world in 
which a relation is continued. As Deleuze notes, “the power of renewal is conceded only to 
individuals in the world, and only for a time—the time of their living present,” while the event 
suspends the stabilization of the predicate, by subdividing the present in the direction of the past 
and the future.
178
  
By exploring Husserl’s predicative process, we saw that the predicate was intended as the 
identical predicate in the explications of the noesis, because the noematic core had this 
something-x that permitted it to be recognized as the same one. For Husserl, this identical 
predicate allowed the ego to transcend the individual monad in order to attain the second level of 
the sense-bestowing act common to all egos. This is precisely where Deleuze is in disagreement 
with Husserl:  
We cannot therefore follow Husserl when he puts into play the highest synthesis of 
signification inside a continuum, all the lines of which converge or concord. This is 
not the way to transcend the first level. Only when something [x] is identified 
between divergent series […], an object=x appears transcending individuated 
worlds.
179
  
 
We have already mentioned that there is no underlying unity in Deleuze theory of sense. What, 
then, could this object=x be that transcends the individual worlds? In order to demonstrate this 
object=x, Deleuze reiterates that the singularities are inseparable from the paradoxical instance 
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of indetermination that underpins every determination. He writes that “it behooves the problem 
[the complex theme of sense] to refer to conditions which constitute this superior and positive 
indetermination; it behooves the event to be subdivided endlessly, and also to be reassembled in 
one in the same Event.”180 We have seen thus far that each field of singularities is distributed 
with respect to the paradoxical instance. Each singularity as such bears the paradoxical instance, 
which makes the distribution. The entire complex forms a problem that each time gives way to a 
different solution in the actual. Despite this, there is something common to the different 
solutions: 
We must therefore understand that incompossible worlds, despite their 
incompossibility, have something in common—something objectively in common—
which represents the ambiguous sign of the genetic element in relation to which 
several worlds appear as instances of solution for one and the same problem.
181
  
 
Now, this object=x are persons, or synthetic predicates. By synthetic predicates, Deleuze means 
that individuals are no longer defined as analytic predicates, but are opened unto divergent 
worlds, or different possibilities. In the first chapter, we saw how the sense was approached from 
the perspective of the transcendental field, and from the perspective of the being. Beings are not 
delimited to this one relation, but are opened onto a variety of relations that necessarily produce 
what would be called incompossible worlds; a being is a complex entity with diverse 
characteristics which appear to be in opposition with one another. Nevertheless, it is always the 
same person or object=x that is replayed in these worlds. But Deleuze’s point here is that, 
persons are opened onto these diverging worlds because of the common something to all worlds, 
not on the side of the person, but on the side of the transcendental field. This common 
something=x is the genetic element, or the paradoxical Event as the return of difference. It is 
only in relation to the Event as the return of difference, that Deleuze permits anything common 
to subsist in divergent or incompossible worlds. This paradoxical instance, however, does not 
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prevent us from generalizing the synthetic predicates implied by persons. Since the synthetic 
predicates in connection with the paradoxical x imply the different worlds as possibilities, we 
can now treat the person as a class of its own to which the predicates correspond as variables. 
“Properties and classes are grounded in the order of the person. This is because persons 
themselves are primarily classes having one single member, and their predicates are properties 
having one constant. Each person is the sole member of his or her class,” a class which includes 
the properties as variables of it.
182
 Deleuze argues that from this point it becomes possible to 
generalize the structure, so as to claim that the universal Ego or person corresponds to the 
something x in all worlds, while each particular ego is the object=x common to the worlds it 
envelops.
183
 In the last instance, the person is taken as the universal something x to which 
various properties would correspond. Deleuze thereafter wraps up the discussion of the static 
ontological genesis, by proposing that the eventual covering over of the paradoxical instance 
produces good sense and common sense. The critique of knowledge, however, remains 
somewhat vague since Deleuze does not respond to one fundamental idea proposed by Husserl, 
the correlation of the noesis with the noema. Earlier we mentioned that, for Deleuze, the ideal 
game is the “unconscious of pure thought,” that it is intimately involved in the emission of 
singularities.
184
 But now that we have displaced the ego, how would such thinking address itself 
to the noematic complex? We will return to this question in chapters three and four of this 
dissertation.  
The third aspect of the static ontological genesis leads to the static logical genesis. The 
level defined by classes along with the variable properties that imply persons as synthetic 
predicates, gives way to the logical proposition.
185
 Deleuze argues that in the logical genesis the 
other aspects of the ontological genesis  
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act now as material instances which realize the possibility and determine within the 
logical proposition the relations necessary to the existence of the conditioned: the 
relation of denotation as the relation to the individual […]; the relation of 
manifestation as the relation to the personal; and the relation of signification defined 
by the form of possibility.
186
  
 
The question again becomes, which one of these dimensions of the logical proposition is the 
primary one? By putting forth the static ontological genesis on which the logical genesis 
depends, Deleuze wants to elaborate on the claim made earlier that none of the dimensions of the 
logical proposition can act as the ground. Each one points to the other, none being able to act as 
the primary dimension. Deleuze argues that the circle of the logical proposition can only be 
explained from the perspective of the fourth dimension of the proposition, that of sense, since 
sense produces the ontological order on which the logical order depends. “Precisely because [the 
tertiary structure of language] is produced by the ontological and logical genesis, it is contingent 
upon sense, that is, upon that which constitutes by itself a secondary organization which is very 
different and also distributed in an entirely different manner.”187 The secondary organization of 
language is the transcendental structure of language, which, as we saw, is produced with respect 
to the paradoxical element x that perpetually displaces its own identity, while in the tertiary 
structure, that of the logical proposition, x serves as the object with which we attempt to reinstall 
identity. With respect to this different x, sense would be the dimension of the proposition that 
displaces the circle of the proposition, but also that which is necessarily implied by it as the 
object=x and the word=x, through which language acquires infinite extension or reproduction. If 
we should unfold the circle of the logical proposition as we have done, we find the secondary 
organization of language; that of the production of sense co-present with nonsense. Thereafter, 
Deleuze discusses sense as a problem to which propositions serve as responses. The workings of 
the logical proposition are, in a way, left to function as they do; common sense and good sense 
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are reinstalled. The form of recognition works as it did before, but Deleuze has now shown how 
it stems from the transcendental field of sense, or how the stratum of sense works from within to, 
both, displace it, and to render it possible. The line of singularities, he writes, “opens and unfolds 
the ring of the proposition, the latter closes it up, and between the two, all the vocalizations, 
modalizations, temporalizations, and personalizations are deployed.”188 
 
Conclusion: Para/doxa 
 
 
We began this chapter by framing the two pathways of articulation, one pathway leading 
from the virtual to the actual object, the other pathway following the thread of the virtual. In this 
chapter, we have largely followed the first pathway of articulation, the point of intersection of 
the object of science and that of philosophy. We began with the idea that the genesis of the act of 
thought is missed whenever sense is made out to be a form of recognition. When sense is the 
same as signification, it merely works to justify traditional ways of thinking. In contrast, in 
Deleuze’s theory of sense, sense as the expressed or the saying (the essence of speaking) is 
produced with respect to the paradoxical instance. Paradox as the center of the entire 
development captures something fundamental which we do not get in theories of sense, where 
sense is the same thing as signification. We have already noted that, for him, paradox is 
“opposed to doxa, in both aspects of doxa, namely good sense and common sense.”189 The idea 
that paradox is opposed to doxa is implicit in the double directionality of sense, because of 
which, sense “renders identification impossible.”190 By outlining the virtual structure of 
language, we demonstrated that sense is like an unconscious surface that distinguishes 
propositions, or expressions, and states of affairs. In effect, sense as event points to two distinct 
environs, because it moves in two directions simultaneously; it is actualized in the present, and it 
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is continuously reborn in the transcendental field of singularities, thereby giving way to another 
actualization. With respect to the present, sense always arrives too early or too late, but never on 
time. As the condition of real experience, the transcendental field of events give way to the 
expression, while continuously displacing the actualization of the virtual in the object. On both 
sides of the equation, subject-verb-object, sense co-present to nonsense, displaces the identity of 
the subject, and the coincidence of the object with the expression.
191
  
While sense is the effect of the transcendental field, it, in turn, becomes productive by 
inheriting the field’s ideational cause. This is what Deleuze understands as the movement from 
sterility to genesis; sense becoming productive. In the last section, we traced how the 
transcendental field of sense constitutes the static ontological genesis, and, moreover, how the 
static logical genesis is derived from it. In the movement from one genesis to the other, it became 
apparent that good sense and common sense are reinstalled in the actual, even while sense with 
respect to paradox perpetually uproots the conditioned. Deleuze best demonstrates doxa with 
respect to Husserl’s system, even though the critique of the dogmatic image of thought is 
directed at philosophy in general. In our study of Husserl, the argument was that he reduces the 
event to a form of recognition, to the ready-made, to established values. Despite the highly 
rigorous way in which the transcendental field is presented in his philosophy, Husserl gives up 
paradox in order to reconcile transcendental and formal logic. This is erroneously done, 
however, from the perspective of the latter. In Husserl’s system, sense moves from the most 
differentiated to the least differentiated in the universal predicate. He is able to affirm the 
universal predicative judgement by supposing the identical nature of the object; the object itself 
being constituted in an identical way or in accordance with the predicate. This is precisely what 
Deleuze understands as good sense. He writes that the  
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systematic characteristics of good sense are thus the following: it affirms a singular 
direction to go from most to least differentiated, from the singular to the regular, and 
from the remarkable to the ordinary. […] It assigns the present a directing role of 
distribution in which all of the preceding characteristics are brought together. Good 
sense plays a capital role in the determination of signification, but plays no role in the 
donation of sense.
192
  
 
In other words, when we assert that sense is identical to the act of judgement to which it lends 
itself (S is p), we only follow one of the directions of sense, its actualization in the present. But, 
as we have seen, sense takes flight as soon as it is appropriated in the expression, meaning that, 
for Deleuze, Husserl eliminates the paradox at the center of the production of sense, in order to 
reassert the predicative judgment. This suggests that good sense, the movement of sense in one 
direction, gives way to common sense. Common sense is the organ or faculty of identification, 
that  
brings diversity to bear upon the form of the Same. […] Subjectively, common sense 
subsumes under itself the various faculties of the soul […], and brings them to bear 
upon a unity which is capable of saying I. Objectively, common sense subsumes 
under itself the given diversity and relates it to the unity of a particular form of 
object.
193
  
 
The permanence of the object has as its compliment the self-identical subject, capable of 
unifying all of its intuitions. It also pertains to dynamic forms of recognition, where what is 
affirmed in thought is the identical with respect to its content. In the next two chapters, it will 
become even more evident how paradox working from within, continuously placing the identity 
of the subject, and, the object, into question.  
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3 
The Theatre of Events and the Dividing Line of Time 
 
Theatre is valuable only as a search for an art of living.
1
 
 
 
The art of living, a way of being in which the sense of a life is created, is the pivotal theme 
around which Deleuze’s philosophy revolves. In the opening pages of the second chapter we 
noted that, for him, the plane of immanence is “a singular essence (or Event), a life,” which 
consists of virtualities, singularities, events.
2
 We emphasized this conception of the plane of 
immanence in order to formulate the doubling of the pathway of articulation as the turn towards 
the virtual. The doubling of the pathway is the counter-actualization of the event, in which 
speaking the event so as to “give a new event” to beings arises as a problem. In his emphasis on 
the new, Deleuze gravitated towards thinkers like Nietzsche, Bergson, and Whitehead. All of 
these thinkers, in one way or another, affirmed life as the unceasing creation of the new. An 
excerpt from Bergson’s Creative Evolution will show us how this shift towards the philosophy of 
life changes the landscape of something like Husserl’s world of transcendental egos:  
The line of evolution that ends in man is not the only one. On the other paths, 
divergent from it, other forms of consciousness have been developed, which have not 
been able to free themselves from external constrains or to regain control over 
themselves, as the human intellect has done. […] Suppose these forms of 
consciousness brought together and amalgamated with the intellect: would not the 
result be a consciousness as wide as life? And such a consciousness, turning around 
suddenly against the push of life which it feels behind, would have a vision of life 
complete—would it not?—even though the vision were fleeting.3  
 
How can we become capable of experiencing a consciousness as wide as life? Since a life itself 
unfolds in time, it is only in time that we can enter into the stream of becoming where things are. 
Life always presents us with imperceptible threads, that if we follow through to the end, we 
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manage to think something, giving back to life a new beginning. It is by managing to think 
something other than ourselves that the intellect is itself born. This is why a theory of knowledge 
cannot be separated from a philosophy of life.  
A theory of life that is not accompanied by a criticism of knowledge is obliged to 
accept, as they stand, the concepts which the understanding put at its disposal […]. A 
theory of knowledge which does not replace the intellect in the general evolution of 
life will teach us neither how the frames of knowledge have been constructed, nor 
how we can enlarge or go beyond them. It is necessary that these two inquiries, 
theory of knowledge and theory of life, should join each other, and, by a circular 
process, push each other on unceasingly.
4
  
 
The philosophy of life that Deleuze has in mind after Bergson
5
 tailors a singular sense 
attributable to “this” thing in its specificity. Such tailoring is an essential aspect of what he calls 
transcendental empiricism or experience.
6
 It opens up the way for a critique of knowledge, 
particularly the two aspects of doxa, good sense and common sense.  
In the conclusion to the previous chapter, we outlined the way in which Deleuze tries to 
destabilize the permanence of savoir in The Logic of Sense. In that text, he distinguishes between 
two kinds of knowledge, one that is external to the object, the other “seeking its object wherever 
it is.”7 This distinction is already found in Bergson’s “Introduction to Metaphysics,” where he 
proposes that one form of knowledge seeks to extract from things their usefulness, while the 
other type, which he calls intuition, involves entering into things by the thread of time.
8
 In this 
chapter, we intend to follow the thread of time that Deleuze lays out in Difference and 
Repetition. This thread is followed in reverse, because Deleuze distinguishes three syntheses of 
time that he traces from the present to the future. Although the three syntheses have their own 
regions of operation, we cannot, in fact, sever them. They all culminate in one and the same 
Event: “In a certain sense, the ultimate repetition, the ultimate theatre, therefore encompasses 
everything; while in another sense it destroys everything; and in yet another sense selects among 
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everything.”9 This is why the two readings of time outlined in The Logic of Sense are consistent 
with the three syntheses. While the present can only be said to exist, the other two syntheses 
subsist in it, and subdivide it in the direction of the past and the future, each presenting a distinct 
operation. Our effort to outline Deleuze’s theory of time is dedicated to exploring how someone 
could enter into the becoming of beings, since it is only by entering into this stream of becoming 
that we manage to think and articulate something new. While this chapter focuses on the 
becoming of beings, in the fourth chapter we will revisit the theory of time from the perspective 
of learning. This is all in an effort to propose what saying the Event consists of; how it is that the 
theory of life and the theory of knowledge push each other along.    
 
The Living Present: 
Contemplative Souls and Rhythms of Contraction 
 
 
Deleuze’s study of time in Difference and Repetition is recognized as one of the more 
substantial aspects of his philosophy. The first synthesis of time, that of the living present, 
however, has not been developed and given as much attention as the other two syntheses. The 
fact that Deleuze lays out the living present in a few pages seems to reinforce the idea that it is 
not as relevant as the rest of his philosophy of time. This is an oversight, as much of what 
precedes the chapter, “Repetition for Itself,” paves the way for the short section on the first 
synthesis. In the very first pages of the text, Deleuze clearly articulates his central problem, 
which is to distinguish genuine from discrete repetition. A significant dimension of the text 
would be missed if we did not stress the affinity of such a distinction with Bergson’s effort to 
differentiate two types of multiplicities. These two types of multiplicities are explored by 
Deleuze in Bergsonism and Cinema 2: The Time-Image. By evoking the idea of repetition, 
Deleuze seeks to make, at the least, two substantial statements. To begin with, the sufficient 
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reason of any living organism will never be uncovered from the perspective of the repetition of 
the same. An organism neither experiences its world, nor itself, in an identical sense every 
instance. In line with Deleuze’s radical reconceptualization of repetition, a repetition can only be 
said to have taken place once a difference has been included in the repetition itself.
10
 The 
paradox of repetition is, then, that it is always a singular and unique occurrence, having no 
equivalent before or after it. The idea that we can capture singular modes of being in the general 
concepts we have created for them, nevertheless, finds its compliment in the everyday attitude. It 
is instrumental for human beings to set up a strict horizon of objects in order that they may act 
upon them in a predictable fashion. By turning to the everyday attitude, we see that the problem 
is not delimited to the generalities of the concept, but, more broadly, encompasses habit. If 
unexplained from perspective of genuine repetition, habit runs the risk of diminishing all 
experience to the repetition of the identical. In order to counter this possibility, Deleuze notes 
that this “bare, material repetition (repetition of the same) appears only in the sense that another 
repetition is disguised within it, constituting it and constituting itself in disguising itself.”11 As 
we will see, habit cannot be attributed to the repetition of the identical. Contracting a habit 
instead relies upon something new being introduced in repetition.  
The distinction between the two repetitions is already implied in the first few lines of 
“Repetition for Itself,” where Deleuze argues that repetition is not a counting of separate instants, 
but a continuity that changes something in the mind that contemplates it.
12
 So that we may better 
grasp why it is that repetition is not a counting of discontinuous instants, we will first refer to 
some of Bergson’s writings on the matter. Bergson returns to this distinction in most of his 
works, carefully demarcating the region of duration from that of space, particularly the confused 
projection of time in space as its fourth dimension. In one of his lectures published in The 
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Creative Mind, the distinction between what he calls difference in degree and difference in kind 
is captured quite succinctly:  
Let us begin with movement. I have my hand at point A. I move it over to point B, 
traversing the interval AB […]. But of this each one of us has the immediate 
sensation. No doubt while we are moving our hand from A to B we say to ourselves 
that we could stop it at an intermediary point, but in that case we should not have to 
do with the same movement. There would no longer be a single movement from A to 
B; there would be, by hypothesis, two movements, with an interval. Neither from 
within, through the muscular sense, nor from without through sight, should we still 
have the same perception. If I leave my movement from A to B as it is, I feel it 
undivided and must declare it to be indivisible.
13
  
 
This simple exercise demonstrates that while a movement in space may be infinitely divisible, if 
we should divide it, the nature of the movement itself changes from the perspective of the living 
organism itself. In essence, it is no longer the same movement. It differs in kind. This is precisely 
because the movement AB operates by another logic that is irreducible to the immobile instants 
with which we may map it out in space. In itself, a movement is a single passage, a continuous or 
qualitative multiplicity, indivisible in nature.
14
 While it may be broken down into numerical 
multiplicities thereby signifying differences in degree, the immobile instants that we subdivide it 
into cannot themselves produce the movement itself.  
Let us consider another example taken from Bergson’s Time and Free Will, that of the 
successive sounds of a bell:  
The sounds of the bell certainly reach me one after the other; but one of two 
alternatives must be true. Either I retain each of these successive sensations in order 
to combine it with the others and form a group which reminds me of an air or rhythm 
which I know: in that case I do not count the sounds, I limit myself to gathering, so 
to speak, the qualitative impression produced by the whole series. Or else I intend 
explicitly to count them, and then I shall have to separate them, and this separation 
must take place within some homogeneous medium in which the sounds, stripped of 
their qualities, and in a manner emptied, leave traces of their presence which are 
absolutely alike.
15
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In the latter case, one externalizes the instants in relation to one another, while, in the former 
case, the instants are gathered and contracted states of consciousness, which cannot be 
considered separately. Here, one passes from one state to the other without a break in the 
continuity, meaning that the former state is not taken to be separate from the current state; they 
are not separate units external to one another. Such qualitative repetitions or successions differ 
from discrete ones precisely because the organism “does not set them alongside its actual state as 
one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, 
as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another.”16 Bergson 
has an ingenious way of transforming the strokes of bells, notes, and steps, bound to 
homogeneous time, into rhythms, melodies, and artistic compositions, in order to demonstrate 
the distinction of the two multiplicities. In the latter case, he asks, “might it not be said that, even 
if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and that their totality 
may be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another”?17 A 
qualitative multiplicity is continuous because the moments permeate one another. The before, 
during, and what comes after, are contracted without a break being imposed on them. Because 
one permeates the other, a qualitative multiplicity “is constantly on the point of ending and 
constantly altered in its totality by the addition of a new note.”18 This rhythmic organization of 
qualitative multiplicities is the duration of living present considered from the perspective of the 
living organism itself; it is a duration defined by the states of consciousness that permeate one 
another, as the organism absorbs affects or sensations. In turn, its capacity to absorb affects 
determines the organism’s duration, its state of becoming. For Bergson, an organism develops as 
it absorbs such sensations. It is these multiplicities which are responsible for its development, not 
the lifeless states of the discrete multiplicities extracted from genuine movement. Once discrete 
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repetition is displaced as an explanation of how organisms are constituted in the present, the 
question is how does the organism, nevertheless, make cuts in the stream of becoming thereby 
experiencing a lived present. The same question can be directed at Hume, who is also a point of 
reference for Deleuze. Deleuze’s effort is geared towards showing how we return to discrete 
repetition by way of genuine repetition, once a cut, a selection, a difference, has been made in 
genuine repetition. The question is how this selection is made.   
Although Deleuze proceeds in a similar fashion as Bergson when laying out the synthesis 
of the present in Difference and Repetition, he does not only involve Bergson, whose work 
Matter and Memory develops the entire process of the constitution of the living present quite 
convincingly, he also appeals to Hume in his analysis. It seems as though, for Deleuze, Hume 
and Bergson are approaching the same problem, that of the contraction of discrete instants or 
cases, for a similar purpose, which is to displace any claims to a transcendent principle that 
would guide such a process. Deleuze’s study of Hume in Empiricism and Subjectivity, centers on 
the notion that “the given is no longer given to a subject; rather, the subject constitutes itself in 
the given.”19 Since the subject performs the active synthesis in the present, meaning that it 
somehow transcends the given, the principal question in that text becomes what is this given. 
Deleuze argues that, for Hume, the given is the “flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions 
and images, or a set of perceptions,” in short the mind or imagination, that provides a change or 
movement without any claims to a principle of organization.
20
 In other words, the mind is not 
considered a faculty that organizes the collection, but is this specific collection. If we inquire, 
then, as to why Deleuze begins with instants when studying the synthesis of the living present in 
Difference and Repetition, this is because the empiricist begins with this “experience of a 
collection, or from an animated succession of distinct perceptions. It begins with them, insofar as 
162 
 
they are distinct and independent.”21 The rationale behind their distinction is not given from the 
outside, but rather it is from within the given as this experience. Deleuze notes that, according to 
Hume, “everything separable is distinguishable and everything distinguishable is different.”22 In 
other words, it is the set or collection itself that makes the difference. Experience is succession, 
or each experience is separable or distinguishable, on the basis of the difference made. We are 
now on a better footing when approaching Deleuze’s first synthesis in Difference and Repetition. 
Having begun his study with the repetition of instants as the empiricist would, Deleuze seeks to 
find out if repetition makes any change whatsoever. Given that discrete repetition has no in itself, 
one instant always replaces another without retaining the one that preceded it. As with Bergson 
who argues that space nowhere retains these separate instants, since the former one disappears 
once a new instant appears, Deleuze proposes that the repetitions of instants cannot in any sense 
constitute time. The repetition of instants only present us with the perpetually “aborted moment 
of [its] birth.”23 If the cases or repetitions of instants do not make a difference, how could any 
change take place? By referring to Hume, Deleuze argues that, while discrete repetitions do not 
introduce a modification in the object or states of affairs, they do introduce a change of the mind 
that contemplates them.
24
 In Empiricism and Subjectivity, he notes that “the given is not in space; 
the space is in the given,” meaning that extension itself will be formed in accordance with the 
collections of impressions in the mind.
25
 As we have already noted, it is not the active mind that 
reflects upon the separate instants to extract a qualitative impression. Instead, the contractions 
are passive syntheses that “occur in the mind.”26 The constitution of the time of the living 
present, then, must be considered from this perspective. It essentially refers to the contractile 
power of the living organism, which by being performed on the distinct instants, configures the 
duration of its living present. The time of the living present, Deleuze writes, is “constituted only 
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in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants. This synthesis contracts 
the successive independent instants into one another thereby constituting the lived, or living, 
present.”27 The contractions of the living present mirror Bergson’s gathering of instants, one 
permeating the other, without a separation being imposed on them. To the present belongs the 
past, as the former instant that is retained in it, and the future, which is a state of expectation. 
“The past and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present instant, but 
rather the dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a contraction of instants.”28 In other 
words, for Deleuze, the three instants do not constitute separate times, but are synthesized into 
one instant with two dimensions. The synthesis of the living present is an asymmetrical one, as it 
follows the arrow of time from the particular to the general. We move, as it were, from the 
particular impressions which become the past enveloped in the present, toward the generality of 
the future, which involves an anticipation born of the difference erected in the mind.
29
  
As we have noted, Deleuze’s principal argument is that repetition does not transform 
anything in the states of affairs AB; instead, it produces a modification in the mind that contracts. 
This modification transforms the nature of repetition. We are now given a paradoxical image of 
repetition. Repetition is no longer identified with the succession of homogeneous instants. It is 
said to be produced wherever the mind contemplates something new, or whenever a difference is 
erected in the mind.  
Whenever A appears, I expect the appearance of B. Is this the for-itself of repetition, 
an orignary subjectivity which necessarily enters into its constitution? Does not the 
paradox of repetition lie in the fact that one can speak of repetition only by virtue of 
a change […] By virtue of a difference that the mind draws from repetition?30  
 
After Hume, Deleuze argues that the contractions, the repetitions synthesized, are performed in 
the imagination or mind. The imagination is thought to have a “contractile power: it contracts 
these cases, elements, agitations or homogeneous instants and grounds these in internal 
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qualitative impressions endowed with a certain weight.”31 The function of the imagination is, 
then, to contract the multiplicity of elementary excitations in order to draw a difference from 
repetition. It is as though the repetitions contracted in the imagination allow us to transition from 
cases of discrete repetition, which are external to one another, to the for-itself of repetition, or the 
internal repetitions performed by the organism. What enables Deleuze to move away from 
discrete or bare repetition, towards genuine repetition, is difference. The argument for difference 
can be slightly confusing because Deleuze begins with discrete repetition.
32
 It is made in two 
ways. In the first place, there is a difference in kind between the two repetitions, as genuine 
repetition introduces a qualitative change. Moreover, once difference is itself introduced into the 
system, or becomes internal to repetition for itself, difference allows the organism to move from 
one repetition to another, without such repetitions being perceived as discrete. Deleuze writes 
that  
in every way, material or bare repetition, so-called repetition of the same is like a 
skin which unravels the external husk of a kernel of difference and more complicated 
internal repetitions. [In internal repetition] difference lies between the repetitions. Is 
this not also to say, conversely, that repetition lies between two differences, that it 
allows us to pass from one order of difference to another?
33
  
 
The passive syntheses in which difference is drawn from repetition constitutes repetition for-
itself, while repetition between two differences gives us, a comprehension of the in-itself of 
repetition; how it is that one instant vanishes when another one has appeared. But it appears as 
though Deleuze needs to begin his study of the living present with discrete repetition so as to 
demonstrate how it is that action in the present, which is conceived of as a repetition of the same, 
in no way constitutes repetition. We are moving from the simple repetition of instants to the 
depths of repetition, in order to resurface with a new comprehension of the living present. His 
entire effort is directed at showing how the agent of the present doubles the contemplative soul, 
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the passive self, which is disguised in bare repetition. From this perspective, we see that 
difference does not merely allow us to pass from discrete repetition to genuine repetition, it also 
permits the reverse. Deleuze writes that in the other direction we move “from the instantaneous 
repetition which unravels itself to the actively represented repetition through the intermediary of 
passive synthesis.”34 In a sense, he must begin with bare repetitions in order to demonstrate how 
the doubling of the passive syntheses by an agent, makes it possible that it turn around on itself 
in order to reflect upon and represent the moments. The active syntheses are distinct from the 
passive syntheses of the living present in that “the past is then no longer the immediate past of 
retention but the reflexive past of representation, of reflected and reproduced particularity. 
Conversely, the future also ceases to be the immediate future of anticipation in order to become 
the reflexive future of prediction.”35 These active syntheses, performed in voluntary memory and 
the understanding, can only take place once the passive syntheses have been covered over, or 
doubled by the agent. We will return to discrete repetition once we have outlined the process by 
way of which the passive synthesis is itself constituted as the cut in the becoming, since it is its 
future mode that seems to allow the separation of instants in accordance with discrete repetition 
to be re-installed.  
The question here is what are these passive synthesis composed of? What are the 
contemplative selves that Deleuze is referring to? Deleuze’s arguments on the syntheses of the 
living present are hard to follow, because they do not unfold the way that the present does. Since 
the present follows the arrow of time, contractions already imply sensations that have become 
perceptible by the living organism. They are imagined or sensed affects that await their extension 
into action. Here, Deleuze does a turnaround, noting that, “in the order of constituent passivity, 
perceptual syntheses refer back to organic syntheses which are like the sensibility of the senses; 
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they refer back to a primary sensibility that we are.”36 According to him, the perceptual 
syntheses refer to organic syntheses, which already constitute the sensed. The organic syntheses 
are central in Deleuze’s study because they shed light on the problem of habit. When he argues 
that the repeater repeats precisely because they draw something new, a difference from a causal 
sequence, we have an entirely novel conception of habit. Deleuze puts into question whether the 
commonsensical notion of habit as repetitious action can capture the concrete processes involved 
in it. For him, the question is whether “it is through acting that we acquire habits […] or whether, 
on the contrary, it is through contemplating?” He continues this course of inquiry when noting 
that the “question is whether or not the self is a contemplation, whether it is not in itself a 
contemplation, and whether we can learn, form behaviour and form ourselves other than through 
contemplation.”37 A habit is not acquired with the repetition of an act, but through that which the 
organism contemplates, so as to draw it into itself in accordance with its capacity. Habit would, 
then, be produced by way of contemplation, or with the formation of a contemplative soul, self, 
or mind. A soul, he writes,  
must be attributed to the heart, to the muscles, nerves and cells, but a contemplative 
soul whose entire function is to contract a habit. […] Habit here manifests its full 
generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have 
(psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the 
thousands of passive syntheses of which we are organically composed. It is 
simultaneously through contraction that we are habits, but through contemplation 
that we contract.
38
  
 
Contraction points to the processes where something new is extracted by the living organism, 
while contemplation displaces the artificial separation of the organism from other matter in the 
world, allowing it to draw a difference. In other words, contemplation presupposes a world from 
which the organism comes. In contemplating, the boundaries of the organism are not strictly 
defined. The living organism contemplates a world by being implicated in it, or in the midst of it. 
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Or as Bergson notes in Matter and Memory, my body is but one image amongst the other images 
in the material world, while the brain, not being different in kind from the body, does not give 
birth to images, does not produce such images, but is also part of the image. The material world 
is not part of the brain; the brain is in the world. Being one image among others, the body 
mirrors the interaction of organisms in which it is implied. Deleuze’s conception of 
contemplation is best approached through Bergson’s conception of the image. For him, in 
contemplation “we do not contemplate ourselves, but we exist only in contemplating—that is to 
say, in contracting that from which come.”39 Accordingly, every organism lives in contemplating 
a world, and is derived from the world that it contemplates; it exists in contemplating the 
elements from which it originates. “What organism,” he asks,  
is not made of elements and cases of repetition, of contemplated and contracted 
water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby intertwining all the habits of 
which it is composed? Organisms awake to the sublime word of the third Ennead: all 
is contemplation […] even rocks and woods, animals and men, even Actaeon and the 
stag, Narcissus and the flower, even our actions and our needs.
40
  
 
All organisms contemplate; they draw something from the world by being in the world. The 
passive self of the perceptual syntheses is itself constituted by the thousands of contemplative 
selves that contract matter. Contemplation, then, does not refer to a subject that performs the 
contractions, but refers to a “system of a dissolved self”; the myriad of primary sensibilities and 
larval selves that we are.
41
 These contemplative selves are found everywhere in matter, or 
wherever matter is able to contract a difference from repetition; a theme that is revisited by 
Deleuze in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque many years later. Comparable to Whitehead’s 
conception of the organism in Process and Reality, Deleuze claims that every contraction is itself 
an auto-satisfaction, an elementary enjoyment or pleasure, in having contracted a particular 
contemplation. Its enjoyment is its ability to contemplate that from which it comes, because it is 
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in contemplating that it exercises its own vitality, its capacity to contract a habit, to make a 
claim, to draw something from, or as Bergson would put it, to extend the image, the affection on 
the body, into action. As Deleuze says after Plotinus, it is only by contemplating what it 
originates from, that the organism is “filled with an image of itself.”42 The image with which it is 
filled is a sensation that it contracts by contemplating. This is the principal way in which the 
organism affects itself, mirrors the interaction of bodies, by drawing something new from 
repetition. This image, once perceived by the organism, allows it to extend the passive syntheses 
into action; it is the bridge that joins a contraction and the anticipatory dimension. The 
movement from one to the other is the perpetual present with its two dimensions.  
 In the syntheses of the living present, we are delimited to a specific form of contraction of 
the past and the future. This contraction is conceived from the perspective of the living organism 
itself. It is basically the needs of the organism that determine its rhythms of contraction, or the 
limit of the synthesis of the present itself. The duration of contemplations, the elementary claims 
of the contemplative selves, must be defined with respect to the needs of the organism and its 
capacity to contract.
43
 Let us briefly return to contraction. The living present has a different 
duration depending on the cases that the organism is capable of contracting, meaning that, in the 
present, there are multiplicities of different rhythms of contractions. Each living present has a 
different duration depending on the contractions of contemplations. Or, as Deleuze writes, “the 
duration of an organisms present, or its various presents, will vary according to the natural 
contractile range of its contemplative souls.”44 This contractile range defines the capacity of the 
organism to satisfy a need, which means that fatigue, conversely, marks the inability of the 
organism to contract contemplations. According to Deleuze, need, defines the limit of the 
present. He argues that the present  
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extends between two eruptions of need, and coincides with the duration of 
contemplation. […] Repetition is essentially inscribed in need, since need rests upon 
an instance which essentially involves repetition: which forms the for-itself of 
repetition and the for-itself of a certain duration. […] The rule is that one cannot go 
faster than one’s present—or rather, one’s presents.45  
 
If the repetition is inscribed in need, or if the present itself extends between two repetitions, then, 
need in the first instance must be conceived in relation to a sign, an excitation, in relation to 
which contemplations arise. But a sign, for instance, the presence of water, does not suggest a 
lack such as thirst on the part of the organism.
46
 So what now? Deleuze argues that need is 
already there in form of a question, it “expresses the openness of a question.”47 This instance of 
questioning is best understood from a Bergsonian perspective. In Matter and Memory Bergson 
writes that  
the nervous system, interposed between the objects which affect my body and those 
which I can influence, is a mere conductor, transmitting, sending back or inhibiting 
movement. This conductor is composed of an enormous number of threads which 
stretch from the periphery to the centre and from the centre to the periphery. As 
many threads as pass from the periphery to the centre, so many points of space are 
there able to make an appeal to my will and to put, so to speak, an elementary 
question to my motor activity. Every such question is what is termed a perception. 
Thus perception is diminished by one of its elements each time one of the threads 
termed sensory is cut.
48
  
 
The continuity in the stream of becoming is, then, broken by needs according to Bergson. While 
contemplation refers to the capacity of the body to absorb affections, perception itself is our 
possible actions on things.
49
 Possible actions are defined by the capacity of the organism to 
absorb affections, meaning that the aggregates or collections of impressions are selected in 
accordance with need or usefulness. For Deleuze, need coincides with the contemplative soul 
which persistently poses the question, what difference is there, while the contractions that it 
performs serve as responses.
50
 The sign is, as it were, already picked out on the basis of the 
elementary questioning on the part of the organism, so that the presence of water does not signify 
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a lack, on the contrary, it relates to capacity of the organism to sense its presence. In order for the 
organism to sense its presence, there must be a modification in the organism. As we saw, “the 
self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification—this term designating precisely 
the difference drawn.”51 Along with this modification, we have the other aspect of need appear, 
an expectation made on the basis of a contraction. Deleuze elaborates that “every contraction is a 
presumption, a claim, that is to say, it gives rise to an expectation or a right in regard to that 
which it contracts, and comes undone once its object escapes.”52 These two moments, the 
excitations which correspond to the openness of the organism to draw a difference, and the 
anticipations that contemplations give rise to, encompass the entirety of the passive syntheses of 
the living present. This duration, as Deleuze notes, is undone once the anticipation is doubled by 
an agent, or, better yet, the anticipation itself ushers in an action. Bergson captures this transition 
when writing that, “that which I call my present is my attitude with regard to the immediate 
future; it is my impending action. […] Of my past, that alone becomes image and consequently 
sensation, at least nascent, which can collaborate in that action, insert itself in that attitude, in a 
word makes itself useful.”53 Deleuze’s conception of action in the living present resembles 
Bergson’s present, with the image being extended into action once a habit has been contracted. 
Such habits are the multitude of passive selves in which a difference is contracted. In other 
words, habit is that which “inciting us to move from one object to a second [one] which follows 
it”; it is as it were the thing that organizes the synthesis of time or that which makes the present a 
perpetual present.
54
 By giving rise to an action, these larval selves which define the habits that 
we are in contemplating, are covered over or disguised by it.  
Given that contemplation never appears at any moment during the action—since it is 
always hidden, and since it ‘does’ nothing (even though something is done through 
it, something completely novel)—it is easy to forget it and to interpret the entire 
process of excitation and reaction without any reference to repetition.
55
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Once a sensation is perceived, these contemplative selves are doubled by an agent, thereby 
becoming disguised in the action, as well as the active syntheses performed by the subject. This 
doubling which follows from the impending action, allows the subject to do a turn around and 
interpret the synthesis as consisting of discrete instances. As Deleuze puts it while referring to 
Hume, “the imagination, under the influence of the principle of habit, is also the mind which 
reflects time as a determined future filled with its anticipation” while,  “the understanding is 
[instead] the mind itself, which under the influence of experience, reflects time in the form of 
past entity subject to its observation.”56 The active synthesis pertains to the subject that presents 
the two dimensions of the present, past and future, as distinct instants forming a case that is 
essentially repeatable in the same sense. The past becomes a reflexive past, a reproduced 
particularity which is now “behind us,” rather than remaining the origin from which the subject 
emerges. In the other direction, the future instant enables the subject to predict that the cases of 
repetition will resemble one another; when I do p, S will result, or when I encounter Paul, the 
idea of fidelity will come to mind. This is, as it were, a second look at the states of affairs in 
which nothing seems to have changed from the view of activity, the sign I encounter produces 
the same effect, even while there is a difference made from the point of view of the passive 
syntheses themselves in which the effect originates. According to Deleuze, the entirety of the 
tracing of the directionality from the particular past to the generalities of the future in the present 
is the arrow of time in accordance with which difference is eventually cancelled.
57
  
 
The Being of the Past, or the Time of Beings 
 
 
Turning from the living present to the being of the past not only requires, in the first place, 
a dilation of our point of departure, but an entire recalibration of our instrument of perception. If 
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the living present is studied under a microscope, the being of the past requires a telescope for its 
viewing. We need another instrument of perception because, as Bergson claims, the past operates 
in two different ways, it passes into the actual, which would be our attention to life, or it is the 
plane of pure memory in which past reproduces itself in its own domain as an ever expanding 
whole indicative of a spiritual existence. By installing ourselves in the past, we no longer inquire 
into the durations of living beings delimited to the syntheses of the present, but place ourselves 
directly in a time shared by them, or parted by them. Or, as Deleuze puts it, we must  
detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in 
general, then in a certain region of the past—a work of adjustment, something like 
the focusing of a camera. […] We place ourselves at once in the past; we leap into 
the past as into a proper element. In the same way that we do not perceive things in 
ourselves, but at the place where they are, we only grasp the past at the place where it 
is in itself, and not in ourselves, in our present.
58
 
 
For us, the being of the past, the theatre of events, has special importance if we can focus in on 
what it is that we are searching for when we install ourselves in it. This amounts to inquiring as 
to how it is that we pass from the living present in which the organism experiences the past with 
a view to utilizing it in the present, towards a time shared by beings, a singular time with a view 
to spiritual existence. Since the living present embraces a multiplicity of rhythms of contractions, 
is it possible to conceive of a single time that gives way to divergent durations? If the being of 
the past is to be the ground the given, then, as Deleuze proposes, what is of importance when we 
install ourselves in the being of the past, is not only how the present is explained now from this 
new perspective, but also how it is that one and the same past is internal to multiple beings with 
divergent durations. Deleuze’s inquiry in Bergsonism if there is one or if there are many 
durations, can be directed at the very same problematic. The concept of centers of convergence 
that imply divergent series, discussed in Difference and Repetition, grapples with the same idea. 
Approaching the past from the perspective of this problematic not only places Deleuze’s outline 
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of the constituent aspects of the past in a new light, it gives us a sense of why it is that we search 
the past to begin with, even if this search is unconscious. Beyond the philosophical curiosity that 
propels us to inquire as to why the presents vanishes or passes, there is the searching of the past 
in which we are installed immediately. In order to understand how it is that we return to the 
present with a new set of eyes after having searched the past, we must, nevertheless, grasp why it 
is that we leave it.  
 When discussing the first synthesis of the present, we inquired as to how a change takes 
place in the present that could account for it being this instant, rather than the former one that 
was. We approached the passing of the present from the perspective of the contraction of instants 
by the organism, which, as we saw, involve varying rhythms in which the intra-temporality of 
the present is implied; the different dimensions belonging to it. By studying the duration of the 
present, we showed how time passes in the time that it constitutes. It passes in accordance with 
the capacity of the organism to contract contemplations, or the passing appeared to be equivalent 
to its contractile range. This is what Deleuze refers to as the paradox of present, “to constitute 
time while passing in the time constituted.”59 But how could the present simultaneously 
constitute the time in which it passes? Wouldn’t this mean that the present passes because it 
constitutes the past after it has been present, essentially annulling there being a past in which this 
present passes? Even if we were to conceive of the past of the next present as this present, we 
would still be unable to explain how this present passes to begin with. The active synthesis of 
memory is responsible for this type of analysis of the past. In accordance with it, the former 
present is only constituted once we have reflected upon it in the present. For Deleuze, this 
suggests that, in the present, we not only represent the former present, but include the 
representation of the present in the representation of the former one. Or stated otherwise, the 
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present “reflects itself at the same time as it forms the memory of the former present,” meaning 
that the past is constituted after being reflected upon in the present.
60
 The error lies in the notion 
that “the past as such is only constituted after having been present; on the other hand, that it is in 
some way reconstituted by the new present whose past it now is.”61 If we focus in on the passive 
syntheses instead, the contractile power of the organism is exhausted in the finite present, 
meaning that it also cannot tell us how a past in which this present was already set to pass is 
constituted, or, conversely, how it is that a present becomes a former one that can be experienced 
by the organism as already past. The past is nowhere retained in the present. It is annulled after it 
is experienced, thereby giving way to the illusion perpetuated in the active synthesis that the 
present constitutes the past. This is why Deleuze argues that the living present can only show us 
the effect of the passing, not its cause: “We have by no means shown why the present passes, or 
what prevents it from being coextensive with time. […] The claim of the present is precisely that 
it passes. However, what causes the present to pass, that to which the present and habit belong, 
which must be considered the ground of time,” is memory.62 Since the present does indeed pass 
in order for a new present to come about, Deleuze proposes that there must be another synthesis 
in which the first synthesis is enfolded. This second synthesis is the being of the past or the 
passive synthesis of memory, as the ground of time. The ground of time is initially distinguished 
from the foundation of time in the following way: “The foundation concerns the soil: it shows 
how something is established, how it occupies and possesses it, whereas the ground comes rather 
from the sky, it goes from the summit to the foundations, and measures the possessor and the soil 
against one another according to the title of ownership.”63 As the foundation of time, habit shows 
us how beings occupy the soil of time. How it is that contemplations are elementary claims that 
carve out a specific duration in a stream of becoming. In this sense, Deleuze is correct to 
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recognize that “everything depends upon a foundation,” since time can only be experienced by 
living beings.
64
 This idea is revisited in The Logic of Sense when he argues that the second 
reading of time, including the ground, does not subsist anywhere else than in the present. 
Nevertheless, what we are after here is how this time is constituted to begin with. It is true that 
we get the active synthesis of memory by virtue of the passive synthesis of habit; the former 
present represented in the representation of this present once the passive synthesis is doubled by 
an agent. But it is because of the transcendental passive synthesis of memory which serves as 
ground that such reflection becomes possible. The past in general is, then, constituted prior to the 
synthesis of the living present, or it makes the difference between two presents, making the 
previous one pass in it and calling forth the next one. By being a priori, it allows us to experience 
the former and current present as two asymmetrical elements of the past; the two presents 
marking the shifting relation of the ground with respect to the soil.
65
 As Deleuze notes, since 
every present coexists with its past, it is erroneous to interpret the past in the active synthesis as a 
former present, when in fact, the past was, properly speaking, never present. The former present, 
instead, has a past which coexists with it, due to which we can reflect upon it as having been.   
 Why is the past in general conceived by Deleuze as a priori, however? A number of 
paradoxes define the being of the past, the primary one being the paradox of contemporaneity of 
the past with the present that was.
66
 The first paradox is meant to provide the reason behind the 
passing of the present. Deleuze’s argument is that the past is not a present that was, nor is it 
constituted after it has been present. The past has never been present. The “past would never be 
constituted if it had not been constituted first of all, at the same time as it was present. […] If the 
past had to wait in order to be no longer, if it was not immediately and now that it had passed 
‘past in general’ it could never become what it is, it would never be the past.”67 If we were to 
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presuppose that the past is constituted after it has been present, a view just explored, then, we 
would be unable to explain how the previous present passed in order for new one to come about. 
In effect, we would have to wait for the new present in order for the past to be constituted, which 
would, in turn, mean that the passing of the former present goes unexplained. For Deleuze, in 
order for the new present to come about, the past must be contemporaneous with the present that 
was. Or, in general, so as to pass, the present must be past at the same time as it is present.
68
 “No 
present would ever pass were it not past ‘at the same time’ as it is present; no past would ever be 
constituted unless it was first constituted at the same time as it was present.”69 The awkward 
saying that the past is first constituted at the same time as it was present, gives us a glimpse as to 
why the being of the past is paradoxical. In the first place, we must insist that the past as the 
ground of the passage of time is, in general, prior to the present, as it does not depend on it. On 
the other hand, the past is the ground of the passage of the present that was, meaning that the past 
is indeed constituted, even if it does not retain the content of the present. The contemporaneity of 
the past with the present does not place into doubt that the past cannot be formed after it has been 
present; it is not one and the same thing as what we refer to as a former present, since it is merely 
the reason for its passage. But it does tell us that something that insists in the previous present, 
namely its passage, is preserved in the past. In other words, the contemporaneity of the past with 
the present that it makes pass, at the same time transforms the past as well. This transformation, 
the ground of time reconstituting itself with the constitution of the passing of the previous 
present, gives way to the new present. Deleuze, thus, writes that, “if each past is 
contemporaneous with the present that was, then all of the past coexists with the new present in 
relation to which it is now past. […] The past does not cause one present to pass without calling 
forth another, but itself neither passes nor comes forth” in the present.70 The past makes the 
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previous present pass, while constituting the past of the present that is to come. The present to 
come would be the future dimension of the past. In preserving the passing of the previous 
present, however, the past does not itself pass in any way. Again, what is preserved in it is the 
passage of the present, or stated otherwise, the past preserves itself in itself. This is essentially 
why it pre-exists the present, despite being the past of this present.      
 The contraction of the past in itself demonstrates that the past itself does not pass. One of 
the difficult aspects of the past is precisely that in preserving itself in itself, it pre-exists the 
present, never itself being present as such. Since we are prone to search for the past in the 
present, in the brain, or to trace it in space, it is challenging to, as it were, leap into it or install 
ourselves directly in the past. Bergson shows in Matter and Memory that our tendency is to 
inquire as to where such memories are in fact stored up. Yet, it is not so much that we actively 
install ourselves in the past, we passively make our way into the pure recollections of the past 
prior to the constitution of the present. As we saw, one of the paradoxes of the past is that it is 
already-there; “it does not exist, but insists, it consists, it is.”71 As Deleuze argues after Bergson, 
the essence of the past is to perpetuate itself, to continually bring itself to bear upon a new 
present. In Bergsonism, he recognizes that the past preserving and continuously perpetuating 
itself is difficult to think through, when writing:  
We have the difficulty of understanding the survival of the past itself because we 
believe that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. We confuse Being with 
being-present. Nevertheless, the present is not rather it is pure becoming, always 
outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its proper element, that of the present is not being 
but the active or to be useful, while the past ceased to be useful—but has not ceased 
to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: it is 
identical with being in itself. It should not be said that it ‘was,’ since it is the in-itself 
of being, and the form under which being is preserved in itself. […] At the limit, the 
ordinary determinations are reversed: of the present, we must say at every instant that 
it ‘was’, and of the past, that it ‘is’.72  
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It is counterintuitive to conceive of the past as being, while referring to the present as that which 
was, but it is precisely that in the second synthesis of time. The present is continuously passing, 
this passing being preserved in the pure past, while the past is perpetually launching itself 
towards its future dimension, so as to bring about the new present. Since the past does not exist 
anywhere in the present, the present being a time of action, while the past is itself an impassive 
ground of the passage of time, that only becomes useful when expressed or actualized in the 
present as its passing, it is virtual and not actual.
73
 We opened up chapter 2 by discussing the 
way in which our existence is doubled, that, as it unfolds in time, the actual “duplicates itself 
along with the virtual existence, a mirror image.”74 Just as the actual image has its virtual half, 
the virtual duplicates itself or, as we have seen, it has two dimensions, one being the pure 
recollection of the virtual, which perpetuates itself in the direction of the future, the other being a 
recollected image, which is actualized in the present. As the virtual, the past is pure recollection. 
It differentiates itself by being a “recollection of the present.”75 However, in being a recollection 
of the present, it is not a past that was since it has never been present, or we have never had to 
wait for the passing of the present for it to be formed. As we noted by quoting Deleuze, the being 
of the past is what is.
 76
 In being the condition of real experience, the essence of the pure past is 
precisely to be actualized as it differentiates itself. In differentiating itself, according to Deleuze, 
the past “ceases to be in itself;” it is becoming a recollection image that prepares the 
actualization of a past event in the present. As Lampert writes, “once [the past] gets retrieved in 
the present, it is no longer strictly speaking a ‘pure memory’, but a present experience image that 
refers to a past event. […] The status of a memory is that if it should get expressed in a present, 
then it will reveal the past, but until it does, it exists in a virtual status of its own.”77 The whole of 
the past exists virtually in itself, and becomes expressed when a selected series of events prepare 
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its actualization in the present. The series of events recollected in the form of virtual images, as 
though animated postcards or photos sent from the past, constitute the ground of the passage of 
time of the present, the relative limit at which point the past meets experience.  
 Earlier we took note of Deleuze’s argument that all of the past coexists with the present 
that is to come. This means that the actualization of a level of the past in the present, is the most 
contracted degree of the whole of the past; the limit at which point the past reaches its greatest 
contraction with respect to the present that it makes pass. The Bergsonian idea of the contraction 
of the past is, of course, reminiscent of the contractions of the living present. Would such 
contractions be equivalent to the contractions of the first synthesis? According to Deleuze, these 
two contractions refer to different dimensions, or they do not contract the same thing. “In one 
case, the present is the most contracted state of successive elements or instance which are in 
themselves independent of one another. In the other case, the present designates the most 
contracted degree of the past, which is itself like a coexisting totality [or a whole].”78 We might 
say that in the former case we contract our inner duration by contemplating that from which we 
come, while in the latter case we contract something by leaving ourselves. In light of Bergson’s 
metaphor of the cone, Deleuze argues that the present is the maximal contraction of the past 
every time, even while the past coexists with itself in infinity of degrees. This is why coexistence 
is also considered to be paradoxical. This maximal contraction is what we have been referring to 
as the relative limit of the past from the perspective of the future, the point at which the 
potentials of the past can go no further with respect to the present. In the second synthesis, 
however, this limit is the extreme limit of the past, since each passive synthesis of memory is the 
maximal contraction which prepares the actualization of the present. Even though it is a 
contraction of a certain level of the past, we therefore say that the present is a maximal 
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contraction of the past, because the past is not the condition of possibility, but a condition of real 
experience. This present is all it is ever going to be. The past of this present could not be 
otherwise. It is adequate to it as that which makes it pass. The idea, however, that the present is a 
contraction of a certain level of the past, means that the present always produces something 
novel. No two presents are identical, as each present is the maximal contraction of a different 
level of the past. The contractions of different levels explain why the instants of the first 
synthesis themselves differ. “What we live empirically as a succession of different presents from 
the point of view of active synthesis is also the ever-increasing coexistence of levels of the past 
within passive synthesis. Each present contracts a level of the whole.”79 The difference between 
the instants, then, manifests the coexistence of the different levels of the past actualized in the 
present. We can only reflect upon them as different in degree on the basis of this more profound 
difference of contractions, or repetitions, that take place in the being of the past as a whole. 
Conversely, if we install ourselves in the being of the past, the past “appears as the coexistence 
of circles which are more or less dilated or contracted, each one of which contains everything at 
the same time and the present of which it is the extreme limit.”80 Leaving aside the coexistence 
of circles for the moment, we notice that the past plays itself out at different levels. In fact, these 
different levels are already implied in the contraction of the past in the present, but the first 
repetition and the second repetition do not have the same relation to difference.
81
 In the second 
repetition, difference is no longer traced from one instant to the next. It is, instead, there between 
the different levels of the past, along with the lines of actualization that the past has given way to 
(that which is actualized by beings as their personal past). Indeed, the present is a contraction of 
the extreme limit of the past, but the ground of the past is itself composed of different levels that 
replay the same story, theme, or most appropriately, a life, in varying degrees. The contraction of 
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the past therefore consists of the tracing of the whole of the past which coexists with itself at 
varying levels. As Deleuze claims, to be installed in the past means repeating the same spiritual 
life at varying levels, from the most relaxed to most contracted degree of difference. By being 
installed in it, we do not actualize a maximal level straight away. There is a sort of presentation 
of the series of levels that are selected to form the maximal level. To say that the past is 
presented is in a sense correct, since the ground of the past is populated by virtual images, events 
of sorts, which demonstrate the continuous variation of the past. The past preserving itself in 
itself, or repeated at different levels, shows us how the “manner in which each [past event] 
continues the whole life, but at a different level or degree on the basis of a past which was never 
present.” 82 Or, as Deleuze also writes, “everything happens as if our memories were repeated an 
indefinite number of times in these thousands and thousands of possible reduction of our past 
life.”83 The repetition of the whole of the past in every contraction, the repetition of a life at 
difference levels, is referred to by Deleuze as destiny, while the selection of the level played out 
defines our freedom.
84
 As we will soon see, however, the choice of the level is not exactly 
decided from the perspective of the past. We are thrown into the past with respect to the future.  
  Now that we have an understanding of the passive synthesis of memory, the continuous 
contractions of the levels of the past, we must again ask ourselves where this past is preserved. 
We highlighted that the past is what is and that it replays a life, but what is this being of the past? 
We already said that the actual image has a virtual double, but is this virtual double one and the 
same thing as my personal past, my life? It would be a mistake for us to assume that the being of 
the past is my personal memory, as this would reduce ontological duration to psychological 
duration, the virtual being part of the brain, or the duration of a single being. In Bergsonism, 
Deleuze proposes that because there are indeed durations that exist outside of us simultaneously 
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as our own, our consciousness cannot account for the way in which things experience duration.
85
 
Bergson’s intuition is that “there is some inexpressible reason in them which accounts for our 
inability to examine them at successive moments of our own duration.”86 But the idea that there 
are diverse durations at the same time as my own, does not in any way tell us that beings are 
merely closed in on themselves. If duration belongs to things as much as it is attributed to my 
consciousness, then, for Deleuze, psychological duration must open onto an ontological duration 
in which all beings would participate.
87
 In the place of several durations, we now have the single 
time of an ontological duration. The problem with ontological duration, however, is that beings 
continue to experience time in divergent ways. Deleuze, therefore, asks: “In what sense can one 
get beyond the ontological alternative of one/several?”88 Since the being of the past is the 
condition of experience, we must show how there is a single time in which things participate all 
the while giving way to divergent durations. Unravelling this complexity is a great challenge. In 
the previous chapters we argued that an illusion arises when the plane of immanence is 
conceived of as immanent to the subject, the ego, or the self. Here is where most of the wrong 
turns are taken. Our primary question whether this past is my personal past demonstrates one of 
the illusions of the ground, a projection of my duration onto it. Such an interpretation appears to 
be plausible, especially because the ground gives way to divergent durations, one of which is my 
own. Deleuze seems to have resolved the problem of the one or several durations in Difference 
and Repetition. In Bergsonism, however, the problem is evident when Deleuze expresses the 
following reservation: “insofar as we are dealing with qualitative distinct fluxes, it may in fact be 
difficult to know whether or not the two subjects live and perceive the same time: We support 
unity, but only as the most ‘plausible’ idea.”89 Now this reservation is entirely legitimate, 
particularly because once we have installed the qualitatively distinct fluxes, it is indeed difficult 
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to argue that beings perceive the same time. In addition to this, even if we say that the brain is 
part of the image, rather than constituting the virtual images themselves, it is still not clear how 
this being of the past is not my personal past. Deleuze’s apprehension is telling us that he is 
carefully thinking through the relationship of the virtual and its diverging lines of actualization. 
Does actualization imply one and the same virtual for divergent beings? In what follows, we will 
outline how the dualism of the one/several is overturned. 
Let us briefly return to the multiple durations disclosed in the present. For Deleuze, these 
durations only appear to me because my duration is among others: “the flowing of the water, the 
flight of the bird, the murmur of my life form three fluxes; but only because my duration is one 
of them, and also the element that contains the two others. Why not make do with two fluxes, my 
duration and the flight of the bird, for example?”90 We cannot say that there are only two fluxes 
because their simultaneous existence implies that they are contained in a third duration. My 
duration makes it possible that I reflect on another that is reflected in my own. Their simultaneity 
is made possible by a third, meaning that my duration is reflected in another one that likewise 
contains the duration of the flight of the bird. “It is in this sense that my duration essentially has 
the power to disclose other durations, to encompass the others, and to encompass itself ad 
infinitum.”91 But these coexisting durations in the present only gives us the outer envelope of this 
third duration, after its division has been actualized. According to Deleuze, if we install 
ourselves directly in the virtual, there is only a single time, the third, in which there are no longer 
distinct durations. There is a convergence upon the same one. The time of the virtual, then, as the 
condition of experience, is not my personal memory or the memory belonging to another being, 
but an impersonal time in which a life unfolds—a life expressed in the infinitive, to love, to play, 
to learn. Deleuze noted that the ground in which beings participate, “no longer simply signifies 
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my relationship with being, but the relationship of all things with being.”92 But what is this 
relationship with being exactly? The virtual events that play out different levels of the past give 
us what is impersonal of a relation, or better yet, being is itself the relation. What the repetitions 
of the past shows us, are the continuous variations of a relation; the relation varying with respect 
to itself. The being of the past is a time shared in which beings are enveloped; the virtual is our 
other half, which cannot be in any sense actual or lived.
93
 This other half which implicates us 
does not exist as such. We discussed this theme in the first chapter, particularly with respect to 
Deleuze’s Spinoza. Deleuze’s argument was that “all that Spinozism needed to do for the 
univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was to make substance turn around the 
modes.”94 This is precisely what the being of the past must be; it must form itself as that which is 
in-between. Only in this sense could we experience another being, in relation to being. Of course, 
we do not experience the duration of another being, but experience another only by participating 
in that which is internal to both durations, as their condition.  
 Earlier we noted that by differentiating, the virtual gives way to actualizations. In the being 
of the past, every repetition itself produces and has produced divergent lines of actualizations 
that are asymmetrical in nature.
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 We saw that the ground is composed of various levels of the 
past, which culminate in its maximal contraction. The entirety of the ground prepares the 
dissection, the splitting of the past, into divergent lines of actualization, with the maximal 
contraction being actualized in the present. But the lines of divergence move back and forth from 
the ground to the periphery, reflecting each level of the past, or the way in which the 
differentiation is developed in actualizations.
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 The latest actualization reflects the maximal 
contraction itself, while previous lines of actualizations give us what might be called my 
personal past. What is so fascinating about Deleuze’s past is precisely that each repetition is a cut 
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in the fabric of the ground, at which point the past splits into two movements. In one direction 
these divergent lines are further developed in accordance with the capacity of the organism, and 
give way to the actual in the present; an actual which does not resemble the virtual. In the other 
direction, these diverging lines can be traced back to the centers of convergence of the past once 
the actualization has been made.
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 “In both cases,” Deleuze writes, “the pathways are the same; 
what matters is the direction one takes them in, towards divergence or convergence.”98 In 
following one line towards divergence in order to shed light on the actual being, we see that this 
being is constantly displaced and differentiated with respect to itself. The diverging lines “show 
us the thing itself identical to its difference, internal difference identical to something.”99 If we 
move in the direction of the virtual, away from the actualizations of living beings, these lines, 
now being three, converge or intersect upon the same event. Deleuze notes that, it is as though 
the  
articulations of the real and [diverging] lines were relayed back and forth: the 
articulations of the real and [diverging] lines which at least reveal internal differences 
at the limit of their convergence, and conversely, [diverging] lines give us 
articulations of the real, e.g. the convergence of the three diverse lines, leading to the 
true distribution of what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the object.
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In the course of actualization, the being of the past appears to produce the difference that is 
developed on each side of the divergent lines, in the object and in the subject, but it also 
simultaneously turns in on itself, so as to reflect the divergence as though in a mirror. The tracing 
of the past in the direction of the virtual, therefore, presents us with the continuity or becoming 
of the past, the way in which it calls forth a new present in the direction of the future. As we 
mentioned earlier, the being of the past is a passive synthesis of two dimensions: “it spits in two 
dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves the 
past,” or the passing of the present.101 In the process of tracing the ground, we have not only seen 
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how it is that the present passes with the development of the lines of actualizations, but the 
formation of the past on its own terrain as a singular time in which divergent lines converge. 
With respect to the former, the passing of the present pertains to that part of the event actualized 
in it; what Deleuze also refers to as an effect in the present, which is preserved in the past. Why 
speak about the being of the past as a single time of convergence? The being of the past, itself 
being that which is, or the repetition of a life on different levels, is a constitution of a world. We 
saw earlier that convergence essentially implies a world. In Difference and Repetition Deleuze 
discusses the other as a possible world, for instance, the terrified face of the other enveloping a 
terrifying world. Here, the face would be a sign that is unfolded from the perspective of the being 
of the past, indeed it is the repetition of virtual events that give us the sense of this terrifying 
world, or it is these virtual images that express this world as a terrifying one. The sense of the 
world from the perspective of the past would be the terrifying world constituted, which actual 
beings individuate in the present. Actual beings individuate the sense of this terrifying world in 
distinct ways, by manifesting aggression, fear, loathing, and so on, while the divergent ways in 
which the world is expressed by them points to the differentiation that underlies this terrifying 
world, its perpetuation as it were. Deleuze often equates the past, which, as was noted, is that 
what is, with sense itself. The being of the past which expresses itself is the sense expressed in 
actual states of affairs. But this is sense only considered from the perspective of the past.  
The way in which we have dealt with the being of the past reflects its nature. We have 
moved in circular fashion, in order to demonstrate a different aspect or level of the past. But the 
problem is precisely that in the second synthesis of time, the past and the present dance in ever 
expanding circles. These ever expanding circles give way to a various ambiguities with respect 
to the ground.
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 Even while the past is actualized in divergent lines, we cannot explain how the 
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divergent members are affirmed as different in their divergence. The ground moving in a circle 
with the grounded is especially susceptible to reintroducing the idea that what is continued in the 
being of the past is the same or the identical, while what is actualized in the present is the 
similar.
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 As we saw in the second chapter, from here on in, it becomes possible to isolate the 
identical, to eliminate the ground, so as to establish the world of representation. By eliminating 
the ground, “the identical has become the internal character of representation itself, while 
resemblance has become its external relation with the thing.”104 In other words, the ground 
begins to be formed in the form of the grounded, and the grounded in the image of the similar. If 
we continue the course in the direction of the virtual, however, the event is continued in another 
time; it is unfolded with respect to the third synthesis of time. In order to transition to the last 
synthesis, Deleuze inquires if it is possible to penetrate the past, “whether we can in some sense 
live the being in itself of the past in the same way that we live the passive synthesis of habit.”105 
The response comes from the repetition of the future, just as the circle of the second synthesis is 
unravelled in it. In one respect, then, the ground “falls into the grounded,” in another, as we 
intend to show, it is “engulfed in groundlessness.”106 Here, the difference made is conceived of 
from the perspective of groundlessness, meaning that sense is thought in relation to paradox.  
 
Éclat
107
 or on the Bursting Forth of the Pure Event 
 
 
 The second synthesis of time is posited a priori as the ground of experience. While it 
comes close to explaining how the virtual is actualized, it does not do away with the problems 
that the being of the past itself poses. Since the being of the past is a priori, we must assume that 
it is already there. However, seeing that the being of the past is the past of this singular life,
108
 we 
must ask how the ground is itself selected. This question is of great relevance because the 
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singular sense, the complex theme, that the being of the past implies, is not some originary form 
that awaits us. It itself constitutes itself as the ground of this experience from the perspective of 
the future. This future, the third synthesis of time, involves an essential splintering of time to 
which thinking, in the form of the question, addresses itself. As we will see, this disjointing is the 
instance of determination, the selection of the ground, and the indeterminate, thought together. 
Deleuze explores this relation of the indeterminate and determination as it is posited in the work 
of Kant. He opens the discussion of the third synthesis by referring to the fundamental shift in 
thought that Kant had inaugurated when reformulating Descartes’ famous formulation, ‘I think 
therefore I am.’ The Kantian critique, he writes, “amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is 
impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. The determination (‘I 
think’) obviously implies something undetermined (‘I am’), but nothing so far tells us how it is 
that this undetermined is determinable by the ‘I think’.”109 Kant transforms this equation by 
inserting a third value, that of the determinable, or the way in which the undetermined becomes 
determinable as such. It is well known that, for Kant, the undetermined becomes determinable by 
the ‘I think’ in time.110 According to Deleuze, this reformulation is a remarkable shift as 
Difference is no longer approached as an external difference of empirical instances, as though 
being a change traced from one empirical moment to the next. Rather, Difference is now 
comprehended internally “in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination 
as such and what it determines.”111Alternatively, internal difference requires the introduction of 
that which becomes determinable by the cogito in time, with the determinable being that which 
raises the determination by releasing thought from its torpor.
 Now, as Deleuze notes, “my 
undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a phenomenon, of 
a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time.”112 In turn, this passivity, the 
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double of the cogito, addresses itself to thought, or thought is experienced as the affection of the 
passive self upon itself.  
Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner 
sense. The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which 
represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it, which experiences its effects 
rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself.
113
  
 
The essential passivity of the self, presented by Kant as intuition, indicates to us that the ‘I’ 
experiences itself in time through an essential fracturing. This fracturing of the I, which is 
experienced as the affection of the self by self, is the introduction of time into thought, more 
specifically, it is the influence upon thought by, what Deleuze calls, the empty form of time. It is 
indeed the case that such passivity is already there in the being of the past. The fracturing of the 
‘I’, however, can only be grasped from the perspective of the third synthesis of time. While Kant 
fills this fracture by arguing for the identity of the ‘I,’ in Deleuze’s philosophy, this fracture 
refers to an unbridgeable disjointing of time in which before and after no longer rhyme, meaning 
that one never ceases becoming-different.
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 In accordance with this formulation, then, the 
essential transcendental experience of beings is that of perpetually perishing, a becoming-other.  
 In addition to emphasizing Kant’s discovery of the transcendental in the exploration of the 
third synthesis of time, Deleuze evokes Plato’s introduction of movement into the soul. For 
Plato, the movement of the soul or learning “implies the distinction within the soul between a 
‘before’ and an ‘after’; in other words, it implies the introduction of a first time, in which we 
forget what we knew, since there is a second time in which we recover what we have 
forgotten.”115 Between the first and the second time, there is an introjection of the whole of the 
pure past that is being retrieved by the apprentice. Similar to his study of Kant, Deleuze wants to 
emphasize the transformation of the soul in Plato’s philosophy. But his affinity with Plato is 
superficial, since, for Plato, it is the pure past of the Ideas or forms which are recollected by the 
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soul. Here we might ask what relevancy Plato has in Deleuze’s development of the third 
synthesis of time. Deleuze’s references are always strategic. He simultaneously seeks to extract 
something from them, while also carving out a space for a problematic that is his own. By 
evoking Plato, he is not simply seeking to critique him, but proposes the illusions that the ground 
or the being of the past is susceptible to if conceived of as operating by itself; by operating by 
itself, we mean that it constitutes the entirety of time. While Plato is the figure with whom the 
circular movement of the ground (model) and that which is grounded (the copies) is inaugurated, 
such illusions are not delimited to Plato’s pure past. They apply to the workings of the past in 
general. We will discuss Plato’s pure past in the fourth chapter. Here, it is worthwhile noting that 
the circular relationship of the ground to that which is grounded installed from Plato onward, 
“elevates the principle of representation—namely, identity, which it treats as an immemorial 
model, and resemblance, which it treats as a present image: the Same and the Similar.”116 In this 
case, the pure past as the model merely offers the image in accordance with which the 
resemblance of the copies becomes measurable; their difference or identity with respect to it. If 
we were to follow this formulation of the pure past, we could not make the claim that the living 
organism creates anything new, only that it distributes the model to different degrees. Again, the 
problem of circularity is not delimited to this vision of the past.  
Transcendental philosophy likewise encounters it when it posits the being of the past as 
ground in relation to the present, or that which is grounded in it. This sort of illusion appears to 
be permitted by the “ambiguities of Mnemosyne, [or] was already implicit in the second 
synthesis of time,” precisely because the events of the being of the past mark the centers of 
convergence of series; the centers around which two terms converge in a third, are the same 
centers which appear to be prolonged in lines of actualization.
117
 The second repetition reinforces 
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the idea that the past moves in a circular fashion with respect to the present, and that the ground 
falls into what it grounds, because it appears as though its being is conditional upon the terms 
which implicate it. As Deleuze tells us, these repetitions  
include difference, but include it only between the degrees or levels. [The second 
repetition] appears first in the form of the circle of the past coexistent in themselves 
[convergences]; then in the form of the circle of coexistence of the past and the 
present [convergence and division]; and finally in the form of a circle of the presents 
which pass and which coexist in relation to the object=x, 
 
or the complex theme of the past [participation].
118
 But, it is not as though the past and the 
present truly move in a closed circle. On one hand, to conceive them as moving in a closed circle 
is a philosophical error. On the other hand, the circle is dependent upon an affirmation; whether 
enough chance is affirmed in the organization of time in its entirety. It is this affirmation which 
is imperceptible in the circle, but is already everywhere dispersed in it because there is nothing 
like the Identity of the past, neither does the conditioned itself resemble what conditions it, or 
that which it is in relation to so as to become conditioned as such. Deleuze is capable of making 
such arguments convincing only from the third synthesis of time. In order to transition away 
from the past, which is not primary in the order of time, we must remember that to ground is to 
determine the indeterminate, with the indeterminate already installing itself imperceptibly in the 
second repetition. As we have shown elsewhere, the continuum of the ground is “bent and must 
lead us toward a beyond, so the second synthesis of time points beyond itself in the direction of a 
third which denounces the illusion of the in-itself as still a correlate of representation.”119 In the 
previous chapters, we emphasized that the past points beyond itself. When laying out the 
pathways of articulation in the introduction to the second chapter, we noted that one pathway is 
towards the actualization of the virtual, while the other, pertaining to that which is excessive in 
the Event, cannot be actualized. Here, we are retracing the whole of the past in order to show that 
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one of tendencies leaves what Deleuze refers to as the crystal. It is the turning towards the virtual 
which splits the image in two. Now, this turning towards the virtual is precisely the moment 
when the sense expressed or attributed to the states of affairs as the verb in the proposition is 
thrown into relief. We take the direction of the future by way of the question (what is x becomes 
what difference is there). In the direction of the future, the determined infinitive cannot be 
appropriated by representation, it cannot be conceived of as the becoming of the concept, but is 
instead infused with paradox. From the perspective of third repetition, we no longer trace the 
ground in relation to the grounded, but groundlessness as now infusing the ground as the reason 
behind the differentiation of beings.  
 We already mentioned that the third repetition splits the image of time in two. It is 
essentially a spectacular bursting of the whole of the image in two unequal halves. Nevertheless, 
it is considered as a synthesis of time by Deleuze, because the function of the instant is to draw 
them together without necessarily making them coincide. He presents this time as out of joint 
because the before of the being of the past along with the conditioned, and what comes after, do 
not coincide. There is something unequal introduced in the second repetition which cannot be 
made in conformity with it. The ground strangely bending in another direction after it culminates 
in a freeze-frame or a frozen image, is the opening up of the freedom of the future; the beginning 
of time as such. Deleuze, hence, writes that,  
time out of joint means demented time or time outside of the curve which gave it a 
god, liberated from its overly simple circular figure, freed from the events which 
made up its content, its relation to movement overturned; in short, time presenting 
itself as an empty and pure form. Time itself unfolds (that is, apparently ceases to be 
a circle) instead of things unfolding within it (following the overly simple circular 
figure).
120
  
 
We have already shown in chapter one, how this image is split in two, by discussing the 
continuity of becoming in relation to the moment of the caesura. The articulation of the third 
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repetition as a pure order of time is a precise one, because, with it, we no longer have the virtual 
events along with the series unfolding in time, but time itself unfolding as a function of the 
caesura. The caesura is the instant that disjoints time, or distributes the before and the after of 
time. By borrowing Holderlin’s aphorism that time no longer rhymes, Deleuze wants to 
demonstrate that there is something unequal to the ground, which nevertheless configures it, all 
the while dissolving it.  
Overturning its own ground, time is defined not only by a formal and empty order 
but also by a totality and a series. In the first place, the idea of a totality of time must 
be understood as follows: the caesura, of whatever kind, must be determined in the 
image of a unique and tremendous event, an act which is adequate to time as a 
whole.
121
  
 
For Deleuze, this pure event of the third repetition draws together the other syntheses of time, 
which are conceived now from the perspective of its caesura. It draws them together, however, 
without necessarily doing away with their distinct operations. It is better to say, then, that the 
other syntheses are explained from the perspective of the third, because the third is that which 
‘makes’ the difference. This is what Deleuze means when he argues that, “in a certain sense, the 
ultimate repetition, the ultimate theatre, therefore encompasses everything; while in another 
sense it destroys everything; and in yet another sense selects among everything.”122 Along with 
the repeater of the present and the repetition of the past, there is that which is repeated in them; 
the eternal return of the future. The eternal return unfolds the circle so as to form a straight line, 
or raises the ground never to see the same return, by rendering repetition for itself adequate to 
difference in-itself. Since the third repetition distributes difference, the other repetitions arise in 
relation to it, while also being displaced by it. Only difference in-itself returns in the empty form 
of time. The other syntheses can are displaced by it because the eternal return introduces a 
differentiation that each time distributes the being of the past anew, giving way to the creation of 
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the novel in the present. This each time means that the other repetitions do not return, only the 
differentiation that disjoints time returns. It returns as that which dissolves the ground into 
groundlessness. It is the essential formlessness which insinuates itself in every form, thereby, 
resisting the appropriation of the event in representational models towards which it tended. 
 In the first chapter, we showed that the eternal return displaces the being of the past, 
because it is already involved in it. With the culmination of the virtual events of the past, the line 
reverses itself, illuminating the pathway anew, in reverse, showing the third repetition to have 
been there all along, configuring the past itself. This is the point at which time is thrown out of 
joint. To begin with, the third repetition is disguised in the events of the being of the past, which, 
in accordance with the operation of the past, have become centers of convergence. But these 
centers of convergence bear the differentiation, since the being of the past does not itself 
resemble, it is not the same, as the divergent series of actualizations, neither do the events that 
configure it, the levels of the past, bear the same intensity, even though they replay a complex 
theme, a life, a rhythm.
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 This is our first hint of differentiation. Deleuze refers to such a 
disguise of the third in the second repetition as the dark precursor. The dark precursor is the 
disguised differentiation, or that which makes the difference, in the second synthesis of time. The 
concept of the dark precursor can appear mysterious if we do not grasp the simplicity of the 
eternal return, or more importantly, if we do allow that time unfolds as a function of the caesura, 
because of which every determination carries along with it indetermination. So why is the 
precursor dark in the second repetition? The precursor is dark in the second repetition, because it 
is “covered by the phenomena it induces within the system”; it is covered over primarily by the 
centers of convergence that compose the past, around which worlds are created.
124
 But the point 
is that the second repetition is induced or selected from the perspective of the caesura of the third 
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repetition which introduces the difference, even if this is not apparent to begin with. In reverse, 
each center of convergence will be shown as bearing a differentiation that leads to a divergence. 
Each repetition will become disjointed, showing now only difference in-itself. When traversing 
the entirety of the transcendental field, the difficult question is always whether it is divergence or 
convergence that is primary. It arises only because time does not unfold in a linear fashion. 
Deleuze’s most radical argument is that divergence instigated by differentiation is primary in the 
order of time. It is, as we have noted, that which gives birth to time—not only in raising the 
ground, but in dissolving the ground with the difference made. In Cinema 2: The Time-Image, he 
writes that, in the being of the past, “the dividing in two, this differentiation, did not reach 
completion […] because time rolled itself up, and its two aspects relaunched themselves into the 
circuit whose poles they recharged while blocking up the future.”125 When tracing the theatre of 
the virtual, we do not simply move through the different levels which unfold in time. We move 
back and forth, from the centers of convergence, the virtual images, along the lines of 
actualization, and back again, until the entirety of the circuit (of the virtual and the actual) plays 
itself out or plays out a becoming.  
Now, in contrast, the dividing in two [of the virtual and the actual] can come to 
completion, but precisely on the condition that one of the two tendencies leaves the 
crystal, through the point of flight. […] Everything that has happened falls back into 
the crystal and stays there: this is all the frozen, fixed, finished-with and over-
conforming roles that the characters have tried in turn.
126
  
 
What exits this crystal, thereby shattering or fracturing the point of view, is the differentiation of 
the virtual, since it is in itself unequal to the images on the whole. It is released from being 
imprisoned in the other repetitions, reverses itself, and in the process dissolves them, never to see 
them return in the same configuration. Difference in itself posits itself for itself. The unequal 
emerges from the theatre in which the combination of the past is configured, in order to give way 
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to the future: “It creates this future as a bursting forth of life. […] One leaves the theatre to get to 
life, but one leaves imperceptibly, on the thread of the stream, that is, of time. It is by leaving it 
that time gives itself a future.”127 The thread traced imperceptibly by the dark precursor, linking 
difference with difference, is the ultimate differentiation that opens onto a future. The eternal 
return of difference is the highest object of affirmation, because therein lies our unbound joy 
together with the greatest freedom: to begin the story of time anew with the dissolution of time. 
Holderlin captures the dissolution of time and the birth of a life anew, when writing the 
following:  
Thus dissolution as necessity, from the viewpoint of ideal memory, becomes as such 
the ideal object of a newly unfolded life, a look back at the path that had to be 
traversed from the beginning of the dissolution up to where out of this new life a 
memory occurs of what was dissolved, and out of that, as explanation and unification 
of the gap and the contrast that occurs between what is new and the past, the memory 
of the dissolution can follow. The ideal dissolution is fearless. The beginning—and 
endpoint are already posited, found, secured; therefore this dissolution is also more 
certain, more irresistible, bolder; and thus it presents itself as what it actually is, as a 
reproductive act whereby life runs through all of its points and, to acquire the sum 
total, lingers over none, dissolves itself in each, to produce itself in the next.
128
 
 
 What is this difference in itself, however, in which difference is linked with difference 
giving the sense of a life run through all the ‘points’? In what way does this differentiation give 
way to divergence which happens prior to a convergence, even if imperceptibly? Unlike the 
being of the past in which the difference is made between the levels, repetition in the eternal 
return involves the linking of difference with difference without any intermediary.
129
 Deleuze 
writes that  
according to this other formula, difference must immediately relate the different 
terms to one another. In accordance with Heidegger’s ontological intuition, 
difference must be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to 
different without any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the 
analogous or the opposed. There must be a differenciation of difference, an in-itself 
which is like a differenciator, a Sich-unterscheidende, by virtue of which the 
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different is gathered all at once rather than represented on condition of a prior 
resemblance.
130
  
 
By installing ourselves in memory, we become-equal to the whole of the past, while in the 
repetition of the future, in which difference is linked with difference, there is always a remainder, 
the unequal itself, that cannot be subsumed in the second repetition. In the third repetition, we 
have the repetition itself equal to difference in-itself. In other words, the repetition of the future 
is adequate to differentiation. The entire question, however, is how could difference act as 
differenciator linking difference to difference without there being an intermediary, or an identical 
concept in which the differences are subsumed.
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 To begin with, the divergence of two or more 
beings is not identical to the being of the past which they go on to actualize. The divergence 
implies a differentiation around which they are capable of becoming divergent as such, since it is 
through this differentiation that they are brought into a relation with one another. The 
differentiation itself is primary as that which creates the relation that they go on to actualize in 
accordance with their capacities. Deleuze, hence, writes that in order for us to conceive of this 
linking of difference to difference,  
a system must be constituted on the basis of two or more series [or terms], each 
series being defined by the difference between the terms which compose it. If we 
suppose that the series communicate under the impulse of a force of some kind, then 
it is apparent that this communication relates difference to other difference.
132
  
 
The force that Deleuze is referring to is the power of dark precursor to bring different beings or 
terms into relation through a differentiation. It would be incorrect to say that the divergent terms 
are related directly, but that they are brought into a relation with the event of their differentiation. 
Such an event of differentiation allows divergence itself to become an object of affirmation. In 
The Logic of Sense Deleuze asks what it means to render divergence into an object of 
affirmation. He argues that,  
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as a general rule, two things are simultaneously affirmed only to the extent that their 
difference is denied, suppressed from within […]. We speak, on the contrary, of an 
operation according to which two things or two determinations are affirmed through 
their difference, that is to say, that they are the objects of simultaneous affirmation 
only insofar as their difference is itself affirmed and is itself affirmative. […] We are 
rather faced with a positive distance of differential elements: no longer to identity 
two contraries with the same, but to affirm their distance as that which relates one to 
the other insofar as they are ‘different.’133  
 
We will have more to say on the ethic involved in the argument that divergence is an object of 
simultaneous affirmation. Here, we want to stress that differentiation, being that which is 
affirmed of a relation, as it renews this relation, differentiates the terms that are brought into 
communication. This means that we do not affirm two things through their identity, neither do 
we presume in any sense that they resemble one another, but, rather, that they participate in the 
differentiation through which they are simultaneously affirmed as different. The third synthesis 
involves making something new of repetition, what Deleuze understands as freedom, in part 
because the difference affirmed in it is also the affirmation of the differentiation of beings; their 
freedom to create something novel. 
We now have a sense of how differentiation relates to divergence. We do not understand, 
however, what this differentiation is. We mentioned that the dark precursor has the power to 
bring different things in relation through a difference; it can be thought of as an event of falling 
in love which may be imperceptible in a circumstance, or the event of revolution which might 
not have been apparent in the actual, but only becomes grasped in retrospect. But the precursor is 
dark precisely because it operates in the second repetition, meaning that the divergence is itself 
displaced in the series in question, since the lines of actualization traced in the second synthesis 
lead to the actualized; what are understood as qualities. In order to grasp divergence, we have to 
follow the stream of differentiation to its end. The precursor is imperceptible in the second 
repetition because it traces the singular events of the past in order to make the difference. In 
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other words, in order to show that which is unequal to the past. We must keep in mind that such 
an operation is only possible because a differentiation is introduced into the system. Or, as we 
have argued, it is the return of difference that raises the ground of the past to begin with in 
accordance with chance. As we have already said, the difference in-itself that the dark precursor 
traces, is not the difference between the levels or sheets of the past, it is the difference in-itself of 
the repetitions themselves, or that which is repeated in the repetitions. One of the greatest 
innovations on the part of Deleuze is to conceive of the differences that compose the abstract line 
as degrees of difference of quantitative intensities. These differences of intensity were already 
discussed in the first chapter. Here, we are going to briefly revisit such difference in light of the 
arguments that Deleuze presents in Difference and Repetition. There he defines intensity as the 
“form of difference in so far as this is the reason (or being) of the sensible. Every intensity is 
differential by itself difference […] each intensity is already a coupling (in which each element 
of the couple refers in turn to couples of elements of another order).”134 Each difference of the 
level or repetition in a system is a difference in intensity. Being itself coupled, intensity is 
doubled in another order, in the heterogeneous series or terms that diverge, while these elements, 
in turn, refer to the intensity of another differential which is itself coupled. The dark precursor 
moves from the lowest to the greatest intensity in a system by doubling difference, meaning that 
the difference is differentiated from one intensity to another all the way up to the unequal. It is 
the disparity of intensive differences that creates the inequality in the field as whole. As Deleuze 
notes, on one hand, intensity is implicated in itself as difference, meaning that it is indivisible or 
uncancellable in the element of the couple, while on the other, it is enveloped distance, thereby 
being, in a way, divisible in the couples of elements; this indivisibility and divisibility is linked 
to the question one or many durations. According to him, quantitative intensity differs from 
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quality precisely because “division can therefore take place and be continued without any change 
in the nature of what is being divided.”135 This aspect of division, or rather indivisibility, refers 
to the singular events of differentials that spin off into different directions. Conversely, from the 
standpoint of the couples of elements in which it is enveloped, it can be divided but not without 
transforming its nature. Differences of intensity are not like either extensive quantities or 
qualities. Surely, in the direction in which they are enveloped these intensity quantities become 
qualities, but in another, the intensive differences continue to unfold, linking difference with 
difference, all the way up to the unequal. Deleuze, hence, concludes that “intensive quantities are 
therefore defined by the enveloping difference, the enveloped distance, and the unequal in itself 
which testified to the existence of a natural ‘remainder,’ which provides the material for a change 
of nature.”136 The unequal, being that which makes the difference, marks the limit of that which 
can be sensed from the transcendental point of view; it is, however, also that aspect of the event 
which perpetually escapes its own accomplishment. This is the moment at which the straight line 
reverses itself, making visible the difference in intensity as already being there in the events of 
the being of the past. In the next chapter we will show how the being of the past, Mnemosyne, is 
awakened with the chance encounter with a sign in which the intensive is at once “the object of 
encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility.”  
The idea of intensive difference is the most difficult aspect of Deleuze’s thought. It is most 
difficult to conceive of difference because of the nature in which it presents itself. It is like a 
flowing river of lava that increases in rapidity, coming to a sort of boiling point, smashing the 
virtual images to pieces, and burying the surface on the whole. The unequal is like a volcanic 
eruption that shatters the crystal in which the actual and the virtual are mirrored. It is the ever 
increasing speed with which it unfolds, that renders it impossible to find one’s bearings in any 
201 
 
memory. Now, our question is, what sort of effect does this inequality of intensity have? What is 
its relationship to the eternal return? Earlier we discussed Kant’s contribution to Deleuze’s idea 
that the ‘I’ is fractured by time. The inequality in intensity fractures the self by making the 
difference. In other words, it repudiates all that came before, including the roles already played, 
in order to bring the new to beings. Deleuze, therefore, writes that “things must be dispersed 
within difference, and their identity must be dissolved before they become subject to the eternal 
return and to the identity of the eternal return.”137 In chapter 1, we stressed the ethics of the being 
of becoming. We argued that the object of affirmation is itself the becoming of beings, their 
capacity to become-different. This becoming-different was inextricably tied to the eternal return 
of difference, or it was nothing else than the return of the future. If the eternal return has this 
effect, it is because, for Deleuze, it presents us with a point of decision, with the problem of life, 
in which the affirmation is made. In order for such an affirmation to take place, the identity of 
beings must be dissolved by the empty form of time. All that remains once individuals, persons, 
and the world, are dissolved, is the pure Event of the eternal return. It is not only the subject that 
becomes fractured, but the other element of the couple, with which it creates a world, that is 
becomes fractured. This is essentially what it means to make divergence an object of 
simultaneous affirmation. We have already visited some of the arguments that Deleuze makes in 
The Logic of Sense on the ethics of the event. There he argues that the individual must grasp 
herself as event, and all other individuals, in turn, as events. Making a similar argument as the 
one he presents in his text on Spinoza, he goes on to note that:  
as the individual affirms the distance, she follows and joins it, passing through all the 
other individuals implied by the other events, and extracts from it a unique Event, 
which is once again herself, or rather the universal freedom. […] Counter-actualizing 
each event, the actor-dancer extracts the pure event which communicates with all the 
others and returns to itself through all the others, and with all the others. Each series 
returns to itself.
138
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The third repetition is an exploration of a distance in which the difference is made. The 
individuals return to themselves only by exploring this distance, and experiencing themselves as 
different. The return to oneself is not a return to the identical, but a return of difference which is 
the sufficient reason of any being as such. Each returns to itself, by becoming different. We must 
conclude, then, that the becoming different is the being of beings. Their freedom, which is 
always to remake a life anew, is essentially tied to the repetition of the future, in which they are 
the object of simultaneous affirmation. This simultaneous affirmation again being that each is 
affirmed in its becoming, each is given the freedom of the future. As we pointed out in the first 
chapter with respect to Spinoza, the freedom of the future involves affirming others as events 
precisely because in the highest affirmation we affirm their capacity to become other, a capacity 
that is adequate to their power of existing.  
 There is another aspect, however, of this fracturing of the self with the eternal return of the 
unequal. The eternal return, for Deleuze, presents us with the highest form of thought. The 
fracturing of the ‘I,’ enables thinking to emerge. It is the unequal itself which addresses itself to 
it, not the identical. One never thinks the identical as such, or in terms of a pre-existing model; 
thought is only awakened by the return of difference. In Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze 
manages to delineate the relationship of intensity and thought in a more accessible way when 
writing that, in the past, the being of the sensible  
is a feeling that stretches out on a sheet [levels of the past] and is modified according 
to its fragmentation. […] Feeling is that which is in continual exchange, circulating 
from one sheet to another according to what transformations occur. But when 
transformations themselves form a sheet which crosses all the others it is as if 
feelings set free the consciousness or thought with which they were loaded: a 
becoming conscious according to which shadows are the living realities of a mental 
theatre and feelings the true figures of a cerebral game which is very concrete.
139
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It is the feeling, what we previously referred to as a primitive affection, which, according to 
Deleuze, prevents differentiation from being one and the same with the past as the latter 
approaches a fixed point. The limit of the being of the sensible gives way to thinking by opening 
up the transition from the second to the third repetition. At its limit, inequality is the 
indeterminate, the abyss or groundlessness, to which thinking is coupled, or thinking becomes 
the most powerful affect. This groundlessness is, as Deleuze argues, the animality of thought, the 
outside of thought, which does not think, but gives itself to be thought. It is the animality of 
thought because as it traverses the field at an infinitive speed, there is nothing there to reveal it as 
the thought belonging to this or that subject. The outside of the thought that the time out of joint 
produces,  
introduces and constitutes Difference in thought, on the basis of which it thinks, in 
the form of the difference between the indeterminate and determination. It is the form 
of time which distributes throughout itself an ‘I’ fractured by the abstract line, a 
passive self produced by a groundlessness that it contemplates. It is this which 
engenders thought within thinking, for thought thinks only by means of difference, 
around this point of ungrounding.
140
  
 
The emergence of the event of thought will be the focus of our next chapter. Our aim will be to 
explore the relationship of this Event of thought and the object of simultaneous affirmation, by 
firstly discussing what Deleuze calls learning. This is all in an effort to grasp how one can 
articulate the event itself, or what is implied in such a saying. As is evident in The Logic of 
Sense, the pure Event itself must be somehow realized. The future implies a kind of actor that 
ushers in a third or ideal present in which we attempt to become adequate to the event.  
 
Conclusion: Becoming What One Is 
 
To our knowledge, after Nietzsche’s ecce homo, or, how one becomes what one is, no 
other thinker, except for Whitehead, has been able to capture the saying with the same precision:  
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“How an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is.”141 The simplicity of this 
saying sheds a light on what appears to be a highly complex philosophy of time. Indeed, what we 
have attempted to show is how an actual entity becomes, how we can approach it in a relation 
with it. But, of course, it cannot be said that time is internal to beings, but that beings are internal 
to time. It is the flow of time that determines what an actual entity is. With Deleuze, we get a 
distinct answer. A being endures in becoming; it is always in the process of becoming different. 
With the third synthesis of time, we not only begin to understand how a determination comes 
about, but also how beings are incessantly plunged into a becoming. Every instant, prior to the 
actualization of the past, we are presented with a fortuitous event of the future, which allows us 
to replay the potentials of the past, while also charting a new course for the present. As such, the 
groundlessness of the future always comes first. To ground or determine, as Deleuze notes, 
implies the indeterminate. This is where the highest affirmation lies; the greatest joy joined by a 
freedom that releases from purpose, as we manage to think how one becomes what one is. In the 
following chapter, we will explore another aspect of the saying by laying out Deleuze theory of 
learning. According to him, learning is becoming, so that the whole of experience is revisited 
from that perspective. While in the second chapter, we discussed how sense serves as the ground 
for formal logic, in chapter four, we will continue turning in the other direction so as to show 
another point of articulation, that of the Event. As we have seen by outlining Deleuze’s 
philosophy of time, the points of articulation cannot be severed. The ground unfolds “between” 
two presents, one of which presents the first point of articulation, the other puts the present out of 
play, thrusting the event in the direction of the future, thus, giving us another point of 
articulation. Together they form the entirety of the problem that we are trying to think through. 
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4 
Deleuze’s New Meno:  
Learning, Time, and the Event of Thought 
 
 
In this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibit coming-to-be 
and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any moral additive, in forever 
equal innocence. […] Such is the game that the aeon plays with itself.1 
 
 
A new Meno would say: it is knowledge that is nothing more than an empirical figure, 
a simple result which continually falls back into experience; whereas learning is the 
true transcendental structure which unites difference to difference, dissimilarity to 
dissimilarity, without mediating between them—not in the form of a mythical past or 
former present, but in the pure form of an empty time in general.
2
 
 
 
 Earlier we highlighted that the fracturing of the subject in which before and after do no 
coincide, opens up the way for learning. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze calls for a new 
Meno, Meno being one of the Platonic dialogues in which Socrates asserts that learning is 
recollection. In recent years, the study of Deleuze’s theory of learning has flourished, with works, 
such as, Nomadic Education (2008), and, Educational Life-Forms: Deleuzian Teaching and 
Learning Practice (2011), published. Aside from Alberto Toscano’s brief mention of the Meno in 
his introduction to Eric Alliez’s text, The Signature of the World (2005), and, Claire Colebrook’s 
chapter “Leading Out, Leading On: The Soul of Education,” which deals with the central idea that 
learning is not a learning from, the idea of a new Meno has not been explored in great detail. 
Many commentators rely on the pedagogy of the concept to develop Deleuze’s theory of learning. 
This is legitimate, since the concept, for Deleuze and Guattari, is itself a becoming. But, by doing 
so, we overlook the core problematic of the theory of learning, which is that learning is oriented 
towards the future. It gives way to the invention of concepts, the articulation of a problem. 
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Because of this, one might say that we have become friends of the concept, but not lovers of 
learning. By briefly reviewing Plato’s Meno, we intend to frame the discussion that follows: Is 
learning essentially recollecting or is it the invention of the new? After reviewing Plato’s piece, 
we will turn to Deleuze’s study of learning in Proust and Signs where he argues that learning is 
not oriented towards the past, but the future. If it is indeed oriented towards the future as is 
proposed, what does such learning involve? For Deleuze, learning is an apprenticeship to signs 
that constitutes a problematic field or an Idea. This problematic field will be further developed 
with respect to his Difference and Repetition.  
Learning, being the unfolding of a problematic field as a function of the empty form of time, 
puts us on the path of thinking. It radically transforms what it means to think. In accordance with 
it, thinking, for Deleuze, can no longer be conceived as a possibility, neither can it be something 
innate, but rather emerges in the encounter with a sign. Learning renders this thought a thought 
without an image, model, or presuppositions; if it presupposes someone it would be the stupid 
person that questions or does not take things for granted. Thinking is essentially naïve; it is 
immanent to the problematic field that it thinks through at an absolute or infinite speed, without 
there being anything supplementary to reveal it.
3
 Even the affirmation of becoming itself which 
conditions the articulation of sense does not secure the form of recognition. By giving rise to the 
question of difference, paradox disguised in the second repetition, addresses itself to thought. It 
will show itself as already coupled to thought, in the form of the unfolding of the problematic 
field in the encounter with a sign. The genesis of the act of thinking emerges with something 
outside of thought, the never seen or unthinkable, that thought must think through. This is what 
we will be discussing as the Event of thought in Deleuze’s philosophy. The Event of thought is 
the immediate positing of a problematic which gives way to the articulation of the Event, together 
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with all of the complexities that this implies. In the first chapter, we discussed how becoming 
gives way to a working thought, and that the being of becoming in the eternal return produces a 
contemplative thought on account of the caesura. We refer to the primary pathway of articulation 
as forming a working thought, since this thought is part of the virtual events that compose a 
complex theme. It is as it were the unconscious aspect of thought, what this thought has been 
addressed to. The thought continued in light of a difference made is what we are referring to as a 
contemplative thought. Michel Foucault frames such thinking adequately in his commentary on 
The Logic of Sense, when writing:  
Thought has to think through what forms it, and is formed out of what it thinks 
through. […] The fissure of the I and the series of signifying points do not form a 
unity that permits thought to be both subject and object, but they are themselves the 
event of thought and the incorporeality of what is thought, the object of thought as a 
problem (a multiplicity of dispersed points) and thought as mime (repetition without a 
model).
4
  
 
Events themselves are events of thought or differentials of thought, not only in the sense that they 
compose a problem that thought thinks through, but in the sense that the every event involves a 
fissure with respect to which thought emerges without a model that would serve as the response.   
What is at stake with the repetition of thought in Deleuze philosophy is not the two leveled 
predicative process as in Husserl’s thought, but the problematization of the art of living. If 
learning is the weaving of a singular way of living in which another is affirmed as event, then, the 
Event of thought, bearing the highest object of affirmation, opens up the future of action in which 
the new is brought to beings. A new Meno would, thus, involve “the unlimited power to learn 
without damage to the will to act.”5 Learning would no longer be concerned with death, but with 
the art of living. Jacques Derrida adequately formulated this inquiry into the art of living when 
asking: “Is living something that can be learned? Or taught? Can one learn, through discipline or 
apprenticeship, through experience or experimentation, to accept or, better, to affirm life?” he 
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asks. One does not simply learn to live, instead, learning to live “should mean learning to die” 
according to Derrida.
6
 If learning involves learning to die, it would only be for the sake of 
learning how to live. Learning to die has nothing else to teach than learning how to live, a life that 
would be against death. To die only has importance from the perspective of life.  
 
Meno’s Paradox 
 
 
Meno is considered the earliest dialogue in which Plato asserts that learning is recollection. 
Its themes are reiterated in Phaedo and Theaetetus. As is typical of the Platonic dialogues, Meno 
opens up with an inquiry into what is x. The initial question is whether being good is something 
that can be taught. This question, however, is not Socrates’, it is posed by Meno, a young 
aristocrat influenced by the teachings of the sophist Gorgias. This detail is relevant in the study, as 
Meno has gotten into the habit of acquiring knowledge and, hence, takes the same approach when 
conversing with Socrates. In contrast to Meno’s arrogance, Socrates pleads ignorance of the 
matter when stating: “so far from knowing whether or not it’s teachable, I haven’t the faintest idea 
what being good is!”7 Socrates claims that he cannot know if virtue is teachable if he does not 
know what it is to begin with. Foreshadowing what will later become the theory of recollection, 
Socrates returns the favor by asking Meno to remember what his teacher Gorgias has taught him 
on the subject. Meno appears to have forgotten what he has been taught, despite having given 
public lectures on the matter. Once this is demonstrated by Plato, the two characters go on to 
inquire into what virtue is in order to decide if it is indeed teachable. The inquiry is itself meant to 
be an answer to the question. Nevertheless, because Meno is searching for the kind of answer he is 
accustomed to receiving, the question of whether virtue is teachable appears unresolved. The 
problem likewise endures with the reader, which is most likely what Plato intended. By remaining 
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pious to the idea that he only knows that he does not know, Socrates behaves like an exemplary 
teacher. He teaches nothing while repeating the question in the three segments that compose the 
dialogue. The first segment of the Meno (70a-79d) consists of a refutation of the argument that 
one knows what being good is, if one has acquaintance with its parts or properties (for example, 
being able to rule). The parts of being good refer to the good without us having any knowledge of 
it. Socrates insists that to know what being good is, one must have knowledge of the whole (the 
form of the good), or what it is in itself.
8
 Meno and Socrates arrive at an agreement—for different 
reasons, as we will soon see,—that the question cannot be answered with reference to different 
parts or instances of virtue, since the parts themselves refer to a whole that we know nothing of. 
This agreement signals an impasse in the inquiry, yet the dialogue does not end there. Once the 
nature of knowledge is emphasized as an essential component of the problematic, the initial 
question is restated by Socrates, marking a transition to the second segment of the study.  
The second segment is most relevant for our purposes (80a-86c). It begins with Meno’s 
shameful confession that even though he has taught others what being good is countless times, he 
himself does not know the answer to the question.
9
 Contrary to a state of puzzlement that would 
incite a discussant to engage in further dialogue, Meno attributes his bafflement entirely to 
Socrates’ doing, who, in turn, once again professes not to know that which they are seeking. It is 
at this critical juncture of the exchange that Meno raises an objection to Socrates’ way of 
proceeding by posing the following paradox:  
But how can you try to find out about something, Socrates, if you haven’t got the 
faintest idea what it is? I mean, how can you put before your mind a thing that you 
have no knowledge of, in order to try to find out about it? And even supposing you did 
come across it, how would you know that that was it, if you didn’t know what it was 
to begin with?
10
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Socrates recognizes Meno’s paradox as the “famous quibbler’s argument,” which in general 
renders any search for knowledge futile, and more specifically, targets and unsettles his mode of 
inquiry in the absence of knowledge.
11
 He rearticulates the paradox by adding a fragment to it that 
equally endangers the sophists’ method of acquiring knowledge:  
you can’t try to find out about something you know about, because you know about it, 
in which case there’s no point in trying to find out about it; and you can’t try to find 
out about something you don’t know about, either, because then you don’t even know 
what it is you’re trying to find out about.12  
 
While Plato’s mouthpiece Socrates appears unaffected by the deadlock he has reached with Meno, 
in his willingness to address the paradox, Plato himself must have deemed it a potential threat to 
his epistemology. In addition to this, despite Socrates’ polemical response to Meno’s formulation 
of the paradox, it is insufficient in discrediting the latter’s claim that one cannot inquire into what 
one does not know. Socrates must, therefore, defuse the paradox by offering a reply that preserves 
the consistency of his approach. He begins his argument by reminding Meno of the true belief 
held by poets and priests that the soul endures after death. With the aid of this premise, he goes on 
to assert that,  
since the soul can never die, and has been born over and over again, and has already 
seen what there is in this world, and what there is in the world beyond […] there’s 
nothing it hasn’t already learned about. So it wouldn’t be surprising if it managed to 
remember things, the things it used to know.
13
  
 
For Socrates, one cannot learn from others, one can only recollect the things that the soul already 
knows. If the soul has previous knowledge of the whole, then recollection by inquiry cannot be 
understood as teaching or ‘putting something into’ the soul.14 The search for knowledge that 
provokes recollection or learning is distinguished from beliefs and habits acquired through an 
engagement with the empirical world. This assertion is repeated in the Phaedo, in which Plato 
writes: “Learning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time 
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have learned what we now recollect […]. We surely agree that if anyone recollects anything he 
must have known it before,” but has forgotten it.15  
Meno is enticed by Socrates’ theory, since the notion that we already have knowledge of the 
whole appears to lend weight to his argument that one cannot inquire in the absence of 
knowledge. In the typical style of the sophist, he states that he would “like to learn a bit more 
about” the idea that learning is remembering.16 Though Socrates recognizes Meno’s request as a 
ruse, he agrees to demonstrate the theory by leading one of Meno’s slaves through a series of 
questions on geometry. While the slave has no previous knowledge of geometry, by becoming 
immersed in a problem, with its corresponding state of puzzlement and desire to know, he begins 
to recall the solution without being taught anything at all. Socrates reiterates that inquiry does not 
teach anything, it only “leads out” what the slave implicitly has access to. Because Socrates is 
able to show that the slave is “retrieving the knowledge from within himself,” he satisfies the 
argument that one can inquire into things that one does not know, and that the absence of 
knowledge entices one to learn.
17
 Has Socrates effectively defused the paradox, however? The 
reply preserves the consistency of Plato’s epistemology, but it does not explicitly unravel two 
states that appear at odds with one another: knowing and unknowing. Plato must maintain the two 
contrary states in order to uphold the importance of inquiry and the continual search for 
knowledge in spite of ignorance. The simultaneity of the two states complicates the theory of 
learning, because Plato must call knowledge that which has already been learned by the soul, all 
the while referring to recollection as true belief on the way to knowledge. The distinction between 
the two different times of having learned and learning—along with the transitional phase of 
forgetting—preserve the problematic status of the search. However, once we assume that 
recollection is true belief on the way to knowledge, questioning itself also becomes problematic. 
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How does someone with true beliefs begin to inquire into that which one does not know?
18
 
Remaining within Plato’s philosophy, with this sort of question we have effectively come full 
circle, and returned to Meno’s objection. Nevertheless, if the reply is steeped in contradiction and 
not definitive enough to satisfy the reader, Plato’s response might be that the reader has not 
recollected anything and that his or her search for knowledge resembles Meno’s. The third 
segment of the dialogue shows that a definitive answer to Meno’s question in a style that he is 
accustomed to is likewise impossible.  
Despite Socrates’ display of recollection, we are shown in the third segment of the dialogue 
(86d-100c) that, not only has Meno learned nothing in the course of the inquiry, he has regressed 
to his initial position. It appears as though Socrates is looking to put Meno’s mind at ease as he 
delineates a hypothesis that would resolve the matter once and for all. His argument that if being 
good is “a kind of knowledge, then it can be taught; and if it isn’t then it can’t,” seems to resonate 
with Meno.
19
 Socrates searches in vain for examples of virtuous people that not only know what 
virtue is, but have taught it to others. Anytus, an Athenian politician who has acquaintance with 
various decent people residing in the city, cannot answer how anyone learned to be virtuous in the 
first place. In light of this, Socrates arrives at the conclusion that virtue is “something that can’t be 
passed on or handed over from one person to another.”20 In accordance with the stated hypothesis, 
he must also then infer that being good is not a kind of knowledge after all. This claim does not 
contradict Socrates stance that virtue is knowledge, it instead illustrates that propositional results 
fall short of defining what being good is.
21
 The search is aborted thereafter as Socrates mystifies 
Meno by claiming that virtue must be a “gift of the gods.” He too reverts to his initial position 
when adding that, the only way to be certain is to inquire into what being good is in itself.
22
 
Notwithstanding the inconclusive way in which the dialogue wraps up, the reader does have an 
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indication of what virtue is for Plato. It is through the process of questioning that one cares for the 
soul, since the soul is improved only by recollecting the potential knowledge that it holds.
23
 It 
becomes evident in the movement of the dialogue that in his willingness to inquire in the absence 
of knowledge, the slave is more virtuous than the man who rules over him. Because of his 
inability to inquire when confronted by a problem, and his dogmatic desire to satisfy his own 
conditions of knowledge so as to proceed to teach, Meno “leaves virtue an empty word.”24 Meno 
is not a lover of the search.  
 
A Lover of the Search: Learning is Future Oriented 
 
 
What is essential [in the Search] is not to remember, but to learn.
25
 
 
The leitmotifs of the Search are: I did not yet know, I was to understand later; and 
also, I was no longer interested once I ceased to learn.
26
 
 
 
Deleuze’s Proust and Signs is one of those rare texts in contemporary philosophy which 
cultivates a theory of learning as an apprenticeship to signs. This apprenticeship manages to 
capture the two sides of aesthetics, the making of a life as work of art, and the work of art as the 
creation of a life. This new conception of learning is developed in light of Proust’s literary work, 
In Search of Lost Time (Remembrance of Things Past). The reader will quickly note that the 
search, as a kind of remembering, echoes Plato’s philosophy. In light of this, Deleuze establishes 
the tone of the search in the first few paragraphs of his study. He writes: “One might invoke 
Proust’s Platonism: to learn is still to remember. But however important its role [is], memory 
intervenes only as the means of an apprenticeship that transcends recollection both by its goals 
and by its principles. The Search is oriented to the future, not the past.”27 Though the search for 
lost time is a search for the truth of things past, according to Deleuze, time regained cannot be 
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thought of as reminiscence, because it is an instance of the birth of a world that is irreducible to 
the past one. This subtle shift in orientation, towards the future rather than the past, has radical 
effects on the way in which Deleuze will go on to conceive of a new Meno in Difference and 
Repetition. A new paradox is already evident in Proust and Signs. It is only from the perspective 
of time regained, which is an event of an abrupt encounter with a sign that unhinges the faculties, 
that one ‘recollects’ having learned all along. “We [therefore] discover what we could not know 
at the start: that we were already apprenticed to signs when we supposed we were wasting our 
time.”28 The idea that the continuous apprenticeship to signs becomes apparent in a final act of 
apprenticeship, however, does not signal that the search has a predetermined destination; what 
was there in the beginning is not simply recovered in the end.
29
 Neither does Proust’s progressive 
apprenticeship necessarily constitute a linear search. Proust’s search is like no other, not only in 
the style of writing that it is expressed, but also because of the singular rhythm that structures his 
apprenticeship to signs. As Deleuze notes, the search for truth is riddled with episodes of delays, 
disenchantments, regressions, and wrong roads taken, which cannot be dismissed once the hero 
recovers lost time. They are instead essential fragments that configure a life of learning. Such a 
life of learning reveals that “we never know how someone learns” ahead of time, or what sort of 
encounters with signs make them a writer.
30
  
 Deleuze offers a clear conception of learning as an apprenticeship to signs in the first 
chapter of Proust and Signs. He writes that:  
learning is essentially concerned with signs. Signs are the object of a temporal 
apprenticeship, not of an abstract knowledge. To learn is first of all to consider a 
substance, an object, a being as if it emitted signs to be deciphered […]. Vocation is 
always predestination with regard to signs. Everything that teaches us something emits 
signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs.
31
  
 
215 
 
Thus far, we have discussed signs in a number of ways in this dissertation. We first introduced the 
idea of a sign when outlining the three types of knowledge in Spinoza as they are conceived by 
Deleuze. We noted that in “Spinoza and the Three ‘Ethics,’” Deleuze defines a sign as an effect: 
“An effect is first of all the trace of one body upon another, the state of a body insofar as it suffers 
the action of another body. It is an affection—for example, the effect of the sun on our body, 
which ‘indicates’ the nature of the body and merely ‘envelops’ the nature of the affecting body.”32 
The sign as an effect or affection is produced by the mixture of bodies. The notion that an actual 
being emits signs that call for interpretation was also discussed with respect to Deleuze’s 
Nietzsche and Philosophy. In that work, he argues that “a phenomenon is not an appearance or 
even an apparition, but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force.”33 If 
learning involves the apprenticeship to signs, this is because a purely actual object does not exist. 
It always has its other half, the virtual half, which is unfolded with respect to a sign. Deleuze’s 
preoccupation with the nature of signs does not end there, however. He explores them yet again in 
the two works on cinema. What matters for us is to have a working understanding of the sign as 
effect, remembering that the basic definition of sense is that it is an effect produced by the 
mixtures of bodies. It is indeed difficult to pinpoint the nature of a sign. While all signs involve 
the constitution of a transcendental field, not all encounters trigger the faculties in time to 
intervene in the search. In most of our encounters, the sign as that which “forces sensation and 
that which can only be sensed are [not] one and the same thing.”34 To account for this, in Proust 
and Signs Deleuze conceives of various signs that define the singular search of the apprentice.  
There are four kinds of signs that produce the texture of Proust’s search: signs of 
worldliness
35
; signs of love; sensuous signs; and signs of art. Each sign provokes a distinct 
address, precisely because it not only has a different relationship with its sense or meaning, but 
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also because each one corresponds to a different temporal structure.
36
 It is appropriate to begin 
with worldly signs, because these signs, though most frequently encountered, do not directly 
instigate the apprentice to search for truth. Or rather, their address is more likely to stimulate the 
intelligence to search for logical or possible truths. The apprentice turns to such signs when trying 
to decipher how a social milieu is organized, what sort of codes admit, exclude, and distribute 
people in that milieu, and how the change of code transforms the value of signs emitted by people 
occupying that milieu. The problem with worldly signs according to Deleuze is that they are 
conventional gestures (for example, a sign of respect) made to produce a desired effect that is 
sufficient unto itself.
37
 By sufficient unto itself, we mean that such signs do not point to some 
other content besides what they “stand for.” Deleuze, thus, writes that because this sort of sign 
“anticipates [a predicable type of] action as it does thought, annuls thought as it does action, and 
declares itself adequate” to its meaning, it is empty.38 While worldly signs project a 
commonsensical reaction that falls short of forcing thought into action, they do have the effect of 
“nervous exaltation” or anxiety, not unlike the mood Meno experiences when conversing with 
Socrates. In the beginning of the search, this sort of mood propels the apprentice to search for 
possible truths of signs in the actual object.
39
 He turns to the things themselves to point the way. 
“Struck by a place-name, by a person’s name,” the apprentice  
dreams first of the landscapes and people these names designate. Before he knows her, 
Mme de Guermantes seems to him glamorous because she must possess, he believes, 
the secret of her name. He imagines her ‘bathing as in a sunset in the orange light that 
emanates from the final syllable—antes.’40  
 
The inexperienced way in which the apprentice approaches things as objective entities that 
intentionally manifest their true content in the signs they emit, however, cannot be solely 
attributed to the sign. The sign has a subjective pole. Its vocation corresponds to the tendency of 
the intelligence to represent things or relate them to recognizable content. On this, Deleuze writes 
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that the “intelligence dreams of objective content, of explicit objective significations that it is able, 
of its own accord, to discover or to receive or to communicate.”41 At this stage, the apprentice is 
disposed to things potentially manifesting their truth to him. He vigorously seeks to extract from 
them the valuable treasures that he thinks they possess. He sharpens his skills, observes things 
through a finely tuned microscope, in the hopes of receiving their essential meaning. This level of 
the search is not unlike the one of the logician.  
This method of approaching the world, however, leads to dead end. Deleuze shows that the 
apprentice becomes uninspired by the truths that he acquires, because they “lack the mark of 
necessity and always give the impression that they ‘might have been’ different and differently 
expressed.”42 In turn, as he feels alienated from what he is observing and describing, he begins to 
question his own adequacy as a writer. Perhaps he does not have the intelligence or resolve 
required to become a writer. This form of self-questioning makes him vulnerable to the 
subjectivist illusion that the truth of signs resides in his association of ideas. The apprentice no 
longer awaits the object to disclose its truth, but associates the sign with some quality that he 
recalls.
43
 The chain of associations one can construct with the aid of voluntary memory is 
limitless, as it is arbitrary, no matter how elaborate and clever the linkages made. More will be 
said on voluntary memory, but for now, we want to stress that like the objectivist illusion, the 
subjective interpretation of signs, which attempts to offset the failures of the former, is equally 
inadequate in producing any truths that the writer deems necessary to express. All of the effort 
exerted in an attempt to decipher signs, by turning to the thing itself or to the association of ideas, 
produces little to nothing. The time spent on interpreting signs in this way is time wasted. It is no 
surprise then that the hero of Proust’s literature would become disenchanted with the search; he 
ceased to learn where he relied on such interpretations. We should not assume from what has been 
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said that the signs emitted ceased to teach us something, at the least indirectly. Deleuze reminds 
us that time wasted brings with it the awareness that we do not learn from others. Learning does 
not consist of the exchange of ideas amongst friends, the acquisition of information, or the 
imparting of knowledge onto another, which remains abstract unless the apprentice ‘arrives at it 
by other means.’ It is not, amongst other things, our habituation to a social milieu, our effective 
immersion in a discipline, or our ability to correctly respond to stimuli. This is why the apprentice 
learns far less from knowledgeable men who are far more enlightened than he is, than he does 
when engaging directly with his immediate world. As Deleuze writes, “we never learn by doing 
like someone, but by doing with someone, who bears no resemblance to what we are learning.”44 
We do not learn from another, we learn when unfolding the signs that are emitted in our relation 
to another. This is why signs cannot be conceived as synonymous with the actual object, but also 
that they do not coincide with the intelligence that the subject brings to bear on them. How, then, 
do signs become decipherable? We leave this question open for now and turn to signs of love.  
Signs of love are of a different sort because we become more intimately entangled in the 
relation that produces their vocation. Deleuze writes that, “to fall in love is to individualize 
someone by the signs he bears or emits. It is to become sensitive to those signs,” in order to 
unravel a possible world that the beloved inhabit apart from us.
45
 To learn is to become sensitive 
to signs, to not only individualize another while individuating oneself, but also to create a world 
of encounters with signs in the process. Becoming apprenticed to signs of love is becoming 
implicated in the signs that will trigger our suffering in the future. The search for truth in signs of 
love arises with the individualization of our beloved, since it is in distinguishing them from others, 
and creating a world in which we are sensitive to their signs, that the dual quality of these signs 
becomes apparent. Deleuze shows that signs of love are equally signs of deception and torment, 
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because each embrace, kiss, and word spoken by the beloved repeats others from which we are 
excluded, and points to an unknown world in which we may not be favoured.
46
 In other words, we 
are prevented from comprehending the truth of these signs because we attribute them to the 
beloved, even though our past loves are equally implicated in the selection of the signs that the 
beloved emits. The search for truth in signs of amorous love is therefore motivated by jealousy. It 
is the intense feeling of jealously that force the apprentice to survey memories of the beloved in 
order to decipher the earliest moments of their transgressions. When is it that we should have 
known that they did not love us? Proust writes of the apprentice: “Later, confronting the lie in so 
many words or seized by an anxious doubt, I would try to remember; it was no use, my memory 
had not been forwarded in time.”47 For Deleuze, memory in its voluntary form never prompts the 
intelligence in time to search for truth in signs of love. In retrospect, voluntary memory cannot 
assist us to discern what events should be highlighted or given significance, so that we may 
uncover the truth of things past. Signs of love therefore signal time lost.  How, then, does the 
apprentice arrive at the sense of these signs if not by recollecting their truth? Deleuze argues that 
the apprenticeship to signs is unconscious, not only because we forget so that we can love (again) 
in the future, but also because signs of love encountered repeat episodes of past ones by 
introducing differences that we wrongfully attribute to the possible world of the beloved, or to our 
selection of them. Our suffering is turned into joy once it induces the intelligence to arrive at the 
general idea that the series of our loves transcend any particular one; hence, allowing us to 
recognize that our pain is not caused by the beloved.
48
 Proust writes that: “Ideas are the substitutes 
for sorrows […]. Substitutes in the order of time only, moreover, for it seems that the initial 
element is the idea, and the sorrow merely the mode according to which certain ideas first enter 
into us.”49 These general ideas are brought about by the dual nature of signs of love. They are 
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general according to Deleuze, because they are not essences of things past, but rather offer us a 
transpersonal or more impersonal overall theme of our former loves, in which the beloved is no 
longer distinguished. This sort of idea is a ‘substitute in the order of time,’ as it gives the 
apprentice temporary reprieve from sorrow, and allows him to love again by de-individualizing 
another. The idea propels us towards more encounters with signs of love. It does not retrieve time 
lost, but instead prepares us to waste time again. The sense of the signs of love, what is means to 
love in Proust’s search, is expressed in the search itself: “love unceasingly prepares its own 
disappearance, acts out its dissolution.”50  
 Although sensuous signs are not as predominant in Proust and Signs as signs of love, they 
are the most fundamental signs of apprenticeship because they “afford us a means of regaining 
time.”51 Deleuze understands such signs as precursors to signs of art. We will return to these signs 
again when exploring the constitution of the problematic field in Difference and Repetition. At 
this stage of our discussion, we simply want to point out that the apprenticeship concerning 
sensuous signs is unconscious. These signs signal a qualitative difference, for instance, a change 
in the atmosphere of a room when a friend enters. According to Deleuze, they correspond to 
countless minute perceptions and contemplations that are seldom accounted for, hence, the 
tendency to interpret banal encounters with such signs as time lost. Having said this, a sensuous 
sign can trigger the faculty of memory in its involuntary form by signalling a difference in quality 
that becomes interpreted as two simultaneous impressions; the latter sounding quite proximal to 
Plato’s signs of contrary qualities in The Republic and elsewhere. Deleuze argues that the 
differentiation of a quality signalled by a sign arises as an encounter with two impressions, 
because this sort of sign remains coupled to matter, things, or people, past and present. “Leaning 
over to unbutton his boots, [the apprentice] feels something divine [or joyous]; but tears stream 
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from his eyes, involuntary memory brings him the lacerating recollection of his dead 
grandmother.”52 Deleuze points to this example in Proust’s literature to demonstrate that the 
sensuous sign, which is tied to the boot in the present moment, forces involuntary memory to 
intervene and uncover its meaning. What the apprentice recollects with the help of involuntary 
memory is a past encounter with the same sensuous quality now associated with the death of the 
grandmother. Though the sign itself points to a common quality across the two events, it is 
associated with two different things: the boot and the grandmother. Commenting on these contrary 
qualities Deleuze writes: “Doubtless the two impressions, the present one and the past, have one 
and the same quality, but they are no less materially two.”53 Although these signs, unlike the 
others we have examined, have the power to “restore us at least at the heart of lost time,” they 
continue to refer the apprentice to two distinct times along with two dissimilar objects that 
mislead him into seeking the truth of things past in their association.
54
 At this juncture, Deleuze 
raises the question most relevant for us:  
How [do we] explain the complex mechanism of reminiscences? At first sight, it is an 
associative mechanism: on the other hand, a resemblance between a present and a past 
sensation, on the other hand, a contiguity of the past sensation with a whole that we 
experienced then and that revives under the effect of the present sensation.
55
  
 
More than this, how do we explain that an encounter with a sensuous sign recovers the past in a 
way that the apprentice has never experienced it before in reality? Why is it that we experience 
joy in reviving it? These questions signal the limitations and the potentials of sensuous signs. The 
apprentice of Proust’s search has reached an impasse. Deleuze himself must confront the first 
indicator of Platonist tendencies in Proust’s text.  
To do this, Deleuze begins by arguing that the associative mechanism, or the relation of two 
objects, cannot explain the sensuous quality that transcends their temporal distance; neither can 
association explain why something is encountered for the first time. This assertion remains true to 
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Plato’s philosophy who equally seeks to transcend empirical relations. Thereafter, however, 
Deleuze proposes a disjunction that challenges Plato’s approach to recollection. Either the 
recollection of the whole of the past sensation and the effect of the present object are identical 
(indeed, this is how Plato goes on to explain how the parts participate in the whole), or, the past 
sensation is solicited by a sign that introduces an internal difference that is neither equal to the 
whole of the past, nor the present object. The latter claim could be misinterpreted as the 
recollection of a mythical past that the apprentice has learned previously. But this would mean 
ignoring that the sign itself activates the pure past by bringing some new element to it that is 
unequal to it. To lay out this new comprehension of the past, Deleuze once again refers to 
Bergson’s virtual. He argues that the being of the past “does not represent something that has been 
[…], [it] does not have to preserve itself in anything but itself, because it is in itself.”56 On the one 
hand, involuntary memory gives us immediate access into what is, the being of the past, rather 
than involving various series of past presents linked to matter as is the case with voluntary 
memory. As we saw in the previous chapter, however, Bergson’s idea of the virtual, though 
profound according to Deleuze, does not venture to ask the question that Proust does: “But what is 
a memory that one does not recall?”57 With this question, it is not the being in itself of the past or 
memory which is emphasized by Proust, but the way in which the past is solicited by something 
other than itself. Rather than explaining the past from the perspective of the present, we have 
essentially reversed the search in order to unfold the being of the past from the perspective of the 
sign itself. It will become apparent in what follows that the sign comes from the future (as the 
lover had anticipated), just as the search is oriented towards it. How does the apprentice, however, 
arrive at this final revelation?  
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Before we proceed to the final signs of the search, we must stress that there is something 
fortuitous in learning which is explicated in greater detail by Deleuze in Difference and 
Repetition. The notion that learning has this fortuitous dimension is evident both, in the idea that 
we do not know how someone learns ahead of time, and when Deleuze claims that what has been 
learned will remain “buried in us if we do not make the necessary encounters.”58 It is only by 
making the necessary encounters that the lover of the search is apprenticed to signs of art. Signs of 
art are immaterial signs that “find their meaning in an ideal essence.”59 They yield an ideal 
essence or idea, which is the “unity of sign and meaning,” because they go one step further than 
sensuous signs, by forcing pure thought to intervene in the search.
60
 Signs of art are, therefore, 
indicators of the reversal of the search in which memory is secondary to the involuntary workings 
of thought.
61
 This reversal works when considered from either side of the aesthetic, in life tending 
towards artistic creation, and in art producing new possibilities of a life. With signs of art, Deleuze 
writes, “involuntary memory has found its spiritual equivalent, pure thought, both producing and 
produced.”62 Only the faculty of thought can recover the essence of time in its pure state at the 
limits of the being of the past. This is because time regained in fortuitous encounters with signs of 
art is the birth of time, or the beginning of a new world, that cannot be explained by the past, but 
instead explains it. It is only with signs of art that the apprentice arrives at the joyful revelation of 
how something is experienced for the first time. This final stage of the search is itself learning in 
the making, not simply the recollection of something already learned. In our discussion, it is a 
precursor to how learning will become explicated later.  
How are we to understand ideal essences, however, once time is recovered? Thus far, we 
have shown that by being in part enveloped by an object, the sign mislead the apprentice to 
decipher it in relation to something other than in the genesis of its effect. The apprentice had 
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sought the cause of the sign in matter emitting it. Worldly signs and signs of love are especially 
prone to promoting such interpretations, because they do not stimulate the faculties in time to 
intervene in the search. Even though involuntary memory is solicited in time to seek the meaning 
of sensuous signs, by pointing to an association between or among objects, the meaning of these 
signs is equally a material one. Sensuous signs, however, have much more potential than the 
others, because oftentimes the material sense of these signs is not sufficient enough to explain 
them away. This is why the apprentice continues to inquire into the sudden joy he experiences 
when encountering such signs. The only signs that do not tend towards a material meaning, or the 
search for the cause of the sign in matter itself, are signs of art. This is why Deleuze argues that in 
each of the worlds that precede signs of art, the sign and its spiritual or dematerialized meaning 
were not unified. He writes that in art, “meaning itself is identified with this development of the 
sign as the sign was identified with the involution of meaning. So that Essence is finally the third 
term that dominates the other two; that presides over their movement: essence complicates the 
sign and meaning.”63 Considered by itself, this definition of signs of art is quite enigmatic. 
However, once we understand that an essence is adequate to the repetition of difference, we begin 
to grasp how the sign itself is implicated in a transcendental field that makes the essence. We will 
soon see that thought is the faculty of essences
64
 because the differentials of the transcendental 
field are the differentials of thought; that to which thought as such is coupled or because of which 
it unfolds. The differentiation produces a dematerialized meaning that only becomes apparent with 
the development of the sign. The sign points back so as to point forward to an essential difference 
that pointed the way. The entirety of the process of unfolding and refolding the sign defines 
learning, or the idea of what it means to learn.  
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If signs of art are signs of an internalized difference, does this mean that the act of 
apprenticeship is subjective? Can the unity introduced by signs of art, including the revelation that 
the apprentice has been learning all along, be comprehended as a recollection of the whole? Does 
the unity of Proust’s search risk reintroducing Platonic essences? In accordance with Deleuze’s 
definition of learning, we have shown how apprenticeship to signs involves a corresponding 
subjective pole or vocation. Each sign has also served as an indicator of different kinds of 
metamorphosis that the apprentice undergoes in the course of the search. Despite discussing how 
the apprentice sheds certain illusions, and the way in which the four signs evoke different uses of 
the faculties, we have not been able to determine why it is that learning remains unconscious, or 
‘buried in us,’ until it is revealed by signs of art. The idea of internalized difference moves us in 
that direction. For Deleuze, essence in Proust’s text is “something like the presence of a final 
quality at the heart of a subject: an internal difference […] ‘in the way the world looks to us.’”65 
An internal difference determines the singular point of view of a subject, and this point of view 
expresses a world. In this respect, Proust’s subject is like Leibniz’s monad. For Proust, art is the 
‘final quality at the heart of a subject,’ because art gives the apprentice access to a world that 
external reality failed to deliver. But because of this internal difference or essence revealed in 
signs of art, the apprentice has access to worlds beside his own. Signs of art reveal that all beings 
weave a life, or that life itself is an artistic creation. This is essentially what is revealed once time 
is regained. Proust, hence, writes that: “Only by art can we emerge from ourselves, can we know 
what another sees of this universe that is not the same as ours […] Thanks to art, instead of seeing 
a single world, our own, we see it multiply, as many original artists as there are, so many 
worlds.”66 All sorts of worlds spring up once the apprentice learns that they find their sense in the 
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making. All of life’s learning tends towards an “unconscious destination,” which is that of art. 
“We realize that our idle life was indissociable from our work: ‘My whole life […] a vocation.”67  
Learning is continuous throughout the course of the search, even though the signs to which 
the lover of the search is apprenticed to do not form a coherent universe. The apprentice is 
unaware that he has been learning all along until the faculty of essences, that of involuntary 
thought, is awakened by signs of art. “Once they are manifested in the work of art,” Deleuze 
writes, essences “react upon all the other realms; we learn that they already incarnated, that they 
were already there in all these kinds of signs, in all the types of apprenticeship.”68 Despite 
implying a kind of ascending dialectic followed by a descending reminiscent of Plato, the notion 
that essences react upon other signs by ascribing their place in the search according to their 
effectiveness, is not most problematic.
69
 We will deal with the unity of the search in a moment. 
What remains paradoxical is that the essences of signs of art do not merely react on sensuous 
signs. They are progressively developed by apprenticeship to sensuous signs. This is why Deleuze 
argues that sensuous signs prepare us for signs of art. Time regained is itself the birth of time, but 
it equally recovers an essence that is progressively developed in past encounters. Each point of 
progressive development envelops, and is enveloped by, series of past individuations or 
viewpoints that have determined the apprentice. This is precisely why learning as recollection of 
things past, though secondary to the workings of the faculty of thought, remains significant from 
the perspective of time regained. Rather than concerning one structure of time, the act of learning 
involves different lines or fragments of time that cannot be coopted to form a cohesive whole. The 
paradoxical nature of learning instead has the potentials to further help us explain the workings of 
forgetting and memory at the heart of Deleuze’s idea of apprenticeship.  
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Are we to conclude from what has been said that viewpoints participate in the essences? 
Deleuze argues that Proust’s essences are akin to Platonic ones in that they have an “independent 
reality.”70 This independent reality, referred to Proust as the real, cannot be reduced to any 
particular viewpoint, even while the viewpoint itself envelops this essence. Deleuze writes that 
“essence does not exist outside the subject expressing it, but it is expressed as the essence not of 
the subject but of Being, or of the region of Being that is revealed to the subject.”71 Or stated 
otherwise, “it is not the subject that explains essence, rather it is essence that implicates, envelops, 
wraps itself up in the subject. […] In coiling round itself, it is essence that constitutes subjectivity. 
[…] Essence is not only individual, it individualizes.”72 The notion that essences individualize the 
subject, relates back to our discussion in the second chapter on how sense is expressed by the 
individual in the predicate form. The same idea is present in Proust and Signs where Deleuze 
argues that essences “have imprisoned themselves” in us or are our hostages, but also that in some 
way essences keep us open to what is eternal in them.
73
 Many of these notions, including, the 
movement of implication of a viewpoint, complication or development of essence, and explication 
of signs on the part of the apprentice, are themselves Neo-Platonic concepts that are given new 
grounding in Leibniz’s philosophy. In addition to this, the idea that thinking itself becomes active 
when “forced to conceive essence” in the encounter with signs, is one that remains inspired by 
Plato.
74
 What are we to make of these Platonic themes in Proust’s search for lost time? Is the unity 
of the search from the perspective of time regained identical to Plato’s recollection of the whole? 
We have delved into the distinction between Deleuze’s Proust and Plato on the problem of 
recollection. But now it is this conception of essence, and its reaction on other spheres of the 
search, that risks reintroducing the idea that learning is the recollection of the whole. The parallels 
we have raised between the two thinkers, along with the questions that ensued, must be considered 
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in relation to what Deleuze calls style. The concern raised is a question of style, or one might even 
call it a question of pedagogy, because, according to Deleuze, style itself unifies or weaves 
together the multiple fragments that compose Proust’s work of art. Style or pedagogy is just as 
relevant in Plato’s dialogues as his dialectic is itself a type of production of essences in the course 
of learning.  
In our study of the Meno we showed that Plato’s dialectic is aimed at recovering essences 
that had been previously learned by the soul. These essences, such as the form of the good, must 
be known as a whole prior to inquiry. It is only through inquiry that we understand the way in 
which the parts themselves participate in the whole. In turn, a state of bewilderment does not 
permit an inquirer to discover something new, but rather by uncovering a part, to go onto 
recovering the whole.
75
 Deleuze claims that the idea that the intelligence exists before inquiry, 
that the whole is already known, “this is the dialectical trick by which we discover what we have 
already given ourselves, by which we derive from things only what we have put there.”76 Even the 
state of bewilderment becomes ironic according to Deleuze, precisely because it is tolerated so 
long as the parts or fragments are restored to a stable essence by the intelligence itself.
77
 Isn’t the 
dialectic this attempt to harmonize the whole so that we may discern between true and false 
participants in the idea? In contrast, the act of thought which “comes after” for Proust, is not equal 
to the recollection of past events, it is itself producing. In turn, essence itself as time recovered 
does not form an organic unity; the different fragments are not unified in a whole even while they 
participate in the same Event of thought. Time as the essential weaver of the search “is not a 
whole, for the simple reason that it is itself the instance that prevents the whole.”78 It prevents the 
whole because it is an instance that opens up onto the future. Time regained is the ultimate healer, 
the greatest health, since from this perspective the apprentice no longer begrudges time wasted or 
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the wrong roads taken. He rejoices in having become an artist. Proust’s essence according to 
Deleuze is not predetermined; it instead “signifies at once the birth of a world and the original 
character of a world. It is in this sense that the work of art always constitutes and reconstitutes the 
beginning of the world, but also forms a specific world absolutely different from others.”79 The 
difference in style, Proust’s ability to put forth a kind of search in which something new is 
created, relies on his conception of time as fragmentary. “An essence,” Deleuze writes, “is always 
a birth of the world, but style is that continuous and refracted birth, […] that birth which has 
become the metamorphosis of objects. Style is not the man, style is essence itself.”80 Style 
manages to determine the essence of objects by showing them in their metamorphosis, by 
articulating the perpetual recreation of a world.  
 
 
The Idea of Learning: Sign, Question, and Surface 
 
 
 
We have set out to explore Deleuze’s theory of learning so that we may better understand 
his appeal for a new Meno in Difference and Repetition. Our discussion on the apprenticeship to 
signs has special relevancy, as it orients us within a key book of philosophy that does not 
explicitly present a systematic or exhaustive theory of learning. One might even entirely overlook 
the role of learning in Deleuze’s philosophy, since his thoughts on the subject are scattered in a 
few chapters; at places they appear arbitrary as though having little to do with the central themes 
that compose the text. Having in mind the study of Proust, however, we notice that one of the 
fundamental ideas animating the text, what Deleuze calls the “theatre of the future,” confronts the 
complex problem of learning through repetition. A more nuanced and multifaceted account of our 
latest working definition of learning as concerning differentiation is also fostered in the mentioned 
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work. Our aim in this section will be to build on two of the central arguments that Deleuze makes 
with respect to learning: learning is a temporal apprenticeship to signs, and this apprenticeship to 
signs involves the constitution of a problematic field. What we have gathered thus far is that, to 
learn is to unfold a problematic field, a surface, which inheres in the quality of a sign as that 
which allows it to be sensed
81
 to begin with. We seemed to have argued two things that appear to 
be in contradiction with one another. On one hand, the apprenticeship to signs is an unfolding of 
the field, on the other hand, the problematic field is that which allows the apprentice to sense the 
sign. The problem does not lie with the sign itself, but with the structure of time in which the sign 
is unfolded. The sign indicates that which is disguised in it as its condition, that which allows us 
to grasp it as result in the empirical. Hence the principal definition of sign in Difference and 
Repetition: “the sign is indeed an effect, but an effect with two aspects: in one of these it 
expresses, qua sign, the productive dissymmetry [of disparate orders of repetition]; in the other [in 
the actual] it tends to cancel it.”82  
The principal problem that Deleuze faces when laying out a theory of learning is how the 
repetitious encounters with a sign do not produce a repetition of the same. Or, in other words, how 
it is that beneath the “generalities of habit […] we discover singular processes of learning,” or 
“the play of singularities.”83 Deleuze does not dismiss the banal experiences of the everyday as 
time wasted. On the contrary, his claim is that underneath the stereotypical or mechanical 
repetitions that we interpret as the same, there are processes of learning that go unaccounted; in 
this sense, we have knowledge of the product or the result, but not of what we are learning. The 
first step to displacing the idea that learning involves the repetition of the same, or what might be 
understood as the acquisition of certain types of behaviours in which the representation and the 
action coincide to produce the result, is to distinguish the two types of repetition. As we saw in 
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third chapter, there is an “economic difference” between the mechanical or stereotypical repetition 
and ontological repetition. Stereotypical repetitions are generalities in which each one is made 
equivalent or resembles the others. Such repetitions essentially allow us to measure, replace, and 
exchange one thing, encounter, or term, for another. They are well captured by the scientific 
hypothesis that “given the same circumstances” x will ‘learn’ the following.84 Deleuze writes that 
in the modern category of habit we  
find the two major orders: that of resemblance, the variable conformity of the 
elements of action with a given model in so far as the habit has not been acquired; and 
that of equivalence, with the equality of the elements of action in different situations 
once the habit has been acquired.
85
  
 
On the one hand, resemblance itself points to the representation of an object in accordance with 
which an action is to be realized or perfected. Conversely, habituation, as a form of integration of 
a certain action, allows us to represent its manifestation across different instances and contexts as 
being the same.
86
 In either case, representation mediates between the desired outcome and actions. 
In contrast, to repeat in light of the ontological repetition “is to behave in a certain manner, but in 
relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent.”87 Repetition as 
something singular, a singular time with no equivalent in relation to which it could be measured, 
is in direct opposition to the idea that we learn by reproducing the same experience. With respect 
to this type of repetition, the apprentice does not “‘repeat because he has not yet learned the 
part.’”88 One does not repeat to learn, one learns in repeating differently. Any predetermined 
conceptions of what sort of learning one is engaged in are inadequate. One never simply learns 
that which they intentionally set out to grasp. Learning is an adventure with no predetermined 
destination; there is no aim to learning but learning itself. This sort of learning, Deleuze notes, 
“takes place not in the relation between a representation and an action (reproduction of the same), 
but in the relation between a sign and response (encounter with the other).”89  
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 After having distinguished the two repetitions, Deleuze goes on to reiterate the idea that 
learning is an apprenticeship to signs. The apprenticeship to signs becomes much more complex 
in Difference and Repetition, with reference to the object, with respect to its development, as well 
as the vocation that corresponds to it:  
Signs involve heterogeneity in three ways: first, in the object which bears or emits 
them, and is necessarily on a different level, as though there were two orders of sizes 
or disparate realities between which the sign flashes; secondly, in themselves, since a 
sign envelops another ‘object’ within the limits of the object which bears it, and 
incarnates a natural or spiritual power (an Idea); finally, in the response they elicit, 
since the movement of the response does not ‘resemble’ that of the sign.90  
 
The principal aspect of a sign is that it is produced as an effect when there is a difference sensed 
in the repetition of an encounter. The sign introduces a dissymmetry between the past events with 
respect to the encounter with an object. But signs do much more than point to the object in its 
materiality, indeed, they are the effects of an encounter that for Deleuze split the present in two 
directions. In other words, the sign seems to allow us to leap away from the present and to install 
ourselves in the past so as to unfold it. The sign, then, is paradoxically both the sign of an actual 
object, and that which constitutes the encounter with another to begin with.  
 Plato conceives of this difference as a qualitative contrariety or an opposition that forces us 
to unfold the sign. According to Deleuze, however, in grasping the sensible in terms of qualitative 
opposition, Plato reduces the being of the sensible to a sensible being, to the empirical. “In 
defining the first instance by that form of qualitative opposition or contrariety,” he asks, “does not 
Plato already confuse the being of the sensible with a simple sensible being, with a pure 
qualitative being?”91 The whole notion of contrariety is important to grasping how two 
conceptions of apprenticeship to signs diverge. Deleuze’s argument is that qualitative contrariety 
merely captures the empirical result of the difference, but not the difference in itself. It is therefore 
somewhat inadequate to say that there is a difference between the actual and the virtual, since it is 
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the differentiation that makes the difference or produces the effect which is unfolded. Secondly, 
Deleuze reiterates that a sign envelops another ‘object’ that incarnates a spiritual (dematerialized) 
power. By this he means the sign points to a repetitive field in which it is unfolded. The clearest 
example he provides of this repetitious encounter with signs is how one learns how to swim:  
When a body combines some of its distinctive points with those of a wave, it espouses 
the principle of a repetition which is no longer that of the same, but involves the 
other—involves difference, form one wave and one gesture to another, and carries that 
difference through the repetitive space thereby constituted.  
 
He goes on to conclude that: “To learn is indeed to constitute this space of an encounter with 
signs, in which the distinctive points renew themselves in each other, and repetition takes shape 
while disguising itself.”92 Deleuze’s argument is that each encounter with a sign constitutes a 
repetitive field, in which the past events are renewed or differentiated. The sign splitting the 
present in two directions at once, involves the tracing of the past and the production of the novel, 
the perpetual constitution and displacement of this repetitive field, with each encounter. The 
notion that repetition disguises itself in each encounter with a sign is fundamental to this theory of 
learning. The disguising of the repetition of the field, in the repetitious actions of the individual, in 
part, prevents the individual from having an adequate idea of the learning. In other words, 
forgetting is part and parcel of learning. What we have an indication of is the learned, not the 
process itself which inheres in it as that which constitutes it.  
 While the encounter with a sign is always an encounter with the other or the different, it 
bears repeating that such signs are encountered in our relations with beings in the world, in the 
making of such relations. As discussed in previous chapters, Deleuze is seeking to understand 
effects as affections that are produced by the mixtures of bodies. It is as though the effect of the 
relations of bodies cannot be contained in the present, or is nowhere found in the living present 
which is an embodied one. Effects are actualized or expressed by bodies, or what bodies express 
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are such effects, but the effect itself flees the present.
93
 Now, the deciphering of a sign in the 
encounter is not the acquisition of knowledge about this or that thing, but the way in which the 
relation as such is made or renewed. Learning is essentially the making of a life, the creation of a 
relation, within which one becomes what one is. The repetitious nature of the encounters with 
another, capture the differentiations of such a relation; how we continuously become another or 
ourselves, while the other becomes different in the same movement. To the encounter with a sign, 
there corresponds the essential question, the openness of the question, with respect to which this 
repetitive field unfolds, with respect to which the surface of sense is thought as thought arises with 
respect to this unfolding. The question is, for Deleuze, precisely the point of chance, the opening 
for the affirmation of the differentiation of a relation. It seeks after that which grounds the 
differential relation. As with Heidegger, Deleuze makes the question be the central point with 
respect to which the instance of learning unfolds. In the Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger 
argues that “being able to learn presupposed being able to question.”94 But what does it mean to 
question? For Heidegger questioning puts beings into question. The inquiry “why are there beings 
at all instead of nothing?” gets at the ground of beings: “Where and what is their ground?”95 This 
initial question allows him to do a turn around, so as to claim that the question does not in any 
sense involve the nothing. Worse than this, the nothing makes the possibility of their not-Being. 
“Nothing is simply nothing. Questioning has nothing more to seek here. Above all, by bringing up 
Nothing we do not gain the slightest thing for the knowledge of beings.”96 We have brought up 
Heidegger’s mode of questioning, not because it is the same as Deleuze’s, but because it gets at 
something that has importance in the theory of learning. What the questioning seeks after is the 
ground of beings, not the nothing. One can never uncover anything by inquiring after this nothing. 
Instead, to the questioning, in a blind and unconsciousness way, there corresponds the grounding 
235 
 
of beings. This questioning concerns learning, because the ground, the surface, defines that which 
we are appropriated to it in learning; whatever we are concerned with in our everyday encounters. 
In other words, the questioning addresses itself to that which is most proximal, yet distant, in the 
relation of beings.  
 The idea that questioning seeks after the ground of beings is not foreign to Deleuze’s 
questioning instance, since in his philosophy questioning has a “problematizing and searching 
force.”97 According to Deleuze, the repetitious field of encounters with signs originates with the 
question, the chance or aleatory point. The questioning instance, conceived of as (non) or ?-being, 
infuses the indetermination in the genesis of the combinatory of problems.
98
 In turn, the genesis of 
problems finds its origin in the question, since the always open question ‘announces an 
ungrounding’ that sets off the movement of apprenticeship. The question is itself the primary 
point of suspension (an unfolding of the problem or the crack of thought) that corresponds to a 
difference of intensity, or alternatively, an inequality between two disparate realities; the ground 
and the ungrounding is that which makes the difference that forces us to unfold the sign. We have 
formulated the question as a kind of suspension, a meanwhile, because, for Deleuze, “everything 
has its beginning in a question, but one cannot say that the question itself begins.”99 What is 
paradoxical about the question itself is that it is simultaneously the limit point and the beginning 
point of any determination as such.
100
 The repetition of the question, the always renewed state of 
questioning, entails the continued displacement of origin, or the absence of any origin. The 
question, therefore, cannot be said to begin as the “imperatives which it exercises have no other 
origin than repetition.”101 In Deleuze’s philosophy, everything hinges on the placement and 
displacement of the ground with the eternal return of differentiation, the point of the question 
which gives way to repetition. In what way does the questioning instance install the thinker in the 
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empty form of time? Or in what sense is it the unfolding of thought as such? Through our study of 
Proust and Signs, it has become clearer that the sign functions between different levels; that it 
causes the internal differentiation of problems when acting as a signal, and that such a 
“problematic structure is part of objects themselves, allowing them to be grasped as signs, just as 
the questioning or problematizing instance is a part of knowledge allowing its positivity and its 
specificity to be grasped in the act of learning.”102 Deleuze argues that the unfolding of this 
problematic structure, the virtual part of the object, is an unconscious process. For him, questions 
and problems “belong to the unconscious, as a result [of which], the unconscious is differential 
and iterative by nature.”103 This iterative nature of the unconscious is demonstrated by Deleuze 
with the impersonal game of the dice-throw. The game is meant to show that every encounter with 
a sign entails an affirmation of chance that raises the ground all the while transforming it. It is 
appropriate to refer to a game or the play of dice when depicting the apprenticeship of the 
unconscious, since there is something fortuitous in the questioning instance that seeks after the 
ground.
104
 The process of learning is “something total every time, where the whole of chance is 
affirmed in each case, renewed every time, perhaps without any subsistent arbitrariness.”105 While 
learning is itself a progressive determination of the ground, the search itself, the installment of the 
ground from the perspective of the question, is something total every time, something singular.
106
 
The each time in light of the question, is singular precisely because the question presents the point 
of the fracturing of the subject; the difference of ground with respect to the ungrounding that we 
never do away with as such.
107
 The question being the point of chance from which the dice are 
thrown, is also the crack of thought, the zero point of thought, from the point of view of which the 
surface or field is itself constituted. The question from the perspective of which the repetitive field 
of the game is constituted presents “the primary intensity which marks the zero point of thought’s 
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energy, but also from which thought invests its new surface.”108 In other words, for Deleuze, 
thinking itself emerges with this crack, fissure, or fracturing, intimate to the emission of 
singularities that constitute a repetitive field. In the “Tenth Series of The Ideal Game” in The 
Logic of Sense Deleuze writes that:  
The ideal game of which we speak cannot be played by either man or God. It can only 
be thought as nonsense. But precisely for this reason, it is the reality of thought itself 
and the unconscious of pure thought. […] Each thought emits a distribution of 
singularities. All of the thoughts communicate in one long thought.
109
  
 
Here we have returned to our inquiry in the second chapter which is how Deleuze conceives of the 
relationship of events and thought. More will be said on thought bellow. Here, we want to note 
that for Deleuze the differentials that constitute the surface or field are also the differentials of 
thought, with ideas arising with the crack of thought.   
 We can now turn to the argument that apprenticeship to signs constitutes a problematic field 
or an Idea.
110
 Since signs “cause problems,” in exploring the way in which learning constitutes a 
problematic field, we are again outlining the “double aspect of the quality of the sign”: its 
implication in problems, and its explication in solutions.
111
 By arguing that the act of learning is a 
laying out of the ground that conditions how one learns, we are pointing towards the central 
paradox of the problematic field itself. In the first place, the constitution of the problematic field, 
along with the two moments of the determination of the Idea, refers to two complementary 
processes in the theory of learning. Deleuze argues that: “The paradoxical functioning of the 
faculties—including, in the first instance, sensibility with respect to signs—thus refers to the Ideas 
which run throughout all the faculties and awakens them each in turn.” Moreover, he notes that: 
“the exploration of Ideas, and the elevation of each faculty to its transcendental exercise, amounts 
to the same thing. These are two aspects of an essential apprenticeship or process of learning.”112 
He reiterates and clarifies this conception of learning, when noting that: “learning may be defined 
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in two complementary ways, both of which are opposed to representation in knowledge: learning 
is either a matter of penetrating the Idea, its varieties and distinctive points, or a matter of raising a 
faculty to its disjointed transcendent exercise.”113 What sort of relevance do these two aspects 
have in the theory of learning? Are they merely two different ways of talking about learning, or 
does the change of perspective matter? By taking up the Idea, we want to show how a life is 
constituted in the process of learning, how an infinitive is determined in learning, and how the 
progressive determination of the Idea gives way to points of view, or individuations, indicative of 
what is learned. The paradox of learning arises in light of the learning and having learned, what 
we earlier tackled with respect to Plato’s Meno as the problem knowledge; that of knowing and 
being on the way to knowledge.  
 Deleuze’s chapter on “Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference,” in which he lays out the Idea 
through differential calculus, composes some of the most difficult pages of the text. Deleuze 
stresses, however, that mathematics are one way of formulating problems or rather, a solution to a 
problem. The problem itself need not be mathematical. This distinction between the problem-
instance and solution-instance of Ideas is drawn from the work of Albert Lautman. Thus far, we 
have discussed how the structure of the problematic field is generated with the emission of 
singularities, which are themselves related to, or surrounded by, ordinary points in the progressive 
determination of the Idea. In doing this, we placed emphasis on the problematic field in The Logic 
of Sense. Now, we will expand on Deleuze notion of the problematic field by specifically looking 
at what he means by the different dimensions of Ideas. As a way to place into perspective what we 
are concerned with here, let us revisit the example of swimming. Deleuze argues that: “to learn to 
swim is to conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective 
Idea in order to form a problematic field.”114 Or, stated slightly differently, “to learn is to enter 
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into […] the relations which constitute the Idea, and into their corresponding singularities.”115 The 
initial problematic of learning is that differential elements, which are considered ordinary in the 
progressive determination of the Idea and give way to real relations, are also the elements that 
compose singularities, effects or events that transform the entirety of the transcendental field. 
Since we have shown how this field or surface of bound effects is generated elsewhere, here, we 
would like to pose a problem that is central in the theory of learning; a problem that such a theory 
shares with the philosophy of event. The question that is most difficult to answer when exploring 
how ‘someone learns’ is the following: “how is a relation transformed into being, and being 
transformed into relation?”116 Deleuze asks a similar question in The Fold: “how could the 
relation jump out of the non-relation [singularities]?”117 How are we to grasp the divergent 
dimensions that configure an Idea-problem, that of the differential relations of elements, and their 
corresponding field of singularities (the being of the problematic constituted by differential 
relations)?118 Let’s begin with how an Idea is constituted. Deleuze writes that an idea is  
a multiplicity constituted by differential elements, differential relations between those 
elements, and singularities corresponding to those relations. These three dimensions, 
relations and singularities, constitute the three aspects of multiple reason: 
determinability or the principle of quantitability, reciprocal and principle of 
qualitability, and complete determination or the principle of potentiality. A singularity 
is the point of departure for a series which extends over all the ordinary points of the 
system, as far as the region of another singularity which itself gives rise to another 
series which may converge or diverge from the first. Singular and regular, distinctive 
and ordinary have for philosophy of ontology and epistemological importance much 
greater than those of truth and false in representation: for what is called sense depends 
upon the distinction and distribution of these shining points in the structure of a given 
Idea. It is therefore a play of reciprocal determination from the point of view of its 
relations, and of complete determination from the point of view of singularities, which 
makes an Idea in itself progressively determinable.
119
  
 
All of the aspects that define the virtual structure of an Idea must be severed from actuality, or 
considered separately from that which exists. Deleuze expresses the multiplicities of the Idea with 
the deceptively simple equation, dx/dy. According to him, the object x or y, is actually 
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undetermined, while being completely determined in the Idea. In other words, the “object” of the 
virtual, what we have referred to as a complex theme of sense, is the objective dimension of real 
relations that is at each point completely determined, while the object itself and such real relations 
remain undetermined or undifferenciated.
120
The problematic field is not initiated by the common 
quality that two ordinary elements share (the identical d, or the One), but by a singular instance 
that emerges in the differential relation of the elements dx and dy; as though pointing to a third 
element that differentiates them (dx/dy). In other words, “the elements [dx, dy] reciprocally 
determined by these relations, [are] elements which cannot change unless the multiplicity 
changes.”121 In addition to this, dy and dx do not exist independently of the structure in which 
they are developed, they are “perfectly determinable” in relation to the each other.122 Deleuze 
writes that “for this reason a principle of determinability corresponds to the undetermined as 
such.”123 We have referred to this point as the point of change from the perspective of the 
question. The multiplicity of the Idea itself changes with the introduction of a disparity or 
potential in the system that emits each singularity. Each event itself arises by uniting difference to 
difference in the entirety of the problematic field. It is defined by ideal connections of differential 
relations that determine a remarkable point in line with the difference in intensity introduced into 
a system. The entire system participates in the constitution of the singular points. We can also say 
the initial disparity introduced in the repetition of the past makes them be the events of repetition. 
What is repeated in the differential relation is the question.  
 The problem of the relation of differential elements is elaborated on by Deleuze in 
Negotiations. While in Difference and Repetition, as in Proust and Signs, he talks about learning 
and apprenticeship, in his other works they are replaced by the concept of becoming. In 
Negotiations, he gives the example of the mutual relation of the wasp and the orchid to 
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demonstrate what he calls a bloc of becoming or a singular becoming. He writes that “the orchid 
seems to form a wasp image, but in fact there is a wasp-becoming of the orchid, an orchid-
becoming of the wasp, a double capture since ‘what’ each becomes changes no less than ‘that 
which’ becomes. [It is] one and the same becoming, a single bloc of becoming,” but an 
asymmetrical evolution of the two.
124
 The bloc of becoming, what we have been referring to as 
the line of events, is not something that is common to both beings, although it consists of events 
that are co-created in-between as effects without being reducible to either one. The bloc of 
becoming forms what is considered by Deleuze to be a life that is “between the two [or] outside of 
the two.”125 The second kind of becoming, the one referring to the wasp-becoming of the orchid, 
or the orchid-becoming of the wasp, although reciprocal, is an asymmetrical form of becoming. 
The two beings do not individuate the bloc of becoming in the same way, but each individuates 
insofar as there is a differentiation in the bloc of becoming itself. We will say more about 
individuation below. For now, we want to further elaborate on the two determinations of the Idea. 
The differential relation of elements has a different function depending on the dimension in which 
it is considered. To elaborate, the transformation of a relation into being and being into relation 
correspond to a doubled determination. Deleuze notes that the Idea “appears as a multiplicity 
which must be traversed in two directions, from the point of view of the variations of differential 
relations, and from the point of view of distribution of singularities which correspond to certain 
values of these relations.”126 We have already seen how the game of dice-throws refers to a 
principle of complete determination, and that such a principle of complete determination is linked 
to the “power of difference, or the unequal in itself” which introduces the potentiality.127 But we 
also referred to this inequality as an undetermined, which permits there to be any sort of 
determination by transforming the multiplicity of the Idea. Deleuze argues that “the differential is 
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‘an ideal difference’ without which […] undetermined quantity could not carry out the 
determination expected of it. In this sense, the differential is indeed pure power, just as the 
differential relation is a pure element of potentiality” as the third element of a relation.128  
 The internal resonance of singular points is attributed to an intensive quantity, which 
essentially distributes the field of the problem by determining the values of singularities. Each 
singularity is itself a differential marking a differential relation, the potentiality of which is 
measured in the development of sub-series, or the elements of a relation. The transformation of 
the relation of ideal elements points us towards the other sort of determination, which is reciprocal 
inclusion, or an exchange of determination. From the point of view of reciprocal determination, 
singularities are themselves converging points of a changed relation. The difference between 
complete and reciprocal determination, is that the latter deals with the different degrees of 
differential relations (“diverse forms”), the way in which the relation changes, while the former 
deals with “the values of a relation,” or the distribution of the series of past events (“composition 
of a form”).129 We already referred to the reciprocal determination of genetic elements when we 
noted that they are only determinable in relation to each other.
130
 Reciprocal determination can, 
therefore, be circular if considered from the perspective of the elements that envelop singularities, 
and develop these qualitatively.
131
 While both, reciprocal and complete determination condition 
the Idea, the way in which the Idea is expressed or explored depends on how we proceed, and 
from what perspective we understand it. Reciprocal determination demonstrates that the sub-series 
of the Idea, what we refer to the adjunct fields of problems, have a “dependence upon singular 
points,” while complete determination, at the same time, allows us to “pass from one part of the 
object where the function is represented by a series to another where it is expressed in a different 
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series;” meaning that we move from one singularity to the neighbourhood of another, by tracing 
the progressive development of the Idea.
132
 Deleuze argues that  
the completeness of the determination also implies the progressivity of adjunct fields. 
In going from A to B and then B to A, we do not arrive back at the point of departure 
as in a bare repetition; rather, the repetition between A and B and B and A is like 
progressive tour or description of the whole of the problematic field.
133
  
 
Progressive determination likewise refers to reciprocal determination, since in the forced 
movement through which the problematic field arises, also involves the “varitable progression in 
which the reciprocal terms must be secured step by step, and the relations themselves established 
between them.”134 Reciprocal and complete determination, which according to Deleuze form the 
sufficient reason behind all qualitative diversity, are synthesized in the progressive development 
of the Idea. Progressive determination, he writes, “unites in the same continuous movement the 
process of reciprocal determination and complete determination […] It constitutes the total figure 
of sufficient reason into which it introduces time.”135 The potential of complete determination is, 
according to Deleuze, “measured” or further determined by what he refers to as solution curves; 
the adjunct fields of problems. Progressive determination, therefore, serves to demonstrate the 
way in which an Idea is dis-continuously incarnated in qualities and real relations.
136
 In other 
words, it is not the problem that is discontinuous, but the solutions that are discontinuous or 
discrete. Potentiality prepares a process of solvability in divergent fields “which correspond to—
without resembling—a virtual multiplicity.”137 These divergent fields, or what we understand as 
divergent time of progressive determination, are essential to grasping how the process of learning 
leads to individuation; how learning relates to the learned. 
 We previously discussed this process of individuation as a point of view in the Leibnizian 
sense. The same theme was also discussed in the second chapter where we explored with respect 
to the static ontological genesis. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze relies on Gilbert 
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Simondon’s concept of individuation to lay out the explication of the field.138 To grasp what the 
role of individuation is in the development of solutions, we have to return to intensive quantities, 
since quantities, according to Deleuze, dramatize the Idea (prepare it to be actualized). We must 
keep in mind that individuation does not presume the existence of an individual. It is, instead, 
meant to trace the process by way of which quantity, the affection on the self or becoming 
affected, is itself explicated in actual things. Since quantity is implicated in itself, and distributes 
the potentials of pre-individual singularities, in the process of individuation, intensive quantity 
must become subdivided, and must alter in some way. This is why Deleuze refers to secondary 
intensities when referring to individuation. The complexity of individuation lies in that it remains 
implicated in singularities which are completely determined or crystalize once the process of 
explication begins, and it is also folded in qualities, or what we understand with regard to the 
theory of learning as the sufficient reason behind sensibilities, traits, and characteristics. These 
sensibilities, traits, and characteristics are merely the products of individuation, or what we have 
been learning or learned. Learning entails the constitution of a problematic field, and the 
metamorphosis of the self, or the absence of the self in the process of individuation. The process 
of individuation which measures the potentiality of the virtual is explicated in qualities which 
“belong” to the self. Qualities can be thought to belong to the self, insofar as the explication of 
intensities disguises the very transformation of the self, in which essentially nothing is possessed 
by the subject or individual.
139
 What is disguised in qualities, understood as responses to a 
problem, is the “other aspect” of individuation, its implication in singularities. This is why 
learning is reduced to mere habituation in the sense of the repetition of the same, when it is the 
repetition of the same that must be explained from the perspective of learning. By looking at the 
twofold process of learning, we see that what is learned is a sensibility, or a way of being, even 
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while learning itself always displaces the stability of any subject position by emerging with an 
essential differentiation. In turn, what is learned, the solutions to a problem, shape our occasions 
for learning, the sort of signs we become sensitive to, and to what extent we are capable of 
exercising the power of our faculties. We mean this in the Spinozist sense that the more a body 
experiences active affections and is affected in a variety of ways, the greater its capacity to 
individuate, to think, to learn, to grasp its power of action.  
 
A Note on How to Play 
  
 
 The entirety of the process of learning is encapsulated by Deleuze in the playing of the dice 
game. This dice game is not played by the subject as such, but instead opens up the space for the 
highest affirmation. The question that initiates the game is the hinge, “the form of empty time, the 
Aion through which pass the throws of dice.”140 The chance point brings the future to beings, in 
turn, beings must respond in such a ways as to affirm the future, to say yes to the future. Deleuze 
tells us that: “If man does not know how to play: this is because, even when he is given a situation 
of chance or multiplicity, he understands affirmation as destined to impose limits upon it.”141 The 
human way of playing the game is to impose limits on it; to tie the flow of time in which the 
greatest freedom of the future is affirmed, to predictable or predetermined ways of existing and 
experiencing life. A pure idea of play, instead, involves “a game which would be nothing else but 
play instead of being fragmented, limited and intercut with the work of man.”142 According to 
Deleuze, what approximates this pure idea of play, or mirrors it from its other side, is the work of 
art, the way in which artists proceed in making art. In this respect, he follows a long tradition in 
which the idea of play is furthered. Heraclitus’ Fragments, Schiller’s Aesthetic Education of Man, 
Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo, and Fink’s “Oasis of Happiness: Towards an Ontology of Play”, are but 
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few works that have carried this tradition along. In his paper on the ontology of play, Fink, 
following the lead from Heraclitus, has the correct intuition when writing that “play is, as it were, 
existence centered in itself. […] Unlike other activities, play does not fit into this style of life. It 
consists conspicuously with the future mode of being, and it cannot easily be fitted into the 
complex structure of goals. Play is not for the sake of a ‘final goal’” or telos.143 This does not 
mean, however, that play is a purposeless activity. On the contrary, Fink argues that it in being a 
creative act, play has a special relationship with the flow of time as it places no restrictions on it. 
Because it places no limits on the flow of time, it is the sort of activity that has an internal 
purpose, a self-sufficient meaning, which is the freedom to create. Such an interpretation of play 
is, of course, taken from Schiller, who claims in the Aesthetic Education of Man that the object of 
play is to create a living form, or what is also referred to as beauty. He writes that  
by beauty, the sensuous man is led to form and to thought; by beauty the spiritual man 
is brought back to matter and restored to the world of sense. From this statement it 
would appear to follow that between matter and form, between passivity and activity, 
there must be a middle state, and that beauty plants us in this state.
144
  
 
It is beauty, the creation of the living form in play, that human beings exchange this passivity for 
activity; the passive existence for an active one in which their freedom is affirmed. In other words, 
it is the aesthetic life that restores the greatest freedom. We are not saying that Deleuze’s 
philosophy agrees with Schiller’s on every point, but only that they share a certain tendency. This 
tendency is evident in Deleuze’s dice game, the game that the Aion plays with itself, which makes 
the form only to see it lost to the abyss; the formlessness which insists in the form, returns as the 
unformed which allows us to play the game again anew. Here, the repetitions are that activity that 
produces the beautiful, the aesthetic life, or life as art. In the pure idea of play, the making of a life 
is the continuous structuring and destroying of a form without melancholy. This is tragic joy.   
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Event of Thought 
 
A singular act of learning happens in an instant.  
But this instant can be the longest pause puzzling thought.  
 
 
In the first chapter, we laid out the central problematic guiding this dissertation work, the 
two pathways of articulation which are engendered with respect to the paradoxical instance of the 
eternal return. In line with Deleuze’s central thesis in The Logic of Sense that sense moves in two 
directions simultaneously, we have shown that the event is the expressed of the expression, at the 
same time that it is inexhaustible in the actual, always taking flight in the other direction. Since 
part of the event is non-actualisable, in the third chapter, we asked if it is something livable; if we 
can enter the region of the becoming of things by the thread of time. When we laid out our central 
problematic, we suggested that this is indeed the case from the point of the paradoxical instance. 
Not only can the non-actualisable part of the event be thought, but it is that which addresses itself 
to thought as such. If learning involves the constitution of a problematic field, this is always from 
the point of view of the paradoxical instance which, by fracturing the ‘I’, engenders thinking; a 
thinking that arises with differentiation, but is also one long thought as the differential of thought 
in the Idea. The paradoxical instance, which primarily presents itself as the encounter with a sign 
to which questioning corresponds, introduces the unequal in thought, the unfolding of thought, 
because of which thinking itself arises. It is, then, appropriate that we approach thinking through 
learning, since learning transforms thinking from being a mere possibility, to being something 
concrete. Just as we do not know how someone learns in advance, what sorts of encounters with 
signs weave a unique or singular art of living, thinking itself does not arise in conformity with a 
pre-established model. As Deleuze puts it, learning entails “thought which is born in thought, the 
act of thinking which is neither given by innateness nor presupposed by reminiscence but 
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engendered in its genitality [in short, its genesis], [it] is a thought without image. But what is such 
a thought, and how does it operate in the world?”145  
In “The Image of Thought” and elsewhere, Deleuze quotes Heidegger so as to argue that the 
act of thinking does not resemble its possibility alone, neither do we think because it is possible to 
do so: “man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone, 
however, is no guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking.”146 The notion that we are not yet 
thinking, and that thinking is not reducible to possibility, is meant to reinforce the idea that the act 
of thinking is engendered in thought, rather than being something summoned at will. What is 
called thinking does not reflect a recognizable image of thought with respect to which its 
correctness could be verified. As Sartre has shown us, if recognition on the part of the ego were 
somehow implied in the act of thinking, it would bring it to a halt, severing thinking from the 
transcendental field in which it unfolds. If anything, acts of recognition hinder the act of thinking. 
In this respect, images of thought that imply its possibility can likewise be its impediment. So then 
how is that we become capable of thinking? While the approaches of the two are distinct, we 
would like to briefly lay out what Heidegger means by thinking, so as to demonstrate how 
Deleuze resolves the same problematic. In his introduction to What is Called Thinking?, Glen 
Gray sums up Heidegger’s position with the following:  
For Heidegger thinking is a response on our part to a call which issues from the nature 
of things, from Being itself. To be able to think does not wholly depend on our will 
and wish, though much does depend on whether we prepare ourselves to hear the call 
to think [...]. Thinking is determined by that which is to be thought as well as by him 
who thinks.
147
  
 
There is a tension running throughout Heidegger’s text on thinking. On the one hand, he argues 
that we are not yet thinking, because that which is to be thought “has turned away from us,” or it 
has withdrawn from us in being constituted. This argument is meant to preserve the notion that 
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thinking is not simply accessible to us whenever we set out to think. Heidegger also, however, 
proposes that there is a kind of reciprocity between thinking, and the call which emerges in our 
relatedness to beings. “Insofar as we are at all,” he notes “we are already in relatedness to what 
gives food for thought.”148 Indeed, for Heidegger, what calls for thinking is that which is most 
thought-provoking (whatever we are concerned with), and it is thought-provoking precisely 
because it is that which is most proximal to us yet distant, as that which is concealed. He writes 
that, what gives us food for thought “wants itself to be thought about according to its nature […]. 
[It] demands for itself that it be tended, cared for, husbanded in its own essential nature, by 
thought.”149 Heidegger conceives of that which is thought-provoking as a gift, to which we, in 
turn, give thanks or thinking. How do we give thanks by thinking? Thinking itself is considered a 
gift by Heidegger, because it is in thinking that our essential nature is itself manifested: “original 
thinking is the thanks owed for being.”150 By considering that which is thought-provoking as gift, 
he is not arguing that by thinking we can appropriate whatever spurs us to think; this would not be 
giving thanks for being, but a violation of it. Rather, it is that with which we are concerned with 
that “appropriates us to thought.”151 The call remains a kind of imperative to which thinking 
responds by being devoted to that which is thought-provoking in its problematic being.
152
 For 
Heidegger, we are devoted to that which gives food for thought by committing it to memory; by 
both saving it from perishing and recalling it. What does memory have to do with thinking? In the 
opening pages of the same text he writes that:  
Memory is the gathering of thought. Thought of what? Though of what holds us, in 
that we give it thought precisely because It remains what must be thought about. 
Thought has the gift of thinking back, a gift given because we incline toward it. Only 
when we are so inclined toward what in itself is to be thought about, only then are we 
capable of thinking. In order to be capable of thinking, we need to learn it first. What 
is learning? Man learns when he disposes everything he does so that it answers to 
whatever essentials are addressed to him at any given moment. We learn to think by 
giving our mind to what there is to think about.
153
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There are two central ideas that stem from the argument that memory is the gathering of 
thought. The two explain the tension that we outlined earlier. In the first place, memory as the 
keeping of that which essentially is, and, therefore, remains to be thought about, is intimately tied 
to concealment and forgetting. On the other hand, if memory is the gathering of thought, along 
with that which remains to be thought in what is recalled, then, thinking is, for Heidegger, the 
unfolding of memory.
154
 It is a kind of recollection, a thinking back. In the first place, we become 
capable of thinking by learning. Learning, what we shall refer to with reference to Heidegger as 
being on the way to thinking, is the development of a sense of responsiveness, or becoming 
attuned, to the “presence of that which is present.”155 It is by becoming disposed to the call of 
being in every instance, the presence of our essential relatedness to beings, that we are directed to 
recollect that which is committed to memory. This answer must be disappointing, since Heidegger 
does not tell us exactly how to learn. In inquiring, we return to the previous point, which is that 
we learn in every moment that we heed the call of that which gives us food for thought. This sort 
of approach is consistent with the argument that thinking cannot be taught, it does not consist of 
putting something into the soul, everyone must “learn to do it for” themselves.156  Does this mean 
that thinking is a remembering? The idea of thinking that is put forth by Heidegger and advanced 
by Deleuze is one in which thinking itself plays a creative or inventive role, meaning that thinking 
aligned with learning no longer gives us an image of thought in which the object is merely 
represented.
157
 The act of thinking does not address itself to an already constituted being. Both the 
subject and the object lose their identity in the act of learning. In his later works, Heidegger will 
refer to this turning towards that which, by gathering itself in memory, gives way to thought, as 
the event of appropriation. The event of appropriation, that which addresses itself to thought as a 
living problem, gives way to meaning.
158
 In addition to the notion that thinking is the gathering of 
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memory, or the “the ground of meaning,” Heidegger will argue that Dasein “finds itself already 
claimed by an inherited meaning and then […] responds creatively to this inheritance.”159 The two 
moments of thought, thought as the gathering of memory and its inventiveness, find their place in 
Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze, however, does not conceive of thinking as a gift, since for him the 
event of thought is a violent occurrence. According to him, we become capable thinking in an 
encounter with a sign that violates the harmonious workings of the faculties. 
If the act of thinking emerges in the encounter with a sign, hasn’t Plato already posited an 
accurate presentation of it? For Deleuze, Plato is the exception and the founder of the orthodox 
image of thought. He is the exception because in Plato’s philosophy  
learning is truly the transcendental movement of the soul, irreducible to knowledge as 
to non-knowledge. It is from ‘learning’ and not from knowledge, that the 
transcendental conditions of thought must be drawn. This is why Plato determines the 
conditions in the form of reminiscence not innateness.
160
  
 
If Plato does posit a form of learning that involves the transcendental movement of the soul, 
without reducing it to the empirical, to the division of non-knowledge and knowledge which 
remained problematic in the Meno, why does Deleuze reject his image of thought? The answer 
lies in the movement of the soul. As we have already discussed, not only does Plato posit a 
dogmatic image of thought when he makes the movement of the soul “disappear with the result,” 
but the act of learning, for Deleuze, does not primarily consist of the movement of the soul. 
Rather, it involves the introduction of time in thought.161 The introduction of time in thought keeps 
open the inventive aspect of thinking. This is why Deleuze argues that a new Meno would involve 
a transcendental structure in the ‘form of an empty time in general,’ and not reminiscence of 
things past. If thinking were simply a remembering of things past we would never manage to think 
anything. Thinking instead addresses itself to the new. “What forces does this new bring to bear 
upon thought, from what bad nature or ill will does it spring, from what central ungrounding 
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which strips thought of its innateness and treats it every time as something which has not always 
existed, but begins, forces and under constraint?”162 For Deleuze, it is an encounter with the other 
or sign that generates the act of thought.  
Wherever the occasion for thinking presents itself as a chance encounter with a sign, 
thinking is no longer a mere possibility. Deleuze says: “Do not count upon thought to ensure the 
relative necessity of what it thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an encounter with that 
which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a 
passion to think.”163 It is a chance encounter with a sign, in this case, a signal of a difference in 
intensity that corresponds to a question, that the search itself is set off. As discussed previously, 
by search, we mean that the sign perplexes the apprentice, forcing him or her to unfold the 
problematic field. The search corresponds to an order according to which the transcendental use of 
the faculties becomes triggered. Although there is an order and communication amongst the 
faculties at their limits, the movement of one to the other is thought of as discordant by Deleuze. 
He argues that the “discord of the faculties, chain of forces and fuse along which each confronts 
its limit, receiving from (or communicating to) the other only a violence which brings it face to 
face with its own element, as though with its disappearance or its perfection.”164 Rather than 
“converging and contributing to a common project,” the faculties emerge only to be exhausted in 
their own element or the nature that belongs to it alone.
165
 Each faculty reaches this state of 
exhaustion, or is born in dissolving which is its perfection, because each one emerges already 
repeating something new implicated in the problematic field. Each dice throw implies the 
complete determination of the field itself, meaning that there is nothing else supplementing it. The 
potential generated in the field is that which propels the workings of the faculties to their limits. It 
is the dissolution of each that enables the others to emerge. The fundamental encounter in which 
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the transcendental faculties are awakened, “condenses all singularities, precipitate all the 
circumstances, points of fusion, congelation or condensation in a sublime occasion, Kairos, which 
makes the solution explode like something abrupt […] this is having an Idea as well.”166  
According to Deleuze, a chance encounter with a sign demonstrates the involuntary 
workings of the faculty of thought, the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself, where 
nothing outside of the field of its unfolding is presupposed.
167
 The object of encounter is distinct 
from the object of recognition in that its object is the being of the sensible, an affection, that is not 
a quality, but the reason behind any quality as such.  
In this sense it is opposed to recognition. In recognition, the sensible is not at all that 
which can only be sensed, but that which bears directly upon the senses in an object 
which can be recalled, imagined or conceived. […] The object of encounter, on the 
other hand, gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense.
168
  
 
As noted, Deleuze argues that this affective tone is not a quality or a sensible being which would 
reduce it to an object of recognition. Rather, it is the being of the sensible, the difference in 
intensity, that produces the sign. This difference in intensity, the affective tone itself, is the 
imperceptible from the point of view of recognition or the common sense workings of the 
faculties. The sign is a sort of limit of the sensible that forces emergence of the transcendental use 
of the faculties. Deleuze writes that, “that which can only be sensed (the sentiendum or the being 
of the sensible) moves the soul, perplexes it—in other words, forces it to pose a problem: as 
thought the object of encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a problem.”169 In what way does it 
raise the problem? The affection enables the unfolding of the problematic field, or the gathering of 
memory. Deleuze writes that “sensibility, forced by the encounter to sense the sentiendum, forces 
memory in its turn to remember the memorandum, that which can only be recalled.”170 As we saw 
in the second section in the study of sensuous signs, involuntary memory intervenes with respect 
to the primary affection. Here, however, it is an inequality in intensity, and not a quality referring 
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to two moments, which triggers the being of the past. The being of the past is central insofar as, at 
its limits, the faculty of memory or memorandum, is no longer separated from what if forgotten. 
The “forgotten thing,” Deleuze writes, “appears in person to the memory which apprehends it.”171 
He goes on to say that, that which has been disguised, or disguises itself in the movement of 
explication, “is no longer a contingent incapacity separating us from a memory which is itself 
contingent: it exists within essential memory as though it were the ‘nth’ power of memory with 
regard to its own limits or to that which can only be recalled.”172 The tracing of the being of the 
past, not only involves that which has been thought in the process of learning, but also presents 
this in a way never seen before. We must remember that the being of the past is a singular time in 
which a differential relation is enveloped. It must be, as Deleuze notes, the always has been seen 
and the never seen, since it is both a life in which we are implicated, but one which always seems 
to escape us. We have already seen how the tracing of the field from one singularity in the field of 
the problem to its adjacent fields all the way to the vicinity of another one, belongs primarily to 
the being of the past explored by the faculty of memory. The being of the past plays a crucial role 
in the recollection of what has been learned, since it is the gathering and tracing of what the 
apprentice had been hitherto thinking. The tracing of the folding of singularities in the adjunct 
fields or centers of envelopment, offer an obscure image of the disconnected solutions of the 
problematic. As we saw in the second chapter, these are the analytic predicates, the learned as 
such, in which the event inheres. This sort of tracing of the line of singularities is itself informed 
by the difference in intensity; each is differentiated from another in intensity, even while each 
repeats the other. These singular events that condition the problem as such, are the “differential 
elements in thought,” the elements of its genesis.173 We also, however, argued that this difference 
in intensity is developed or raises Mnemosyne as a function of an essential ungrounding. Time out 
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of joint here means that the ground itself emerges in being dissolved. At the limit of the faculty of 
memory, emerges that which is unequal to the events of the past. It is this unequal which gives 
way to the cogitandum. Deleuze writes that a “characteristic of transcendental memory is that, in 
turn, it forces thought to grasp that which might be something other than thought […] as though 
this were both the final power of thought and the unthinkable.”174    
Although we have spoken about the faculties in the order that they arise, a linear narrative 
does not inform their use. The being of the past does not merely dissolve because it is exhausted, 
it dissolves because it arises with respect to the empty form of time, or it emerges in being 
ungrounded. This is why Deleuze writes that “an origin assigns a ground only in a world already 
precipitated into universal ungrounding.”175 Or, “beyond the grounded and grounding repetitions, 
[there is] a repetition of ungrounding on which depend both that which enchains and that which 
liberates.”176 It is the future that is itself repeated in each and every singular point composing the 
conditions of the problematic. For Deleuze, the past is born in repeating the future; it can be 
recalled by virtue of an internal differentiation. We have already shown that all of the singular 
points that compose the line are, in retrospect, divergent, and that the entire image is thrown out of 
joint. This disjointing of the image gives birth to the act of thought, because, in light of it, thinking 
is no longer equal to that which it has thought through passively as a working thought, but must 
address itself to that which is to be thought on the basis of the different. This is what it means to 
“engender thinking in thought” or thinking as creation.177 But what is this different? This 
difference, the unequal itself, is the object of encounter which is posed yet again in the being of 
the question. In other words, it is coincides with the being of the question, the questioning 
instance, even if this only arises once we have thought through the field of determinations in a 
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passive way. As we have said, this question for Deleuze is “what difference is there?” Because the 
question addresses itself to thought, it is as though an imperative that implies  
our greatest powerlessness, but also that point of which Maurice Blanchot speaks 
endlessly: that blind, acephalic, aphasic and aleatory original point which designates 
‘the impossibility of thinking that is thought,’ that point at which ‘powerlessness’ is 
transmuted into power, that point which develops in the work in the form of a 
problem.
178
  
 
The question presents the powerlessness of thought (the zero point of thought), that which is 
outside of thought addressing itself to it, but also that chance point when thought makes the 
greatest affirmation, or manages to give birth to the new. According to Deleuze, we manage to 
think something new when we “make something new of repetition itself,” when there is a 
difference made between the repetitions.
179
 It is essentially the question that makes way for the 
highest affirmation, by opening up the way for the selective affirmation (the yes saying). The 
question ‘which one is the being,’ becomes the question, ‘what difference is there,’ in which the 
imperative to repeat generates the act of thought, the differential of thought. Deleuze writes that in 
the reversal of the field thought from the perspective of the caesura, “the frontier or ‘difference’ is 
[…] singularity displaced: it is no longer between the first time and the others, between the 
repeated and the repetition, but between these types of repetition. It is the repetition itself that is 
repeated” in the contemplative thought.180 It is that which is disguised in the second repetition that 
addresses itself to thought, as the outside of thought; Thought-Nature. It is along with this reversal 
of the line that the highest selection is made, the affirmation of the being of becoming in the 
eternal return. From the initial sensibility with respect to the sign, to the question that correlates 
with it, we have the fracturing of the ‘I’ by the empty form of time, the indetermination, on 
account of which thinking emerges. Deleuze argues that “far from being the properties or 
attributes of a thinking substance, the Ideas which derive from the imperatives enter and leave 
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only by the fracture in the ‘I’, which means that another always thinks in me, another who must be 
thought.”181 In other words, thinking does not arise without “becoming something else, something 
that does not think—an animal, a molecule […] that comes back to thought and revives it.”182 
Here we do not think ourselves, but only think in becoming other. 
The act of thought is revisited in The Logic of Sense with the paradox of the actor. In that 
text, Deleuze argues that there is something excessive about the event (the effect which is 
nowhere localizable in the present) that can never be actualized, but must nevertheless become 
accomplished or articulated. In the previous chapter, we mentioned that the present is transformed 
from the perspective of the being of the past. Deleuze now argues that there must be a third 
present pertaining to that which is excessive in the Event: “there must be a third [present], 
pertaining to the Aion. In fact, the instant as paradoxical element or the quasi-cause which runs 
through the straight line must itself be ‘represented’.”183 This third present is introduced in that 
text because, for Deleuze, the part of the Event which is non-actualisable can only be 
accomplished in thought or by thought.
184
 It can only accomplished in thought because thinking is 
invested in the effects of the mixtures of bodies with respect to which it is endlessly born; “the 
incorporeal splendor of the event [is] that entity which addresses itself to thought, and which 
alone may invest it.”185 In other words, thought arises by being coupled to singularities or effects   
in which it is invested, or better yet, thinking arises with the difference of intensity, the unequal, 
the indeterminate, the unformed, with respect to which a new surface of singularities is emitted. 
This time of thinking which happens with time out of joint, the crack of thought, is accomplished 
in the third present, a  
present without thickness, the present of the actor, dancer, or mime—the pure perverse 
‘moment’. It is the present of the pure operation, not of the incorporation [in worlds, 
individuals, and persons]. It is not the present of subversion or actualization, but that 
of the counter-actualization.
186
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The third present puts out of play the present of actualization; it is an interval, a minimal time. As 
we have noted, the events of the past are reviewed from the point of view of the future, even if 
this is not apparent in the tracing of the singular events that compose the problematic field. The 
path that the event traces is “invisible and becomes visible in reverse.”187 The encounter with a 
sign, being that instant that sets off the unfolding of the transcendental field, suspends the 
incorporation of the event in the present. The intensity of the event is embodied by the actor, as 
“the most precise and the most instantaneous, the pure instant at which it divides itself into future 
and past.”188 This is what Deleuze interprets as a “change of the will, a sort of leaping in place 
(saut sur place) of the whole body” in which the “organic will [is exchanged] for a spiritual 
will.”189 The actor, being identical with the quasi-cause, or with the paradoxical instance with 
which it emerges, traces the problematic field as it unfolds with respect to the Aion. Being 
immanent to the flow of the transcendental field, the actor mimes the singular components of the 
Event. We have already highlighted that Deleuze conceives of this tracing as the working thought 
which affirms becoming. However, if the actor is identical with the quasi-cause, the reversal of 
the event in the direction of the future presents us, in turn, with the moment when the mime is 
called upon to become the actor, to begin again once all of the roles have been exhausted. The 
highest affirmation is not found in the repetition of the past to which the mime becomes equal, but 
the point at which the actor is faced with the question: Which one is the being? Or, as Deleuze 
frames this question: What difference is there? Here is the most instantaneous act of thought, as it 
turns about to affirm a being as event, by affirming the being of becoming. This is the highest test 
of the eternal return; the point at which before and after no longer coincide. In the doubled 
affirmation the actor does not affirm the predicate in a universal judgement, but has, instead, 
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learned that what a being is coincides with how that being becomes. This sort of affirmation was 
most appropriately expressed by Spinoza as an active joy or affection embodied by the actor.  
For Deleuze, “either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing 
else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us.”190 Not to be unworthy of what happens to 
us, in the first place, means that we live in such a way as to affirm life, the active affections, and 
secondly, that the will that the quasi-cause creates in us calls for the articulation of the event in the 
form of a problem. Deleuze refers to the actor’s identification with the quasi-cause as humorous 
conformity, because the entirety of the process is produced from the perspective of the caesura 
which disjoins before and after. The event essentially awaits the actor, just as the actor patiently 
awaits the event. The event is the chance opened up to the actor, the actor, in turn, must be 
decisive in the affirmation. This is why, for Deleuze, “becoming the actor of one’s own events,” 
amor fati, “is one with the struggle of free men.”191 The actor does not merely repeat the events of 
the being of the past which make a life in which they are implicated, but thinks the event from the 
perspective of that which is unequal to the past. If the actor brings “about the correspondence of 
the minimum time which can occur in the instant with the maximum time which can be thought in 
accordance with the Aion,” this is precisely because the paradox itself inheres in the highest 
thought; how to become worthy of the event.
192
 With the doubled affirmation, we have the 
affirmation of the being of becoming; the affirmation of the differentiation of beings in which all 
beings return to themselves through the others. If the event of thought involves the greatest 
freedom, this is because the sort of thought that is created in light of the eternal return is one that 
affirms the differentiation of beings; beings taken as events. Although this is not what freedom is, 
in the negative sense, we could also say that beings are freed from utility, purpose, or having to 
coincide with their identity. The eternal return is the eternal truth of beings, their freedom 
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affirmed in the Event; to do away with one’s carnal birth, to “thereby be reborn, to have one more 
birth.”193 This notion of freedom resonates with Heidegger’s writings: “freedom for what is 
opened up in an open region lets beings be the beings they are. Freedom now reveals itself as 
letting beings be.”194 While Deleuze does write in depth about freedom, the notion that what is 
affirmed in the eternal return is the continued becoming of beings, for us, resonates with 
Heidegger’s idea of freedom as letting beings be what they are. Along with Constantin Boundas, 
we are convinced that the problem of freedom (especially the way in which it is linked with the 
dissolution of the subject and object in the eternal return) is an important one to understand 
Deleuze’s philosophy of the future.195 In his piece “Gilles Deleuze and the Problem of Freedom,” 
Boundas writes that “Deleuzian freedom is nothing without the Nietzschean double affirmation of 
the eternal return, in other words, without the repetition and the counter-actualization that makes 
the difference.”196 That freedom is indeed central to the philosophy of the future is evident in the 
first few pages of Difference and Repetition:  
Make something new of repetition itself: connect it with a test, with a selection or 
selective test; make it the supreme object of the will and of freedom. […] [Repetition 
is not a matter of extracting from] it is rather a matter of acting, of making repetition 
as such a novelty; that is a freedom and a task of freedom.
197
  
 
By letting beings be what they are, we are not saying, then, that the actor becomes indifferent or 
that they adapt an attitude of resignation. On the contrary, we are saying that becoming worthy of 
the event, means affirming life in such a way that the art of living, the creation of a life, becomes a 
problem. Deleuze writes that:  
Only the free man, therefore, can comprehend all violence in a single act of violence, 
and every mortal event in a single Event, which no longer makes room for the 
accident, and which denounces and removes the power of ressentiment within the 
individual as well as the power of oppression within society. […] It is this mobile and 
precise point, where all events gather together in one that transmutation happens: this 
is the point at which death turns against death; where dying is the negation of death, 
and the impersonality of dying no longer indicates only the moment when I disappear 
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outside of myself, but rather the moment when death loses itself in itself, and also the 
figure which the most singular life takes on in order to substitute itself for me.
198
  
 
It is in this sense that the singular events of a life create a vocation that is not delimited to what is 
most personal in a life. For Deleuze, it is a matter of becoming a cosmic ego, a citizen of the 
world, or making the affirmation that is affirmed of all beings, which participate in one and the 
same Event.  
Speaking the Event 
 
Throughout this chapter we have shown that learning involves making a life, and that this 
singular life produces a problem proper to it, the problem of the art of living. We have already 
discussed how propositions, as solutions to a problem, are produced in relation to what Deleuze 
calls “extra-propositional genetic elements.”199 So as to turn to the other line of articulation, we 
have argued that the event must somehow become accomplished. The second type of articulation, 
the one in which the actual is counter-actualized, involves the creation of the means of expression 
in which the problem is expressed. We will return to the creation of a new type of enunciation in a 
moment. Here, it bears repeating that, for Deleuze, sense is essentially extra-propositional, 
meaning that it cannot be actualized in the solutions that it gives way to; the solution-instance 
differs from the problem-instance. “The mode of the event,” he writes, “is the problematic. One 
must not say that there are problematic events, but that events bear exclusively upon problems and 
define their conditions.”200 Deleuze distinguishes the problem from solutions, because we cannot 
do away with the problem in the solutions. The solution in the propositional mode presents us 
with the instance of the acquisition of knowledge, but the problem itself persists in spite of it. This 
is because the problem defined properly does not concern the acquisition of knowledge, what we 
are concerned with in the problem-instance is the art of living, which, as we have seen thus far, is 
expressed in the infinitive as a becoming. The act of enunciating, likewise, cannot resolve the 
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problem once and for all, even if it is in a strange conformity with it; in other words, there isn’t 
anything that bridges the learned and the action itself, or the thought and thinking for us. Just as 
the problem is disguised in the solutions, the act of enunciation is not some sort of a calculative 
move on the part of the thinker that would produce the result. This is precisely why, for Deleuze, 
the task of the thinker is not inspired by knowing, but involves inventing new possibilities of life 
or what he alternatively understands as belief in the world. “It may be that to believe in this world, 
in this life, has become our most difficult task, the task of a mode of existence to be discovered on 
our plane of immanence today.”201 To believe in the world consist of creating modes of existence 
that are affirmative: “It is to say yes to what is singular yet impersonal in living; and that one must 
believe in the world and not in the fictions of God or the self.” 202  
The articulation of a becoming is an act in which we create or invent new possibilities of a 
life. But what is this articulation of this becoming in the infinitive a response to? In the first place, 
for Deleuze, the infinitive is the expression of being in that being is Voice, that it expresses itself 
in the verb: “The Verb is the univocity of language, in the form of an undetermined infinitive, 
without person, without present, without any diversity of voice. It is poetry itself. As it expresses 
in language all events in one, the infinitive verb expresses the event of language.”203 Why claim 
that the univocal being is poetry itself? In “An Unrecognized Precursor to Heidegger” Deleuze 
arrives at the argument that this poetic conception of language injected in the current language, 
generates  
a kind of foot stomping, a stammering, an obsessional tom-tom, like a repetition that 
never ceases to create something new. Under the impulse of the affect [of such a 
language], our language is set whirling, and in whirling it forms a language of the 
future, as if it were a foreign language, an eternal reiteration, but one that leaps and 
jumps.
204
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The discourse of being is this language of eternal reiteration, of the repetition of difference. By 
approaching articulations of the event in this sense, language itself, for Deleuze, becomes a Sign 
able to give way to “the Thing in its muteness—vision [becoming is vision]. The thing is the limit 
of language, as the sign is the language of the thing [or] the Sign shows the Thing.”205 We will 
briefly return to the relationship of these two languages in a moment. Here we want to highlight 
that this is a way of responding to the central question we laid out the introduction and developed 
in the course of laying out our problem: What does it mean to speak “for” another if the other is to 
be affirmed as event, and if all others are grasped as events? We posed this question because one 
and the same Event allows us to affirm the singular sense of a becoming, and all becoming as 
inter-expressive, or as said in the same sense (univocal being).
206
 On a more basic level, with this 
question we have begun from the premise that speaking itself always involves another, is either a 
relation with another, or works to invent a new relation with another by approaching another as 
event. Deleuze and Guattari take up this question when writing the following in What is 
Philosophy?:  
Artaud said: to write for the illiterate—to speak for the aphasic, to think for the 
acephalous. But what does ‘for’ mean? It is not ‘for their benefit’ or yet ‘in their 
place.’ It is ‘before’. It is a question of becoming. The thinker is not acephalic, 
aphasic, or illiterate, but becomes so. […] We think and write for animals themselves. 
We become animal so that the animal also becomes something else. […] Becoming is 
always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes the people to come and 
the new earth. The philosopher must become the nonphilosopher so that 
nonphilosophy becomes the earth and people of philosophy.
207
  
 
The philosopher must become the non-philosopher, must become something else, so that 
something else is created through him or her; the philosopher, the thinker, must become the artist. 
We have already discussed how the thinker is coupled to that which does not think, that which 
speaks without speaking; these are the affections that compose a differential relation. It is through 
these affections that the authors conceive of double becoming. The thinker doubles the surface, 
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the mirror, in which another is reflected as a condensation of singularities.
208
 One extracts the pure 
event from becoming, and articulates this event, so that that which they are in relation to becomes 
another, just as they become another. As we pointed out in chapter 1, such articulation involves 
two things: it involves a critique of knowledge as a critique of modes of living that diminish life, 
and the creation or invention of new modes of life. In “Literature and Life” Deleuze argues that:  
Writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being 
formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience. Writing is 
inseparable from becoming: in writing, one becomes-woman, becomes-animal or –
vegetable, becomes-molecule, to the point of becoming-imperceptible. […] To 
become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find a point of 
proximity, indiscernibility, or undifferentiation, where one can no longer be 
distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule.
209
  
 
We do not write for ourselves, we write for others. This writing is not about another, on behalf of, 
or in their place, so that we may impose a form on a being, so that we may represent it, or instruct 
others about it. Writing in a style that displaces such limits when equivalent to a becoming, opens 
up a world in which the Thing becomes a sign or affection doubling becoming. 
The resoluteness to express the event, the affirmation that invests the thinker with the 
capacity to act, is first and foremost not a philosophical activity, for us, it is an ethical position. 
Deleuze finds this articulation in painting, cinema, and literature. With respect to literature, it is a 
matter of producing a new style of expression in a dominant language. Great writers, Deleuze 
argues, make a minor use of language, “they minorize this language, much as in music, where the 
minor mode refers to dynamic combinations in perpetual disequilibrium. [...] This exceeds the 
possibilities of speech and attains the power of language, or even of language in its entirely.”210 In 
the minor mode, it is not a matter of addressing those “who are already there, awaiting their 
becoming conscious,” instead it is a matter of expressing blocks of sensations or pure affects, 
anticipating what, together with Guattari, he calls minority or non-human becoming(s).
211
 If our 
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aim is to render the existence of something visible in a new light, then, what is at issue is the 
becoming-other of the subject, or, as Daniel Smith notes, its de-subjectivation. To carry language 
to its limit so that it falls silent giving way to the outside of language, would be a becoming-minor 
of a major language.
212
 It is here that words themselves become “pure visions, but visions that are 
still related to language in that they constitute an ultimate aim, an outside, an inverse” of 
language.
213
 This is what it means to become a foreigner in one’s language, to speak with an 
accent. As Deleuze notes, the style of expression “isn’t just an aesthetic matter, its [a matter of] 
ethics.”214 Nevertheless, the enunciation itself in which we create new ways of living, or 
becoming in relation to a problem, is, for Deleuze and Guattari, the ultimate task of philosophy. In 
What is Philosophy?, the two argue that “the concept speaks the event, not the essence or the 
thing—pure Event, a hecceity, an entity: the event of [another] or of the face (when, in turn, the 
face is taken as concept).”215 The concept does not exist a priori, it is not somehow discovered or 
unearthed, but must be created in relation to a problem: “all concepts are connected to problems 
without which they would have no meaning.”216 Or alternatively, the concept “is the event as pure 
sense that immediately runs through [its] components.”217 According to Deleuze and Guattari, the 
concept is distinguished from the proposition, because the concept itself has a becoming; it creates 
this becoming in the infinitive. The absolute survey of the plane of immanence, the ontology of 
the concept, pertains to the infinite speed of thought, or its self-positing; the becoming of thought. 
The relative becoming of concepts refers to the pedagogy of the concept, the way in which a 
concept along with its components or intensive features is created to resolve a problem. The 
resolution of a problem, expressed in the creation of a constellation of concepts, each traversing 
the other and transforming it, is the event expressed in philosophy.  
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The question that remains is in what way does a style of articulation create new modes of 
existence, or affirm in existence that which does not have existence. This question is relevant, 
since the concept speaks the counter-actualized event; the event as becoming, severed from the 
actual. Earlier we argued that the Event disjoins before and after. This disjointing does not merely 
pertain to the becoming with respect to the caesura, but pertains to the relationship of becoming to 
history. The event as a lived problem not only requires an articulation of a new way of living, but 
it also calls for a critique of evaluations that hinder life. We already suggested that the lived 
problem expressed in the infinitive, to play, opens up a critique of modes of evaluation that reduce 
beings to categories of knowledge in which they are conceived in accordance with a usefulness, 
utility or purpose; in which they are made to coincide with the identity we bestow upon them. 
Philosophy, then, according to Deleuze must find a place not only for the becoming expressed in 
the infinitive, the dice-thrower, but also for the idiot, the tyrant, the priest, god, the friend, the 
animal, and other conceptual personae that act out the theatre of events. Or better yet, conceptual 
personae “are thinkers, solely thinkers, and their personalized features are closely linked to the 
diagrammatic features of thought and the intensive features of concepts. A particular conceptual 
persona, who perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us.”218 The conceptual personae are 
intrinsic to the act of thought; they arise along with it as the multiplicity of views engrossed in a 
thought. Again, these personae are not found in states of affairs, in History, but are articulated in 
relation to a problematic field in its becoming. The thinker “wrests them from both the historical 
state of affairs of a society and the lived experience of individuals, in order to turn them into the 
features of conceptual personae, or thought-events on the plane laid out by thought or under the 
concept it creates.”219 In other words, while the event is itself a becoming, the critique of 
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evaluation has some sort of a relationship with the states of affairs. What is this relationship? 
Deleuze and Guattari write that  
history today still designates only the set of conditions, however recent they may be, 
from which one turns away in order to become […]. Without history, becoming would 
remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not historical. Psychological 
types belong to history but conceptual personae belong to becoming. The event itself 
needs becoming as an unhistorical element.
220
  
 
The event is extracted from the states of affairs as a becoming, or it is better to say that, the event 
opens up a region of being that is unhistorical. Its paradox is that it is “born in History […] but is 
not of it.”221 While History, even personal history, captures the actualization of events, events 
pertain to something which ultimately flees from History, so as to transform it by bringing about 
the new; the third present as the never finished with future of thought.
222
 The conceptual personae 
have a bearing on their time, but they are nevertheless an invention that articulates a problem. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the thinker extracts the pure event in order to act “counter to 
the past, and therefore on the present for the benefit, let us hope, of a future—but the future is not 
a historical future, not even a utopian history, it is the infinite Now.”223 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Deleuze says something interesting about philosophical activity that should remain with us: 
“A philosophical theory is an elaborately developed question, and nothing else; by itself and in 
itself, it is not the resolution to a problem, but the elaboration, to the very end, of the necessary 
implications of a formulated question.”1 We began this dissertation with the question, what does 
it mean to speak “for” another, because we wanted to underline that speaking is itself an ethical 
act that already always presupposes a relation with another being. Rather than asking what is x in 
the traditional sense, we set out to explore how something new is expressed of beings, in the 
course of which the question, what is x, is itself overcome. In the course of our study, we have 
asserted that the way in which something becomes is what that being in effect is, or as Deleuze 
would put it after Nietzsche, the becoming of beings is their future possibility of becoming-other 
or different, with the how pertaining to their relation to time. With the study of Spinoza in the 
introductory chapter, we were able to show how beings implicate being in their becoming; how it 
is that by having an adequate idea of the principle of production of all essences, we not only 
know our own, but manage to understand how all essences are comprised in being. By turning to 
Deleuze’s Nietzsche, we placed the emphasis on the way in which the eternal return displaces the 
traditional conception of being, in order to affirm the being of becoming, which is the repetition 
of difference itself. To begin with, this was in an effort to demonstrate how the simulated sense 
expressed of a singular becoming is dependent upon the ontological sense. Deleuze’s study of 
the doubled affirmation in Nietzsche’s thought, for us, however, gets at the heart of a 
problematic that we have explored in this study, that of the doubling of the line of articulation, or 
the two pathways of articulation.  
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 The turning of the line of articulation, as Deleuze conceived of it in Bergsonism, always 
begins in an encounter with a sign that corresponds to a questioning instance. A sign can be 
thought of as either emitted by actual beings and tied to the present, or, as pointing to the turning 
of the line of articulation, to that perplexing encounter in which the Aion, at the edge of the 
present, perpetually puts it out of play. A sign is indeed effect or affection, but this affection 
supposes a change in the repetition of the encounter with another, a change that sets off the 
search or remembrance of things past. But this is only because the sign corresponds to a 
questioning instance that lends itself to the search: What difference is there? With the 
coincidence of the two, we have the most brilliant effect, the unfolding of the line of the Aion. 
What is this line? We have explored this line in several ways. We began with Deleuze’s 
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, in which this line was initially viewed as the affections or 
modifications of substance. These affections are the occasions for the re-expression of substance 
in the modes through the attributes as a degree of power of existing, or capacity to act. We 
argued that if a mode should exercise its capacity of affection in an active sense, then, its force of 
existing would show itself as equivalent to its essence. The third type of knowledge arises when 
a mode is overcome with active affections, and combines these affections with the 
understanding. In the third type of knowledge, a being is able to form, not only an idea of one’s 
own essence, but to know how another essence is involved in the expression of its own, by 
having an adequate idea of substance as the cause. For Deleuze, however, it still seemed as 
though substance was independent of the modes, that the “modes are dependent on substance, 
but as though on something other than themselves.”2 According to him, being must be said of 
becoming, it does not imply anything more, while becoming itself, though not dependent on 
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actual beings for its being, must, nevertheless, solely pertain to their becoming. This minimal 
ontological proposition sends shockwaves across the line; the line takes on another face.   
With the study of Nietzsche and Philosophy we wanted to explore how this line of 
becoming does not in any sense imply a power relation, but the will to power, which is a certain 
vitalism, a primitive affection for Deleuze. Here is where he will begin to conceive of the line as 
consisting of degrees of being or quantitative differences in the place of qualities. For Deleuze, 
the will to power has a special relationship with the eternal return. It is the chance point, the 
question corresponding to the sign, that gathers the degrees of being in a constellation, or as 
Nietzsche wrote, it “forces even chance events to dance in a stellar formation.”3 The continuous 
variations of the constellation of being, is attributed to the chance point that traces the entirety of 
the line. After having reviewed the Stoic bond of event-effects which are gathered upon this line, 
we turned to the study of what Bergson called the virtual in the third chapter. It was our aim to 
demonstrate that these chance events, which are gathered upon the line, become the tracing of 
the being of the past. The primary encounter with a sign, the affection itself, awakens 
Mnemosyne. What are these events that are gathered upon the line as the ground of beings? 
From the perspective of the being of the past, these are memories of the constitution of the in-
between of beings, that which is exchanged in the repetitious encounters of beings. In light of 
Spinoza-Nietzsche, we can say that they are that which is affirmative of a relation, or that which 
(re)makes the becoming of the relation as such. We traced this line of virtual past events many 
times over, demonstrating that from one sheet of the past to the next, the being of the past splits 
off into adjacent fields, which are former actualizations of events. The repetition of the line in 
itself, however, is a repetition of the different levels of the past. It has not yet been raised to the 
third repetition in which the entirety of the line is adequate to difference from the perspective of 
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which it emerges. By tracing the constellation of events many times over, we showed that this 
constellation becomes exhausted in one direction; it becomes a freeze-frame, or comes to a 
relative limit. At this limit, a simulated sense becomes articulable, which is the total effect of the 
becoming itself—the determined infinitive expressed in the proposition as verb. This is what we 
referred to with respect to Nietzsche and Philosophy as the principal affirmation. It is not us who 
make the sense. Instead, it is the singular becoming that makes the sense, allowing itself to be 
articulated in the propositional mode. We say that becoming says itself, that it expresses itself, 
precisely because what is expressed does not come from the one that articulates it. How does one 
speak “for” that which does not speak? As Deleuze argues, it is a matter of becoming.   
The tracing of the being of the past in its passivity produces a working thought, a thought 
of that which we have been hitherto thinking, that which thought has been addressed to. This 
working thought has as its result the sense which becomes the expressed of the proposition and 
attributed to states of affairs. Our efforts in the second chapter were directed at showing that the 
event has a special relationship to language; that it is the essence of events to become expressed 
in language. The bond of effects of mixtures of bodies, explored in light of the Stoic distinction 
of corporeal and incorporeal entities, form the surface of sense that dis/joins the two series 
mentioned, that of the proposition and states of affairs. We then dealt with the intricacies of the 
expressed as the fourth dimension of the proposition so as to sever it from signification. Our aim 
was to demonstrate that sense is not the general concept, neither can it be expressed in the form 
of the function which is realized in particular cases. This was a way of saying that sense always 
arises as something new, as something singular, which cannot be subsumed in modes of 
recognition. Indeed, sense as produced from the perspective of nonsense or paradox, displaces 
common sense and good sense. It displaces good sense and common sense by displacing the one-
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directionality of sense. In relation to nonsense, sense is always what is said of states of affairs, as 
sense is perpetually becoming in the other direction. As was noted, language is “endlessly born 
in the future direction of the Aion where it is established, and somehow, anticipated; and 
although it must also say the past, it says it as the past of the states of affairs, which go on 
appearing and disappearing in the other direction.”4 This idea became more pertinent as we went 
on to consider the static ontological genesis by shifting from the sterility of sense to its genesis. 
In that section we showed how sense as the verb is expressed in the individual as predicate, but 
that for the individual indeed to actualize this predicate, it is as thought the individual must 
become suspended, differentiated, metamorphosed. In other words, while the sense appears to be 
imprisoned in the predicate, it is likewise that which opens up the individual to its virtual half 
which is pre-individual. From the perspective of the virtual, the sense expressed is the expression 
of the becoming of beings, which amounts to saying that sense is continuously weaved in the 
direction of the future in which the coherence of subject and object is simultaneously dissolved. 
This dissolution is part of the effect itself which they both individuate.      
This movement in the future direction of the Aion opens up the space for the ‘long error’, 
which is the equation of this sense with signification. The turning of the line of articulation with 
respect to the appropriation of sense as signification, gives way to the negative. With our short 
study of Hegel, we demonstrated how Deleuze distinguishes himself from the doubling of 
negation. For him, the turning does not express a contradiction or its resolution in a higher 
instance of grounding. Rather, it corresponds with the question, what difference is there, which 
allows us to raise the second repetition to the level of the third in the eternal return. Deleuze 
argues that the eternal return is  
opposed to the coherence of representation; it excludes both the coherence of a 
subject which represents itself and that of an object represented. Re-petition opposes 
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re-presentation: the prefix changes its meaning, since in the one case difference is 
said only in relation to the identical, while in the other it is the univocal which is said 
of the different. Repetition is the formless being of all differences, the formless 
power of the ground which carries every object to that extreme ‘form’ in which its 
representation comes undone.
5
  
 
We repeated this gesture in our study of Husserl in order to further demonstrate that the dividing 
line in philosophy is between those who interpret sense as abiding with models of recognition, 
and those who determine sense as co-present to paradox. Deleuze’s basic problem with the 
Husserl is that Husserl’s genesis is a “rationalized caricature of a true genesis.”6 By exploring 
how Husserl’s stream of consciousness unfolds with the weaving together of the components of 
the noema and noesis, we wanted to show how he arrives at the two leveled predicative process; 
the explication and the apprehension of the content of the noema. The key critique of the two 
leveled process outlined was that Husserl must reduce sense to predictive generality in order to 
show how such sense is the same objective something intended to in consciousness by every ego, 
or that it is the common form in every act of judgement. In other words, he must render the 
something x in the noema capable of supporting the unification in the noesis. This sort of critique 
of Husserl becomes possible with Sartre’s paper on “The Transcendence of the Ego,” in which 
Sartre accuses Husserl of explicating more than he knows, in other words, of having doubled the 
stream of consciousness with the ego. The conclusion in our review of that essay is that Husserl 
had not adequately performed the phenomenological reduction on both sides of the stream; by 
both sides we mean the subject and the object. The question then became: If consciousness is 
essentially pre-individual and impersonal, how are thought and events linked in Deleuze’s 
philosophy? We turned to this question in the last two chapters.  
In the third chapter, we turned in the other direction; we moved towards the virtual, rather 
than away from it. The response to the question, which way to go, away or towards the virtual, 
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marked the moment of this turning when time comes out of joint. In tracing the being of the past, 
we wanted to show that the ground is essentially raised from the perspective of the future, and 
that what is repeated in it once the line reverses itself is the third repetition itself. With the 
reversal the line because otherwise. Difference shows itself as having been disguised in the 
events of the past, which, for us, amount to the difference already in process of being made. It 
was there all along as that which raises the ground. This is precisely why continuity and moment, 
the form and the abyss, are both affirmed in Deleuze’s philosophy. The continuity of becoming 
arises as a function of the eternal return, or the third synthesis of the future. The future is that 
which, then, dissolves the ground, expels the agent of the working thought that has become equal 
to the past, suspends the appropriation of the sense in the proposition, all so as to raise thought to 
the highest instance; thought becoming the most powerful affection, and a life of learning 
becoming the greatest vocation. We left off the third chapter with the notion that time out of joint 
produces the fissure of the subject, its splintering, which is the condition of thought. In other 
words, thinking requires this suspension of the subject, the ego consciousness, in order to 
emerge. We then turned to Deleuze’s theory of learning in order to repeat the entirety of the 
process from the perspective of encounters with signs. The central idea in this theory of learning, 
the idea that animates the new Meno, is that learning is oriented towards the future, or it is 
concerned with the empty form of time. By tracing how the sign and the question coincide, 
prompting the apprentice to unfold a surface or problem (which is the determination of the 
infinitive) we showed how learning involves the linking of difference with difference, singularity 
with singularity, in the repetition of encounters. Now, this questioning which is synonymous 
with the time out of joint that seeks after the ground in which it makes the difference, is also 
considered by Deleuze as the zero point of thought, its powerlessness, from which the act of 
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thought emerges. While the tracing of the ground involves a certain passivity, the crack of 
thought, the turning itself with the question, pertains to the inventiveness of thought; to make 
something new of repetition. This doubling is not like Husserl’s act of judgement in the 
predicative process. It is, instead, an articulation of the event with respect to what is excessive in 
it. To counter-actualize the event, in the first place requires that we maintain the paradoxical 
nature of this Event of thought, rather than subsuming it in modes of recognition. Becoming 
worthy of the event, becoming worthy of a life of learning, a problem that is most intimate to our 
life, but at the same time, one that involves an affirmation that affirms all of beings in one and 
the same Event, call upon us to not only pose the question, what does it mean to speak “for” 
another, but to abide by the humorous conformity of the Event. The third present of action means 
to never be done with the Event. The idea that the action is always awaiting with respect to what 
is excessive, does not mean that it can somehow be delayed for another time, but that we are 
never finished with it.  
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Introduction: The Question of Sense 
 
1
 Marc Froment-Meurice quoted in Nancy’s The Sense of the World. trans. Jeffrey Liberett (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1997) p. 76 emphasis added 
2
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